Israel .vs. Palestine (Part I)

Following on from Perry’s reference to the event on Saturday, and prompted by Brian Micklethwait, I have decided to commit my presentation to the Libertarian Alliance meeting to the Samizdata.

It isn’t all arm-twisting. This is not just an important issue, unarguably one of the ‘hottest’ of all topics, it is one that has potentially global implications and I do think it fitting to examine it in depth.

This is not merely a recantation of the events that are plastered bloodily across our TV screens and newspapers every day for every bomb that explodes and every bullet that flies makes headline news and anyone reading this post is already likely to be conversant with the actual events.

This is more a strategic assessment and overview.

The conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians (or more accurately, this round of the conflict) can be traced back to the Oslo Accords of the mid 90’s and the subsequent rounds of complex negotiations, culminating at Camp David in July 2000 when the Ehud Barak offer of Palestinian sovereignty over 95% of the West Bank, was rejected. Very shortly afterwards the Second (or Al-Aqsa) Intifada began.

Despite the welter of accusation and counter-accusation flying back and forth at the time, the real reason for the breakdown was the Israeli refusal to countenance the Palestinian demand for ‘Right of Return’ i.e. a right for all and any Palestinians to return and reside in Israel proper. It is a proposal that the Israelis cannot, under any circumstances, accept and one that the Palestinians will not, in any circumstances, withdraw.

But the breakdown of the Accords was actually a symptom of the problem and not the problem itself which was far more systemic. The Accords were never going to succeed because one side, the Palestinians, had a strategic goal and the other side, the Israelis, did not.

The Palestinian goal was always assumed by most to be independence and that was indeed true up until 1980’s and the rise of Hamas. Hamas proved to be remarkably successful remarkably quickly, mostly because it provided a hard-line, Islamic, rejectionist philosophy and also because, as well as having an armed wing, it also provided ‘Islamic social care’ in the form of health care, schooling and welfare. They provided money and services to the families of suicide bombers (before and after recruiting the bombers) and even money and services to the families of alleged collaborators (before and after they tortured and killed them).

Despite (or maybe because of) this ruthless single-minded zealousness, Hamas succeeded in winning the battle for many Palestinian hearts and minds. Whilst it is true that not all Palestinians subscribe to Hamas, it is impossible to imagine a Palestinian political position that does not pay deference to them.

Hamas, as opposed to Arafat and the PA, are quite open about their agenda. It is contained in the Hamas Covenant. The following is from Article 11:

“The Islamic Resistance Movement believes that the land of Palestine is an Islamic Waqf consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgement Day. It, or any part of it, should not be squandered: it, or any part of it, should not be given up. Neither a single Arab country nor all Arab countries, neither any king or president, nor all the kings and presidents, neither any organization nor all of them, be they Palestinian or Arab, possess the right to do that. Palestine is an Islamic Waqf land consecrated for Moslem generations until Judgement Day. This being so, who could claim to have the right to represent Moslem generations till Judgement Day?

This is the law governing the land of Palestine in the Islamic Sharia (law) and the same goes for any land the Moslems have conquered by force, because during the times of (Islamic) conquests, the Moslems consecrated these lands to Moslem generations till the Day of Judgement”.

A clear and unambiguous statement that no sort of compromise can be contemplated. Any solution that leaves Israel standing on even one square inch of ‘Islamic Waqf’ land is unacceptable and any Arab leader who is willing to entertain such betrayal will face assassination. (And, as an aside, I wonder if the Spanish have read this?)

There may, of course, be many Palestinians who do not share this view but I submit that they are not the ones in control.

The methodology for achieving this strategic Palestinian goal was not by going to war with Israel head-on. If the Palestinians were to don uniforms and march on Tel Aviv they would get their clocks cleaned. So that’s not what they are going to do. Instead, the process was to be advanced in stages that start with a seemingly reasonable political demand being backed up by violence, bombings and shootings on the ground until that demand is met. Then comes a further seemingly reasonable demand which is also pursued with the employment of violent attacks until it is met and so on.

This is the methodology employed throughout the negotiations and it is why the Second Intifada erupted as soon as it became clear that the demand for ‘Right of Return’ had been rejected. It was rejected because for the Israelis it is a slow death-sentence. Leaving aside, for the moment, the validity of the claims of returnees, Israel would quickly have to absorb anywhere up to 6 million Arab returnees who would, within short time, reduce Israel’s Jewish population to minority status. With none of the hatred and loathing having been assuaged by this measure (indeed, it would probably be thrown into sharp relief) the day-to-day violence would dramatically escalate. The majority Arabs would soon wrest political control from the minority Jews and then the fate of the latter would be sealed.

It is worth noting here that Israel does stand apart from other Western nations on the issue of ethnocentrism. Israel is not just a national project, it is an exceptionalist project. Israeli Jews must remain the majority and remain in control, else the raison d’etre of the State evaporates. No other Western nation exhibits such a conscious concern for its ethnic or religious composition. Indeed, most have vigourously eschewed the concept altogether, embracing, instead, the multiracial, multicultural ideal.

It seems quite extraordinary that the Israeli leadership went into the Oslo Accords with the objective only of securing some sort of peace and without being aware that, for their protagonists, the game had changed. But peace is not, nor has it ever been, a strategic goal and that left the Israelis without one. I believe that this loss of direction was wilful and reflected the belief among many in Israel that, despite all the evidence of Palestinian rejectionism, they would, given sufficient time, come to accept the reality of Israel’s permanence and a de facto peace would materialise as a prelude to a settlement of sorts.

It is my view that this faith was misplaced and it has left the Israelis in a strategic paralysis from which they have yet to emerge. Despite all of Israel’s military capability, their home-brew bomb-kit protagonists now have the upper hand just by virtue of knowing what it is they want to achieve and being prepared to pay the price to achieve it.

As things stand, Israel could be washed up. It will not disappear in a puff of smoke or an apocalyptic bang; there will no sudden big hole in the ground where Israel used to be. No, it will be more prosaic than that. Israel is a complicated, market economy with things like industries, transport, communications and night-life. Societies such as this can only operate successfully in conditions of relative calm. Just a couple of suicide bombers a month and the occasional large-scale attack and it all starts to break down. Soon, the young and the talented, who yearn for a normal life where they can do things go shopping and eat at restaurants without being killed, start to leave in search of it. Then capital begins to fly, then the economy starts to whither and the leadership loses its nerve and so begins the inexorable crumble. A long, drawn-out, hum-drum extinction.

In order to avoid Death by Indecision, the Israeli leadership must, within the near future, make a decision about the country’s long-term strategic goal. It is my view that the Israelis have only 3 options from which to choose. None of them are easy and all of them are decidedly grim.