We are developing the social individualist meta-context for the future. From the very serious to the extremely frivolous... lets see what is on the mind of the Samizdata people.
Samizdata, derived from Samizdat /n. - a system of clandestine publication of banned literature in the USSR [Russ.,= self-publishing house]
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The US DoD is studying whether to continue with its’ current broadband satellite systems or to move on to a global space laser com relay network. According to Undersecretary of the Air Force Peter Teets at a DoD News Briefing on Tuesday, Sept. 3, 2002, they hope to be ready for a decision by December 2004:
“Just exactly that way. We will progress in the development of the laser comm. technology between now and 2004. In 2004, we will decide whether or not we have confidence enough to deploy — whether we have confidence enough to not procure AEHFs 4 and 5 and, rather, rely upon a high bandwidth relay network of some kind using some form of laser comm.”
They seem primarily interested in space-space links, but I predict usefulness for space-ground links as well. Laser links have many admirable characteristics for this if you can get the pointing right. They do not have the extensive sidelobes or wide footprint of radio signals1; they are difficult to jam2; they can carry enormously more data3; and left entirely unsaid at this briefing… they are amenable to quantum cryptography4.
Oh I just love the future!
1 = This makes it very difficult to intercept. Even tightly beamed microwaves have enough off axis signal to be read miles away as the Russians did in New England in the 80’s. They purchased an old country house as a diplomatic site, stuck up a bunch of antennas and started picking off White House and other phone calls. At that time the exchange number was part of a clear text header, easily filtered for out of the massive volume of long distance voice traffic. It goes without saying US ELINT sats can pick up the faint leakage of microwave links from orbit.
2 = Someone will certainly comment about the effect of fog, clouds etc. It is not as much of a problem as you think, and most especially for point to point orbital communications. Even on ground links, much depends on the frequency in use. Water vapour does not absorb at all frequencies.
3 = Think of live two way hiresolution video links between pilots in theatre and control centres elsewhere in the world; perhaps even holographic 3D heads up data displays. The possibilities are staggering.
4 = Even without encryption, quantum tricks lets them make sure undetected “man in the middle” attacks are literally impossible.
Every time I see or hear the media talking about “dirty bombs” my teeth grate. Dirty bombs are nuclear weapons that are either too inefficient to “burn” most of their fissionables in the explosion or else are built intentionally to spread fallout. The media almost always means what is now being called a radiological weapon, something like a terrorist’s standard anti-personnel bomb, but packed with bits of radioactives lifted from medical equipment, old watches or what have you, instead of rusty nuts, bolts and nails.
Any idiot can build one, but they will probably fail to get more than local dispersal. Bad enough in fact; but by the time the SafetyNuts are done you’d have an entire city evacuated for years over the risk of a handful of extra cancers per year. So this is more mass disruption than mass destruction unless the enemy acquire some really nasty radionucleotides and manage a good dispersal within the desired target footprint.
The first type of real “dirty bomb” is what we will almost certainly get from the enemy. It is dirty because they don’t know how to make their fissionables fission before the plasma blows itself apart. When the fission process occurs there is a chain reaction in which a neutron splits one nuclei, which releases at least one more neutron and on average “a bit” that in turn cause another one or two atoms to do the same. This exponential growth happens so quickly it has no meaning on a human scale.
But on the bomb level it does. Each atom releases a great deal of energy; that radiated energy turns the fissionables and the bomb casing into a plasma racing outwards at an enormous speed… which is still slow relative to the neutron cascade.
If the cascade happens fast enough, virtually all of the Uranium 235 or Plutonium fissions and releases energy before the wisp of plasma blows the ghost of the bomb matter outwards. If the cascade is a bit slow the “flame” is extinquished and the cascade stopped because the remaining fissionables are too far apart to have much chance of a neutron hit.
Those unfissioned materials become a nasty bit of the fallout. It is highly unlikely that an “amateur” bomb will get things right the first time, so one expects 5% or less of the material will “burn”. The other 95% gets dispersed in the mushroom cloud. This is the scenario all of us “in the know” fear: a couple kiloton fizzle with a lot of very hot debris and a deadly cloud drifting down wind.
