Samizdata

In what might come as a surprise to some, and I would suggest is a counter to a broad narrative, an Employment Tribunal (a form of Labour Court) in England has upheld the principle that criticism of ‘unreformed’ Islam is legally protected. The Tribunal considered a preliminary point as to whether or not the Claimant (Plaintiff in old, sound [ 🙂 ] money) could in principle bring a claim on the basis that he held a belief that had sufficient cogency as to be worthy of respect in a democratic society. As far as can be discerned from the judgment, there was an issue (which is very much now an issue for a determination on the merits at a later hearing) as to whether the employer was taking action against the Claimant (the circumstances of which we know nothing) because of his manifestation of his belief, (which is permissible) rather than because he simply held those beliefs, which is not permissible; e.g. a nurse who is a devout Christian being sacked for being a Christian rather than specifically, sacked for e.g. saying to a seriously-ill patient ‘Convert or face Hell-fire soon!‘ which could well be a manifestation of a belief at which offence might be taken.

The issue that the Tribunal considered is set out in the judgment (linked above) as follows:

“The belief that Islam, particularly in a traditional form – rather than a reformed, modernised, moderate and Westernised form – is problematic and deserving of criticism in so far as it fails:

(i) To recognise a separation between religion (sacred) and politics (secular) and/or the Church and state,

(ii) To value and respect fundamental human rights such as:

• freedom of conscience and of speech,

• to eschew and condemn violence in the name of religion (Islam),

• to treat and respect women and girls equally when compared to men and boys.”

The Claimant appears to have been ‘hauled up’ by his employer over his Twitter/X usage, there is reference to a file of 141 pages showing his Twitter feed, which the employer sought (at this stage) to use to argue that his belief in the need for a ‘reformation’ of ‘unreformed Islam’ was not genuinely held, i.e. that he was using this ‘belief’ as a shield for views that would not be protected. That is yet to be determined, if it is continued with by the employer.

The main points of the Claimant’s case were the following which he considered problematic were noted at paragraph 13 in the judgment:

‘In his witness statement [C/14], the Claimant has cited the following

“traditional and unreformed Islamic belief[s]” that are that are incompatible with “Western values” in that they:

(i) advocate or justify violence against non-believers or apostates;

(ii) promote unequal legal status for women;

(iii) call for the death penalty for apostasy, blasphemy or homosexuality;

(iv) reject the separation of religion and state, and seek to impose religious law;

(v) promote antisemitism or hatred towards groups including reformed Muslims;

(vi) condone child marriage;

(vii) permit forms of slavery or indentured servitude;

(viii) justify domestic violence, including wife-beating and female genital mutilation (“FGM”).’

It is important to note here that the Claimant’s belief isn’t about hostility towards Muslims as such, but to the holding and promotion of the ‘unreformed’ version of Islam that he is objecting to.

The issue for the Tribunal hearing the final case is summed up at paragraph 17:

‘The degree to which the Claimant will be able to establish that these tweets were a manifestation of the pleaded belief or that the Respondent will be able to show that these were inappropriate manifestations of, or otherwise separable from, the belief, are matters which fall to be decided at the final hearing.’

I.e. was the Claimant criticism of the ‘unreformed’ Islam that he weighs in against inappropriate, which takes into account the position that he held in the employer that he worked or works for.

There is nothing in this judgment that surprises me, it seems to be a legally-sound decision that the principle of criticising a belief on the basis of its incompatibility with ‘Western values’ (whatever they might be) is one where not only is it lawful, but an employer who acts against an employee for doing so (unless the manifestation is inappropriate) is itself acting unlawfully. Clearly, given that Courts are holding that such expression is legally-protected in principle, any notion that such comments are criminally unlawful are unfounded so any police action arising from those Tweets would be wholly unlawful.