We are developing the social individualist meta-context for the future. From the very serious to the extremely frivolous... lets see what is on the mind of the Samizdata people.
Samizdata, derived from Samizdat /n. - a system of clandestine publication of banned literature in the USSR [Russ.,= self-publishing house]
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US Army Generals have been much discussed lately, and not for the right reasons. For the most part, discussion has been based on the criticism of US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, by a faction of recently retired officers who have lost confidence in his handling of the insurgency. Discussion has taken two tacks- firstly the etiquiette of senior officers criticising their political superiors, and then the actual merits or otherwise of Rumsfeld. I haven’t been following recent events in Iraq that closely. However for a good description of the case for the prosecution (of Rusmfeld) The Belgravia Despatch has been all over the story.
However, my ruminations were triggered by a story in the Daily Telegraph where American commanders have been criticised for their style and operational methods by British Brigadier Alan Sharpe. There is a long and not entirely honourable tradition of British officers looking down on US Army commanders, going back to the Second World War if not earlier, motived partly by the different traditions of the two Armies, and partly by envy. However, after thinking about this story, I think the thrust of British views on the US Army might have a point.
Since the Second World War, the British Army has changed radically. It has changed from being a force which was designed to defeat an enemy army on a battlefield to a force designed as often as not to keep the peace, and to use military means to create a political climate in which a political solution can be used to solve disputed issues. This means that there has been a great deal of change in the way in which the British Army operates. The United States Army, however, has not changed in this way. It remains designed mostly to defeat an enemy army in battle. It is frighteningly good at this job, as witnessed by the mauling it gave the Iraqi Army in the invasion of 2003. However it is not so good at being a force that uses military means to create the desired political climate.
This is not to be critical of the US Army. It is simply a rumination about why the British Army is perceived as being better then the US Army at one particular style of military operations. The British Army has evolved in this way because it suits the strategic requirements of the United Kingdom to do so. However, in the long term, it is likely that the US Army is going to be increasingly involved in Iraq style counter-insurgencies. If the US political establishment continues to require the US Army to serve as a sort of ‘firefighting’ role in strategic hotspots around the world, then we might see the US Army evolve into a force with an operating ethos more in the style of the British Army.
I was talking to a civil engineer friend of mine today. I asked him what he knew about the vulnerability of underground facilities, such as those rumoured to be under construction in Iran as part of their nuclear programme. He told me that one does not need to go that deep underground to make such facilities impervious even to a surface level nuclear strike. The flipside is that once you get inside the underground caverns, it is fairly simple to demolish them. If Iran’s nuclear programme is made up of significant subterranean facilities, any effort to end the programme using military means will require a ground offensive of some kind. A concerted air offensive is not going to be enough – bodies on the ground will be necessary to infiltrate and destroy the facilities.
Assuming the intelligence about Iran’s underground laboratories is correct, thoroughly disarming Iran will require more than the easy solution we saw used against Serbia in 1998/99. It remains to be seen whether the United States has the stomach for another ground war in the Middle East – a war they would probably fight alone or in concert with Israel as a (very) junior partner. Under such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that some are questioning American resolve on the issue. Unfortunately, the possibility of Iran successfully acquiring nuclear weapons is far from remote.
Sometimes people are shown ink blots in the hope of finding clues as to their mental characteristics. If the ink blots remind you of the ‘wrong’ things then you may have problems.
However, a different form of “ink blot madness” has been doing the rounds for some time: The ink blot strategy.
The ink blot strategy holds that the British won in Malaya (now Malaysia and the independent city state of Singapore) not by killing, capturing or driving out the communists, but by taking bits of Malaya and making life “so good” in these bits that people “did not want to fight the British any more” and then expanding these bits “like ink blots”. By copying this strategy we can all win in Iraq – or so it is claimed.
There are various problems with this idea. Firstly it is not what the British army did in Malaya – whatever some people may say they did. In reality the men went out and fought the enemy (in the jungle or elsewhere). Certainly there were ‘protected villages’ and so on, but Malaya was a fight (it was not a welfare project).