The second type of dirty bomb is even uglier. If you re-read your ’50’s literature, you’ll run across the “Cobalt Bomb”. This is a thermonuclear weapon packed with Cobalt or other materials that will generate nasty and long lived fallout. The Doomsday bombs of yore.
To my knowledge, no one ever built one. It’s not a terrorist likelihood as H-Bombs are out of range of the technology of anyone but a major state at present… without help that is.
A third type, which falls between the cracks of the definition, is the Neutron Bomb. This is an extraordinarily “clean” bomb with very low yield. It causes limited blast damage but it gives off an extremely intense pulse of neutrons. These kill everything (except roaches and Radiodurans bacteria) in a wide radius. The buildings are untouched and the people are dead.
These were tested but not deployed1. It is doubtful anyone could build one without extensive experience or testing.
Let’s pray none of us ever learn about these things first hand.
1= A clarification for those who want precision: a large number were built, but after a big political battle over deployment in the Reagan years, they were put into storage. They were perhaps disassembled during Bush Sr’s Presidency. I do not know if any of these tactical “Enhanced Radiation Weapons” remain in the US inventory.
That 80 or more hostages have been killed is dreadful but the fact 750 were saved is a triumph.
But there are some very stark lessons here.
In 1995, a related Chechen group took over 2000 people hostage in a hospital in Budyonnovsk. After an initial attempt to free the hostages was botched with considerable loss of life by the Russian forces, a deal was cut by then Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin that agreed a cease-fire in the Chechen war and allowed the hostage takers to escape in return for the safety of their captives.
And of course that was proof that you can indeed get the Russians to cut a deal if you are daring enough and willing to slaughter enough innocent civilians.
Well I hope that Vladimir Putin has just signalled a complete rejection of that mind set. As terrible as it is that so many hostages have died, the fact is the Chechen terrorists who did this are now either dead or facing a very grim time indeed in a Russian jail… and were given nothing for their pains by the Russians. That is the only message that must be sent to terrorists everywhere, to do otherwise is to motivate such people to cause more horrors in theatres, hospitals and homes. The enemy may not fear death itself but I suspect they do indeed fear pointless death.
So whatever the cost, in the long run it is cheaper in lives to never negotiate (other than as a tactical ruse). Give them the death they desire but nothing that would further their aims, no matter how small.
Russian commando with SV-98 sniper rifle
Russell Whitaker sorts the sad facts from the ideological drivel regarding the much deprecated SA80 rifle
In an article typical of London’s The Guardian newspaper – noxiously socialist but sometimes well-researched – I read a sad account of the SA80 British infantry carbine.
In typical socialist fashion, James Meek takes potshots at privatization, in the context of its involvement in the debacle, speaking to the sorry state of the government-owned Royal Ordnance facility of the once-venerable Enfield:
Thanks to privatisation, the atmosphere in the factory was a poisonous mix of bitterness, anger and apathy. Workers who thought that they had a job for life felt betrayed by a government which, many had believed, was both patriotic and pro-military.
I’d argue that the expectation of a “job for life” was part of the cause of quality problems with the weapon, but that point has been set to rest by its evident failures in societies ranging from communist Russia to corporatist Japan.
What’s especially interesting is the passing mention of the involvement of Germany’s Heckler & Koch (H&K to us gunnies) in helping to fix the bloody mess:
In 1985, the German gunmakers Heckler & Koch, who had been asked to do some sub-contracting work on training ammunition, were sent two of the new rifles. Shortly after the consignment arrived, the officer who had sent them got a phone call. The voice at the other end said he was calling about the British rifle. He said: “You know it goes off when you drop it?” The officer admitted that he didn’t. He fetched a gun from the armoury and dropped it. It went off. German experts had discovered a dangerous safety flaw in a British rifle which, after supposedly exhaustive testing and acceptance into service, the Brits themselves had failed to find.
and:
Those who have used it say the new version of the gun, redesigned by Heckler & Koch, is better, but complaints still came in when it was used in Afghanistan. Confidence, rather than reliability, may now be the real problem.
I’ve spoken to acquaintances who’ve had to carry the SA80, and a very close friend formerly of the U.S. Army Special Forces, who confirm that in very recent times, the SA80, in its A2 incarnation, has evolved into an adequate infantry carbine. It’s worth noting in some of Parliament’s own notes of 2000, H&K UK Ltd (also mentioned in MoD/DLO SA80 Individual Weapon (IW) & Light Support Weapon (LSW) Modification Programme notes) has taken over from Royal Ordnance as the Design Authority for the weapon.
