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I am in the process of researching and writing a (long) piece on the story of how Australia came within a hair’s breadth of introducing compulsory ID cards in 1987, which will be posted either here or to my own blog in the next couple of days. However, while researching this, I ran the following 1986 quotation from then Australian (Labor) Health minister Dr Neal Blewett, who was in charge of the ID card plan at the time.
… we shouldn’t get too hung up as socialists on privacy because privacy, in many ways is a bourgeois right that is very much associated with the right to private property.
Yes, that’s right. This was meant as an argument in favour of ID cards.
On the issue of the (ultimately defeated) proposal for ID cards in Australia, I strongly recommend this article, which was written at the time and gives a thorough overview of what happened. The early stages of the then Australian government’s efforts to introduce the card seem eerily similar to anyone who has been watching the recent efforts of the British government. The later stages – a long drawn out battle on the part of the government to pass the enabling legislation which was blocked by the Australian senate, rising opposition to the scheme as the public learned more and more about the proposal and eventually a defeat for the government due to flaws in the drafting of the legislation – are much less likely here due to the lack of the strong bicameral system, sadly.
That said, the lesson that the more that is known about such proposals the less the public like them is surely an important one. In Britain, we really need to get the message out as fast and as comprehensively as possible. The other encouraging thing about the Australian example is that by the end of the fight the public was so against the idea that no Australian government has even dreamed of suggesting an ID card since, and none will any time soon. (This hasn’t prevented the government constructing extensive databases of information on its citizens, however).
I’m afraid I don’t have a link for this – the FT’s web-site wouldn’t let me find the story. One of their columnists suggested a way to beat spam: this is roughly the gist:
Each ISP identifies mail addressed to more than, say, 100 receipients. An employee retained for the purpose glances at the mail, and accepts or rejects the mail. This should be relatively easy, as most spam is readily spotted, compared to mailing list entries, etc.
The employee reviews, say, 1 a minute, for 7 hours a day, stopping 60 * 7 * 100 = 42,000 pieces of spam a day. Over a 200 day working year, and at a salary of say £20,000, that works out at about a quarter of a penny per spam stopped.
The author went on to suggest given the global volume of spam, only a couple of people would be needed to stop it all. This seems fallacious, as EACH ISP would need to employee their own blockers.
I think most people reading this site would see the implications for privacy – ISPs would (perhaps be legally required to) read any mail sent to large numbers of individuals. This is not something I’d look forward to.
Hopefully, the idea will die the death of a thousand rapidly knocked up columns, but it’s worrying that privacy didn’t even strike the writer (or his editor) as an issue. Particularly as, once the proposal had been brought in, there would be a natural pressure to reduce the number of receipients that “triggered” checking. Spammers would drop the size of their mailings, and so the checkers would have to look at an ever higher proportion of mails to have any effect.
At the advanced age of 41 I have some pretty old fashioned ideas. One of these is an absolute belief in the importance of personal privacy.
Invading the privacy of celebrities is a long-standing media tradition and one could argue they deserve it. The danger is when ordinary individuals start to lose their privacy – and welcome that loss.
It probably started with US daytime TV shows of the Oprah variety. Being “on TV” was so important for people that they were willing to share their most personal secrets with the world. As these shows spread and multiplied, hanging one’s dirty linen out in public started to become a goal in life for some. Privacy was willingly sold for a few minutes of fame.
Reality TV shows took this a stage further. People became used to the idea that privacy was something so unimportant that it could be given up in the name of entertainment. Big Brother worked initially because it was new and shocking; now it is commonplace. Most of the “contestants” are canny enough to know they’re playing to the cameras. The danger is the viewing public who come to accept the whole concept as a harmless bit of fun.
These attitudes spread throughout society as a whole. Michael Jennings wrote an interesting piece about bag searches in Australia. We don’t have those here without probable cause, however we almost got to the stage where they were unnecessary. A while back there was a fad for using transparent carrier bags and rucksacks so that the whole world could see your baggage. Even that most sacred of receptacles the woman’s handbag was being exposed to all.
Why does this matter? What dirty secrets am I trying to hide?
Privacy is essential for individuality and diversity. Lack of privacy makes it more difficult to be “different”, it drives people towards uniformity and conformity. If “no privacy” becomes the norm then those of us who insist on privacy will be automatically branded as “suspicious”.
Lack of privacy leads to a bland, safe, boring world. No colours, just shades of grey. A stagnant society that is easily led – and easily sold to. A perfect world for government and big business.
Which is one reason I’m vehemently against compulsory National Identity Cards. People say “if you’re innocent you’ve nothing to fear”. I fear loss of privacy. Where I go and what I do is not illegal, it’s just no business of the police, the government or anyone else.
I don’t want Big Blunkett watching me.
Cross-posted from An It Harm None
The Telegraph reports:
A woman who was strip-searched when she went to visit her son in jail asked five law lords yesterday to create a new law of personal privacy. Lawyers for Mary Wainwright, 49, from Leeds, hope the House of Lords will overturn decisions by lower courts that there is no right to privacy in English common law.