Further the British did not give vast amounts of aid to Malaya. Britain did not have this sort of money to give away in the early 1950’s and it would not have really improved economic life anyway (more on that below). In so far as economic life did improve in Malaya during the “Emergency” British aid was not the real reason.
And, of course, the (mostly ethnic Chinese) communists in Malays were not fighting for “better socio-economic conditions” anyway – they were fighting for communism (hint, that is why they were called ‘communists’). Try asking someone who knows something about Vietnam how all the welfare statism there did not make the VC or NVA vanish (nor was ‘support’ for them among civilians based upon poor social or economic conditions, such support was based on terror – you helped the communists or you and your family would be killed)
How can someone be so plain daft as to suppose that the reason someone becomes a suicide bomber in Iraq (whether they are from Iraq or from outside) is because they turned on the light one day and it did not go on. “Oh if only the electricity and the water supply worked better, then I would not strap a lot of explosives to myself and go blow up a bus full of school children”.
Also physics teaches us that it is less difficult to destroy that to create. The terrorists left undisturbed (under the ink blot strategy) in ‘their’ bits of Iraq will find it less difficult to come in and blow things up in ‘ink blot land’ than the U.S. Army (or anyone else) will find it to build nice services.
The ink blots will not ‘spread, they will shrink. Going on the defensive is sign that one has no real will to win – and would mean that soldiers being killed would be dying for nothing (as the poltical choice to give up had already been made – sound familar?).
Then there is the assumption that government can make the lives of people Iraq “so good they will not fight”, it is not just that the terrorists are fighting because they would like nicer ‘public services’ (which is absurd), but the whole idea that the government can make so many millions of people have such happy lives.
One does not have to a libertarian to see the absurdity of this idea. The government can not (for example) make the lives of Compton in greater Los Angeles. “So good they will not want to fight” (after so many decades of welfare schemes and ‘urban renewal’ schemes) – so how is going to that in Iraq?
Whatever one thinks of the Iraq war, the ‘ink blot strategy’ is stupid. And whoever the military officers and politicans who are behind may be, it is time they shut up. If the war is justified then fighting should continue (i.e. the enemy, especially the leadership, should be hunted down and killed or caputured), and if the war is not justified then the troops should come home.
But there is no ‘socio-economic road’ to victory.
U.S.-based libertarian blogger Jim Henley is none too impressed with the latest story in the Weekly Standard by one of its correspondents, Stephen F. Hayes, to the effect that there are loads of documents proving that Saddam’s Iraq trained thousands of Islamic terrorists. Hayes has been mining this particular seam for years. He recently published a book focusing on the alleged terror link to Saddam.
I am not quite as skeptical as Henley is about the credibility of what Hayes says(Jim does a great line in snarkiness). At the very least, if Hayes is half right, then it does rather undermine one of the standard tropes of the opponents of the war: Saddam was not in cahoots with radical Islamic terror, no way, nothing to look at here folks, etc. In any event, it would be good if all the documents that Hayes talks about could be put into the public domain so we can nail down this controversy once and for all.
This story seems to be making the rounds…
The US military said Wednesday it was investigating a report carried on an Australian television network that claimed American soldiers in Afghanistan burned the bodies of two Taliban fighters and then used the action to taunt other Islamic militants
…and my response is why oh why is this news? Just to state the obvious, the Taliban bodies in question were dead prior to being burned, so who cares?
I guess is that if they had not burned those bodies, the same people making a big deal of this would be penning articles with the title:
US forces start epidemic in Afghanistan!
As for this being an ‘affront to Islam’, if the object was to ‘smoke out’ the enemy by enraging them, again… so what? The job of US forces is to KILL members of the Taliban and I fail to see why it is unacceptable to outrage their sensibilities and perhaps even hurt their feeling prior to punching them full of 5.56mm holes.