Mr. Meeks should admit that the only way to salvage the soiled reputation of the SA80 is complete privatization, ruthless outside testing combined with an intense feedback loop involving design & manufacturing… and years of unavoidable wait & see, with British squaddies acting as hapless test dummies.
In the meantime, variants of the privately-produced (usually by Colt and Bushmaster) U.S. M-16 (e.g. the M4A1) will continue as the choice of the SAS, not surprising given the “2nd culture” nature of most special forces units worldwide: spec ops guys, within limits, generally get their choice of personal weapons.
Russell Whitaker
There is a new generation coming up through the ranks of the US Air force, one with a steely eyed resolve much like their grandparents back in the days of WWII.
The main article is here.
Part III of III
The long awaited third part on Iraq and war is different from what I originally intended. Strategic and military aspects remain important but the debate has moved on in a direction where evidence of Iraqi threat on its own does not convince. Strange since it provides the most obvious reason for war on Iraq – self-defence.
Both the US and the UK have maintained that Iraq has breached the provisions of the UN sanctioned ceasefire agreement from the Gulf War and continues to pose a military threat to the region. Prime Minister Tony Blair’s dossier on Iraq says President Saddam Hussein has the military planning to launch a weapon of mass destruction at 45 minutes’ notice.
There are other documents that deal with Iraq’s military capabilities and certainly convince me that self-defence is essential. A CSIS document Iraq’s Military Capabilities: Fighting A Wounded, But Dangerous, Poisonous Snake concludes:
It is both easy and dangerous to be an armchair field marshall. Anyone can assert how easily Saddam’s regime will collapse in the face of the slightest opposition, or produce worst case scenarios that argue against any form of attack. The reality is, however, that no one can firmly predict Iraq’s military capabilities and the uncertainties and intangibles are as important as the numbers. It is also important to remember that one key risk – Iraq’s unceasing efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction – will grow steadily worse with each year in which the UN cannot conduct effective inspections and take effective action. There are risks in not acting as well as acting.
Perhaps the best way to assess Iraq’s military capabilities, therefore, is to understand that a war might lead to extensive fighting, large civilian casualties, and significant US and allied casualties. It might involve weapons of mass destruction, and it might be far more costly than other recent wars.
This is not an argument for paralysis, but rather to avoid thinking of war as some safe and antiseptic process where other people’s sons and daughters take the risks. It is an argument against facile half-measures like arming a weak and ineffective opposition, and taking the risk that the Bay of Pigs may be followed by the Bay of Kurdistan. It is an argument against trying to do the job with limited amounts of air power or with air power alone, and without coalition allies and access to friendly bases in Turkey and the Gulf. It is an argument against trying to avoid the deployment of “decisive force” and several sustainable heavy US divisions. It is an argument against going to war without announcing clear redlines to prevent Iraq from using weapons of mass destruction, and without preparing a devastating US conventional response if it does. One does not play with poisonous snakes – wounded or not. One either kills them as safely and efficiently as possible or leaves them alone
Good stuff. Another one is IISS Strategic Dossier titled Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment, more recent and poignant:
In conclusion, war, sanctions and inspections have reversed and retarded, but not eliminated Iraq’s nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and long range missile capacities, nor have they removed Baghdad’s enduring interest in developing these capacities. The retention of WMD capacities by Iraq is self-evidently the core objective of the regime, for it has sacrificed all other domestic and foreign policy goals to this singular aim. It has retained this single objective, and pursued it in breach of the ceasefire and UN Security Council Resolutions that brought a conditional end to the 1991 Gulf War. Over more than eleven years the Iraqi regime has sought to evade its obligations and undermine support for the sanctions and inspections regime meant to eliminate its WMD capacities and contain its ambitions. Iraq has fought a relatively successful diplomatic war of attrition. It is worth recalling that the international debate 18 months ago was centred on how sanctions against Iraq might be relaxed, and inspections concluded with some dispatch in light of the dwindling willingness to support the containment policy developed in 1991.