Mrs Wainwright visited her elder son Patrick at Armley Prison, Leeds, in January 1997. She was accompanied by her younger son, Alan, who suffers from cerebral palsy with a degree of mental impairment. Before the visit could go ahead, Mrs Wainwright and Alan were strip-searched for concealed drugs. The searches were more intrusive than was permitted by prison guidelines.
A judge in Leeds decided that their privacy had been infringed but this ruling was overturned by the Court of Appeal in December 2001. Three judges, headed by the Lord Chief Justice, held that there was no right to personal privacy in English law.
Reason’s Hit and Run blog links to this article in the Washington Post about companies who promise not to sell information about you. And they keep their promise. They don’t. They rent it instead.
Original link here.
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If you walk into a large store of virtually any kind in Australia, you will see a sign just outside the door saying. “It is a condition of entry to this story that customers allow us to inspect the contents of their bags on leaving the shop”. Typically, when you leave the shop, there is a security guard outside the door who asks to inspect the contents of your bag. Virtually all customers open their bag, the guard looks inside the bag, and then the customers go on their way.
When growing up in Australia, I simply thought that this was the natural order of things. I never really thought about this as a violation of my privacy until I spent some time living in England in the 1990s. In England, such searches do not occur, presumably because either the British interpretation of the law is that they are not legal or the law is different. (I think that we are likely dealing different interpretations of the same common law here). When I returned to Australia, I suddenly became much more aware of bag searches in stores than had been the case before. And I became much more protective of my rights. I found that I was very unwilling to let anyone look in whatever bags I might be carrying.
Legally, the case for allowing such bag searches is flimsy. Without probable cause (which in practice usually means someone will have to have seen you take something off the shelf of the shop and put it in your bag) the shop has no right to detain you or to look in your bag. However, they can ask to look in your bag. You then have the right to refuse. If you refuse the shop can then ask you to not come back to the shop again, but they have no way of actually compelling you to open your bag for them.
→ Continue reading: Bag searches in Australian stores
In commemoration of Orwell’s 100th birthday, Neuromancer author William Gibson had an op-ed piece in Wednesday’s New York Times, in which he discussed Orwell’s vision, and how it was influenced by its time. In particular, Gibson believes that Orwell’s vision was influenced by the broadcast nature of the media at the time: radio and the nascent invention of television were highly centralised.
The surveillance scheme (and the totalitarian states) envisioned in 1984 were centralised in the same way, from some giant central security apparatus. Gibson believes that today’s world, and the world of the future, is different. Greater surveillance will be mixed with much greater freedom of information. People with access to all this new information will consist of many non-state as well as state actors. We will live in a world with much less privacy, but not necessarily much less freedom.
Surveillance states without this fancy new technology were pretty effective, and still are pretty effective in places (from North Korea to Burma to Cuba) where old technological paradigms still apply. Would these states have been more oppressive if the people runing them had PCs? It’s hard to say. Would the presence of PCs in the security apparatus in East Germany rather than mountains of paper records have prevented the end of European communism? It’s doubtful. Changing surveillance technology is taking us somewhere new, it may be that the vision of Orwell provides a good guide as to what it is.
After quickly observing that Gibson sounds rather like Brian Micklethwait, I will observe that Gibson is at least partly right. The greater freedom of information that results from many to many communications networks changes things dramatically. We saw glimpses of this in the 1980s with the invention of the fax machine, which more or less removed the mass media’s ability to bury a story that the people were not supposed to know about. (The key story was something tawdry: a transcipt allegedly of the Prince of Wales talking to his mistress). This reached every office in London seemingly in minutes. The media and hence the courts could no longer supress things like that. With the invention of e-mail and SMS text messaging, such communications became more ubiquitous, and no longer tied to the home or office.
We are suddenly in a world where a great deal of information is being collected on us and transmitted to other places, and yet at the same time, we are collecting a lot of information on ourselves, and transmitting it voluntarily, and to some extent this controls the flow. Much of this information is and will continue to be cultural rather than political in content. Like Brian, I am fascinated by this phenomenon, which can also be for the good. Due largely to the use of SMS messaging, the Chinese government this year completely failed to keep information secret about the spread of the SARS virus in China. People throughout the country knew far more about what was going on than the government wanted them to know. The Chinese government now seems to know that it cannot keep things secret like this any more, and as today’s Economist discusses, the consequences could be profound. → Continue reading: William Gibson on Orwell and the surveillance state.
An observant reader told us of what he saw in Bristol when staying at a hotel there last weekend. A notice in the Travel Inn proclaims words to the following effect:
In order to comply with police requests and to improve security, all guests paying for their rooms in cash will be required to provide ID and proof of address.
Our gentle reader’s reaction?