I have no idea how events in Iraq will eventually play out. I fervently hope that this tortured country can move to a more peaceful direction but the current violence and mayhem makes such a prospect seem pretty distant. One thing that has always struck me is how Saddam has never gotten sufficient blame for bringing the current mayhem on to his own country. So it is interesting to read this smart passage by Russell Roberts over at the Cafe Hayek blog:
I don’t understand how the failure to find weapons of mass destruction makes the war unjustified. It’s not like Bush made up the idea of WMD. Saddam Hussein is the guy you ought to be mad at. Saddam Hussein acted as if he had or was working on nuclear capability. He’s the guy who employed nuclear scientists. He’s the guy who convinced the UN that he wanted nukes. He’s the guy who resisted weapons inspections. He’s the guy who said you can look over here but not over there. Why did he do all these things? Either because he actually had nuclear capability or was close to it, or because he wanted to fool people into thinking he was more important than he was. He managed to fool Bill Clinton, the United Nations, George Bush and Israel into thinking he had a desire for WMD. It appears now to have been something of a ruse. Probably. Should Bush have ignored the behavior of Saddam on the grounds that the whole thing was probably a hoax to enhance his self-image? I don’t think so. That certainly turned out to be a mistake with Osama. His talk wasn’t cheap.
Exactly. 20/20 hindsight is all very well, but it is not much use in making credible foreign policy.
If the Iraqi local administration in Basra was, as claimed, about to hand over a pair of captured SAS under-cover soldiers that were in their custody to a hostile militia, then it seems that the escalation of tension and violence in Basra should be escalated further… by the British army.
Lesson One of occupying a country has to be to let any local administration know that it is the occupying army that is ultimately in control. The logic is clear: if we are there until Iraq (or whatever comes after the break-up of a unitary Iraq) has been sufficiently stabilised, then we must expect the army to use force to stabilise things, and that is a euphemism for being willing to kill people who oppose that process or interfere with military operations. If the local administration has indeed been infiltrated by enemies with antithetical aims who are cooperating with the enemy, then politics is probably not the answer at this juncture, force is. Unmake the local administration and replace it with another one at bayonet point. Show people in Iraq that some options are simply not on the menu. This is not a normal functioning civil society and should not be treated as one, any more than post-war West Germany was until acceptable institutions were in place to allow it to function as a viable post-totalitarian nation.
If Britain’s government ever wants to extract its forces at some point in the future without leaving behind something almost as bad as what was there before, it needs to be ruthless and none too squeamish. If this is a revelation to the UK government, I cannot imagine what it was thinking when this whole process started. When the decision to use force is made, use it effectively and resolutely, giving the Army the resources and support it needs to prevail… or if Tony Blair is not willing to do that, he had no business using force in the first place. What else was he expecting?
It is splendid news that the trapped Russian submariners have been rescued from the dreadful fate that overtook the Kursk a few years ago. Fortunately the Russians did not stand on their pride as they did the last time they suffered a sub-aquatic disaster. This time they seem to have fairly quickly accepted the help that was offered to them by many navies around the world.
Although the Royal Navy’s robotic sub was the prime mover of this rescue, it was really a very international effort with the USA and Japan providing vital assistance in the rescue. Hopefully this more enlightened approach by the Russian government and military authorities admitting they could not effect the rescue themselves is a sign of institutional change at the top, but the cynic in me wonders if it was not just a domestic political calculation that the embarrassment at having to have their submariners rescued by Western naval personnel represented less political damage than another scene on the television of angry family members on the dockside grieving over their dead sons.
The oldest “mini-aircraft carrier” used by Britain’s Royal Navy, HMS Invincible, is being retired from service. The vessel, from which Sea Harrier jets can operate – as well as helicopters – is more than 20 years old and was used in the Falklands War, among other theatres of operation.