Today, after four years without inspections, there can be no certainty about the extent of Iraq’s current capacities. A reasonable net assessment is that Iraq has no nuclear weapons but could build one quickly if it acquired sufficient fissile material. It has extensive biological weapons capabilities and a smaller chemical weapons stockpile. It has a small force of ballistic missiles with a range of 650km, that are capable of delivering CBW warheads, and has prepared other delivery methods for CBW, including manned aircraft and UAVs. Sooner or later, it seems likely that the current Iraqi regime will eventually achieve its objectives.
In compiling this Strategic Dossier, the IISS has sought to put the best available facts on this difficult issue before the wider public. This Strategic Dossier does not attempt to make a case, either way, as to whether Saddam Hussein’s WMD arsenal is a casus belli per se. Wait and the threat will grow; strike and the threat may be used. Clearly, governments have a pressing duty to develop early a strategy to deal comprehensively with this unique international problem.
Hear, hear.
Update: Just noticed Perry’s post below – not only he got there first with Tony’s dossier but also makes a similar point. Oh, well, great minds think alike. 
Insights come in varied and peculiar forms, such as those decanted from the lips of such British sages as Rab C. Nesbit to the north and the Macc Lads from a tad further south.
To be honest I think the Macc Lads are at least as reliable as DEBKA when it comes to military analysis and probably rather better… well certainly more forthright. Read the article and make up your own mind.
If there is war, it will be a clash of experts as well as armies. If Saddam’s forces collapse, and the American-led action has a quick outcome, the Macc Lads will have disproved Field marshal Lord Bramall and most of academe.
Before you read the linked Spectator article, let me proffer some linguistic assistance to our non-British readers… ‘Boddingtons’ is an inexpensive but far from ineffective beer in considerable favour with the broader end of Britain’s socioeconomic pyramid.
One of the responses to Part II of Libertarians and war, namely the comment by Billy Beck, has puzzled me sufficiently to turn what would otherwise be a rather lengthy comment into another blog. (Part III on Strategic considerations is yet to come…)
“What you have in this is an exemplary waypoint on a logical trail which is consistently extensible toward *validly* including anyone whose productive effort in any way contributes to the efficacy of this so-called “monopoly on the use of force”. And if the logic is consistently extended, then what it means is that your distinction of “civilians” (in your final paragraph, above) is no better than Al-Qaeda’s was on September 11, Adriana.”
It took me a while to work out how anyone could think that the logic of my argument extents to blurring the distinction between combatants and civilians. I came to the conclusion that it must be due to misunderstanding of two other concepts – “monopoly on the use of force” and “collective responsibility” – that I want to clarify.
It is precisely because the state has the monopoly on the use of force that a civilian population can never be a legitimate target. The monopoly on force means that the state usurps the use of force and prevents individuals from using it against external enemies (foreign armies and terrorists) and in many cases, e.g. such as in the UK, internal enemies (criminals). For my part, I resent the state’s exclusive use of force, especially regarding the latter category.
“We were going after military targets. No point in slaughtering civilians for the mere sake of slaughter. Of course there is a pretty thin veneer in Japan, but the veneer is still there. It was their system of dispersal of industry… I’ll never forget Yokohama. That was what impressed me: drill presses. There they were, like a forest of scorched trees and stumps, growing up throughout that residential area. Flimsy construction all gone…everything burned down, or up, and drill presses standing like skeletons.”
The quote above (from Memoirs of Gen. Curtis LeMay) does distinguish between military and civilian installations and makes it explicit that “the veneer was pretty thin in Japan”. It also admits that civilian casualties occurred but the point is specifically made that they were aiming at military targets, never at civilians. Although civilian casualties were to be expected given the [Japanese] system of dispersal of industry…
It is for circumstances like these the double effect doctrine has something to say. The bad effect may be known beforehand but provided it is not the intention and the act itself is required for bringing about the needed good effect, the doctrine of double effect allows waging a war despite foreseeble civilian casualties. I do not see how it opens up a possibility that civilians may ever be a legitimate target just because they have their role in the functioning of the military machine. It is self-evident and blindingly obvious that an army cannot be raised, funded and function without civilian economy and infrastructure supporting it but I fail to see how it can provide a justification for turning civilians into a military target!