You WHAT?!….So, if I refuse to provide you with information you have no right to, I don’t get my room. If I do, you… Do what with it, precisely? Pass it on to the police as a “potential terrorist”? Breach my personal privacy for your own amusement? Send me incessant advertising garbage? Store it in contravention with the Data Protection Act?
Can you tell he was not impressed?
This is a well spotted ‘minor’ occurrence. No police state can maintain its hold over society without its little helpers, who function, not exactly as the hand of the state, but certainly its ‘dainty’ prying and sticky fingers, deep in the everyday life of those around them. They exist in every society and although Britain is not a police state, I would not want to underestimate their reach, especially given the current government policies in the UK. Big Brother seems to have many cousins…
Guardian argues that the key question about ID cards is not whether we have to carry them but what will be on the national database:
Now it is about how much information the government has on each of us, what the authorities want to do with it, and what rights are lost by those who don’t have what is, after all, officially being called an “entitlement” card. The real dangers now are over “function creep” and what will happen to a new cardless underclass who could be called the sans plastiques – a new British cousin for the French sans papiers.
Already function creep is beginning to surface, even though the cabinet is only now getting down to discussing the fine detail of the legislation to be introduced this autumn. In fact, as Blunkett’s white paper last July made clear, the proposal is really about setting up the first national central database of all people over 16, including foreign nationals, who are legally resident in Britain. It is this register, and not the bit of plastic in our wallet, that causes the real anxiety.
The white paper makes clear that one of the aims of the scheme is to “establish for official purposes a person’s identity so that there is one definitive record which all government departments can use if they wish”.
Some commenters have already complained about the bovine and passive nature of the British public, so this should just confirm their views:
The real problem is that we are only too willing to sell our privacy cheap. We will happily give a supermarket our entire personal lifestyle profile simply to get a plastic loyalty card. We are going to help the government create an immensely powerful personal database on each of us, not because of some damnable Whitehall conspiracy but because we couldn’t wait to get our hands on a new piece of plastic.
Also, an earlier Observer article calls for outright abandonment of the whole idea of identity cards:
The arguments against are clear and unchanging. Identity cards create new crimes and criminals while being blunt and ineffectual weapons against fraud and identity theft. They are expensive (Mr Blunkett bypasses Treasury objections only by suggesting we pay £25 for the privilege of holding records of our own fingerprints). Above all, a regime of ID cards, whether kept in a drawer or carried on our person, will create new tensions between police and ethnic minority communities, undoing much positive progress. The divisive ‘sus’ laws will be back with a vengeance.
The Home Secretary hopes to bring forward legislation after a general election. We hope the Cabinet will change his mind.
Criminals carrying fake or stolen documents — such as passports and driving licences — will face up two years in jail under the new law. Home Office Minister Beverley Hughes will tell a conference in London entitled Combating Identity Fraud today:
This new offence will enable the police to crack down hard on criminals involved in identity fraud. False identities are commonly used by those engaged in organised crime and terrorism. The new offence would provide the police with the means to disrupt the activities of organised criminals and terrorists in the early stages of their crimes.
The Home Office Minister added the legislation was not solely targeted at organised crime and terrorism.
Phil Zimmermann, the man who in the early 90s developed the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) encryption product, believes that Moore’s Law and surveillance cameras make for a particularly dangerous cocktail, as reported by ZDNet.
Moore’s Law represents a “blind force” that is fuelling an undirected technology escalation, referring to what he sees as the threat to privacy from the increased use of surveillance cameras.
The human population does not double every 18 months but its ability to use computers to keep track of us does. You can’t encrypt your face.
Zimmerman sees surveillance as the biggest threat to civil liberties and nowhere, he believes, is this more egregious than in the UK.
You have millions of CCTV cameras here. Every citizen is monitored, and this creates pressure to adhere to conformist behaviour. The original purpose of cameras was to catch terrorists, but to my knowledge they haven’t caught many terrorists using cameras.
Another problem with using technology for surveillance according to Zimmermann is that while laws that are brought in during times of a perceived increase in threats to national security, they can be relatively easily repealed. I find it hard to believe that anything can be more inert and irrepealable than laws but his point about technology still holds:
The technology market doesn’t work that way. It has more inertia, and is more insidious. When you put computer technology behind surveillance apparatus, the problem gets worse.
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Who Are We? The Samizdata people are a bunch of sinister and heavily armed globalist illuminati who seek to infect the entire world with the values of personal liberty and several property. Amongst our many crimes is a sense of humour and the intermittent use of British spelling.
We are also a varied group made up of social individualists, classical liberals, whigs, libertarians, extropians, futurists, ‘Porcupines’, Karl Popper fetishists, recovering neo-conservatives, crazed Ayn Rand worshipers, over-caffeinated Virginia Postrel devotees, witty Frédéric Bastiat wannabes, cypherpunks, minarchists, kritarchists and wild-eyed anarcho-capitalists from Britain, North America, Australia and Europe.
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