As I said a while back, I have no ideological issue one way or the other about the exact composition of our armed forces, which must change with the times and respond to different threats to this country. Coming from a bit of a navy family myself and being an enthusiast over our island’s naval history, I am nevertheless the first to realise that sentiment must not trump hard calculation when it comes to manning our defences. But it bothers me that our navy has been reduced to a level that makes independent military action by this country a logistical impossibility. It is probably quite unlikely that we could mount a Falklands-style operation on our own again. The present government wants, so it is reported, to build two new massive carriers but as is usually the case in these matters, the likely date of construction seems to stretch into the horizon, rather like the prospect of England beating Australia at cricket.
In an age when we fret about islamofascist psychos letting off bombs on the Tube, it may be tempting to think that the Senior Service’s role is little more than to patrol the coasts and put on commemorations about the Battle of Trafalgar. How complacent that would be. Given that we are an island nation, still reliant on shipping for a huge amount of our economic and physical wellbeing, such an attitude is fraught with danger. We could run the risk of cutting the fleet so hard that we lose the inner core of skilled men and women needed for the service.
With the exception of anarcho-capitalists, even the most hardcore classical liberal realises that defence is a baseline requirement for a proper state. And for an island nation like Britain with a long coastline, that means having a workable navy.
Piracy in the Straits of Malacca has been a serious problem for many years now and shipping companies have grown tired of waiting for governments in the region to do something effective to stamp it out.
So they are hiring private companies to do it instead. Sounds like an exciting line of work.
Whilst watching the BBC news’ report about the horrific terrorist attacks against Shi’ite civilians in Iraq, I was astonished to hear the following uttered:
Ominously, there are increasing calls for locals to take up arms and defend their communities.
Excuse me? These poor people have just had the centre of their community blown out and many people killed but the desire to defend themselves is denounced by the BBC as… ominous? It might tell you something about what is happening in Iraq but it also tells you quite a lot about the mindset at the BBC.
It seems to me that locals taking up arms to defend themselves against terrorism directly are exactly what the USA should be encouraging whole heartedly. The fact is that people will start doing so regardless of the wishes of the USA if the security situation continues to deteriorate, so not only would it be pointless to try and stop them, why not make a virtue of necessity and show that the occupying powers welcome Iraqis becoming more self-reliant and willing to confront these murdering bastards themselves?
Iraqi territorial para-militaries could be quite an asset fighting the insurgency precisely because they are not going to be centrally directed, at least to some extent. Counter-insurgency by its nature relies on more than just firepower, which the US has in abundance. It also relies on local knowledge and a willingness to be ruthless, something pissed-off locals could certainly provide. The idea that Al Qaeda can only be fought in Iraq ‘top down’ (i.e. directed from Washington using US and Iraqi government forces) is probably a mistake, so arming the people who are taking the brunt of the attacks seems a pretty sensible way to go.
USAF personnel in the UK have been told to stay out of London because of the bombings. Sorry but this is not just a propaganda gift to the enemy, it is just plain daft.
Firstly, the US was not the target of these bombs, Londoners were. Secondly, London is always full of American visitors and US military folk do not really stand out from the crowd all that much. In fact Americans are probably more likely to form identifiable ‘target clusters’ in the rural communities around the US bases in the UK.
It was a terrible atrocity but we have seen it all before in London at the hands of the IRA, so please, telling US service personnel to avoid London is foolish and plays to the often held stereotype of Americans as easily scared by such incidents. Methinks USAF people are made of sterner stuff and more than capable of assessing the risks for themselves.
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Who Are We? The Samizdata people are a bunch of sinister and heavily armed globalist illuminati who seek to infect the entire world with the values of personal liberty and several property. Amongst our many crimes is a sense of humour and the intermittent use of British spelling.
We are also a varied group made up of social individualists, classical liberals, whigs, libertarians, extropians, futurists, ‘Porcupines’, Karl Popper fetishists, recovering neo-conservatives, crazed Ayn Rand worshipers, over-caffeinated Virginia Postrel devotees, witty Frédéric Bastiat wannabes, cypherpunks, minarchists, kritarchists and wild-eyed anarcho-capitalists from Britain, North America, Australia and Europe.
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