It is Al-Qaeda, as Billy Beck correctly points out, and not me, that cannot make the distinction between the effect civilians may have on the efficacy of the military and the moral grounds for turning them into a target for their ‘war’. As I argue in my posting on just war, it is equivalent to taking defenceless hostages – civilians disarmed by the state are targeted by the enemies of that state for its actions.
Here the notion of collective responsibility becomes relevant as it is often implicit in statements of those who hold an individual responsible for actions carried out by a collective entity, such as state merely on the basis of that individual’s membership of such entity. Would you say that all German civilians were equally and personally responsible for the Holocaust and WWII, by virtue of being citizens of the German state or even by virtue of working in one of the armaments factories trying to make a living?! Surely, there is a distinction to be made and one does not need a rigorous moral code to see that.
The doctrines of just war and double effect mean to provide guidance in situations where our moral instincts are torn between two ‘unacceptable’ options. They are meant to provide a moral template, not definitive or comforting answers, for those who want to know right from wrong even in the most difficult situations. They still leave plenty of room for formulation of policy and strategy…
In case there is one person in the world who doesn’t read Instapundit… you really have to read this.
We can only hope the error was due to Soviet era inflated production numbers. I’d much rather believe the 200 “missing” nukes were never actually built than imagine them in the hands of the Russian Mafia. That just does not bear thinking about.
Real Estate on isolated Pacific desert islands is a good investment possibility with an expectation of a very high near term ROI. Samizdata’s cracked investment advisory team also gives a strong buy recommendation on abandoned hard rock mine shafts in the Rocky Mountains…
Part II of III
What would be the requirements of a libertarian just war? Libertarianism permits the killing of another if it is an act of reasonable self-defence. Nothing in libertarianism precludes the possibility of a collectively exercised right to self-defence. This has been accepted by most libertarians as one of the few valid functions of a ‘night-watchman’ state. As long as every individual in a society agreed to be defended by a state and the state acted against only those individuals who were actual aggressors, e.g. an invading army, on what grounds could a libertarian object?
Given that it is not practically possible to fulfil the above conditions, especially the first one, it seems to me that many of those who engage in the debate about war on Iraq for genuine and morally inspired reasons are trying to choose between two evils. Their side in the debate usually depends on which of the two evils seems more morally unacceptable to them. There are also those who find it impossible to choose, their instincts oscillating between the need for self-defence and protection, and fear of compromising their fundamental principles by condoning killing of innocent civilians. One of those is Chris Newman whose comment captures the agony of such moral choice.
The statement ‘as long as harming innocents is not the objective, if a given use of force is justified then innocent bystanders are often just a regrettable consequence’ is based on the acceptance of the doctrine of double effect. It is a useful rule, often used in moral dilemmas that can be summed up as “damned if you do, damned if you don’t”. An act with both good and bad effects is morally permissible if and only if the following conditions are all met:
- The action itself is not forbidden by a moral rule.
- Only the good effect is intended.
- The bad effect is proportional to the good.
- The bad effect is not a direct means to the good effect (e.g. bombing cities to demoralise a population and hence hasten a war’s end).
And since Michael Walzer’s influential book Just and Unjust Wars (1971), in the context of war it is common to see added the following condition:
- Actions are taken to minimise the foreseeable bad effects, even if this means accepting an increased risk to one’s own combatants (e.g. one’s own soldiers)
In modern warfare the principle of the double effect is frequently applicable. In waging a just war a nation may launch an air attack on an important military objective of the enemy even though a comparatively small number of non-combatants are killed. This evil effect can be compensated for by the great benefit gained through the destruction of the target. This would not be true if the number of non-combatants slain in the attack were out of proportion to the benefits gained, as is clear from the fourth condition. Furthermore, if the direct purpose of the attack were to kill a large number of non-combatants, so that the morale of the enemy would be broken down and they would sue for peace, the attack would be immoral because the third condition for the lawful use of the principle would not be fulfilled. It would be a case of the use of a bad means to obtain a good end.
Chris Newman takes a similar route but ends up with a different point and in the utilitarian camp:
“…our moral calculus has at least three variables: the importance of the objective, the efficacy of a given type of force in achieving that objective, and the cost in innocent lives of using that type of force. Presumably, for any given values of the first two variables, there will be a point at which the value of the third becomes too high, so that the action cannot be justified…”
There appears to be a conflict between a moral justification for waging a just war and a strategic aspect of it. But does exploiting the advantage of superior military capabilities amount to using incommensurate or disproportionate force? It doesn’t because force is defined by effect on the enemy including the civilians, not by the amount of firepower. You can use superior fighting force and technology in order to shorten the war and ensure you destroy enemy fighting forces rather than civilians. → Continue reading: Just war and libertarians
Part I of III
Arguments over war in Iraq and its justification, recently fuelled by emotions running high over the first anniversary of the Sept 11th attacks, have been plaguing the libertarian camp. Samizdata decided to summarise its contributors’ positions on war in general and Iraq in particular and received some interesting responses. There are many strands of arguments for and against war on Iraq and it is impossible to even mention them all in one posting. There are several interesting points I wish to add to or stress in the debate.
One of the objections to Perry’s position on the destruction of tyranny and libertarian opposition to it comes from Julian Morrison (a comment on the above linked article):
There are many ways and means of destroying tyranny, but the only ones that are “libertarianly correct” are those which do not involve harm to innocents. Assassination is far preferable, for example, to war – and hand-to-hand war is preferable to blanket bombing. There exists no right to murder, regardless of how convenient it might be.
Here justification of war is reduced to the effects it may have on the civilian population or innocents. This makes opposition to tyranny impossible. For example, makes it impossible to fight anybody ruthless enough to use human hostages.
Ignoring for a moment the other important conditions of just war, which I will deal with in Part II, I want to look at Nazism and communism as examples of historical tyrannies that were accepted as evil to be justifiably eliminated. Opposing Nazism by force was justified as self-defence and the war against Hitler and Germany has been accepted as a just war. The WWII experience proves appeasement wrong on both grounds – moral (fails in self-defence) as well as strategic or practical (gives the enemy opportunity to accumulate weapons and pose a greater threat).
Although during WWII the distinction between a dictator and the nation he lead was blurred, the Cold War made abundantly clear that there is a difference between a dictator waging a war with the country behind him and a dictator with the civilian population being at his mercy and under the same threat as his opponents.
Perry mentions Czechoslovakia as a case in point and I will merely add to his voice. During 1968 Prague Spring civil resistance the Warsaw pact used military threat on the civilian population and in the early days of the Velvet Revolution of 1989 there was in our minds a real threat that the communist government would use the army on the demonstrators. How could an attack by the West make the situation any worse in a country where the state is ready to use ‘military force’ (not just law enforcement) on its citizens? Whether I die being run over by a T-55, shot by AK-47 or by a stray ‘Western’ bomb does not make much difference to me as an individual in such situation. In fact, young and idealistic as I was in those days, I’d probably prefer the latter, given that being killed during a ‘Western liberation’ would at least serve a purpose I agreed with, whereas being killed by communists wouldn’t.
We know Saddam has used military force and chemical weapons on Kurds and will not hesitate to use such force again… Those who oppose war on Iraq on ‘moral grounds’ will find it hard to wriggle out of agreeing that it was right for the West to fight Nazism and wrong to leave the nations of Eastern Europe under communism. The problem is that Nazism and communism are obviously wrong ex-post and the current debate is about determining the moral and strategic position ex-ante.
To be continued…
Doctrine of Just war and libertarians (Part II)
Strategic considerations for attack on Iraq (Part III)
Eager to exploit the growing market for British fashion across the pond, British designers have launched this sexy little number:
“The British Royal Air Force has developed and tested its own conventional warhead able to generate an electro-magnetic pulse. Some of the tests were done in the US, and US officials have said that the British weapon works better than the one they are trying to develop.”
Dahhhlings, this is simply the must have addition to the armoury of every serious anarcho-militarist this season.
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Who Are We? The Samizdata people are a bunch of sinister and heavily armed globalist illuminati who seek to infect the entire world with the values of personal liberty and several property. Amongst our many crimes is a sense of humour and the intermittent use of British spelling.
We are also a varied group made up of social individualists, classical liberals, whigs, libertarians, extropians, futurists, ‘Porcupines’, Karl Popper fetishists, recovering neo-conservatives, crazed Ayn Rand worshipers, over-caffeinated Virginia Postrel devotees, witty Frédéric Bastiat wannabes, cypherpunks, minarchists, kritarchists and wild-eyed anarcho-capitalists from Britain, North America, Australia and Europe.
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