The conduct of the British Army and the Ministry of Defence begins to crumble under the information leaked from the United States and Iraq. Unwilling to deal with the problems of security in Basra (and the potential damage of soldiers forced to patrol with inadequate equipment), British forces on the ground are alleged to have sought an accommodation with the Mahdi army militias in Basra and forsaken the city. They left the citizens of Basra at the mercy of fundamentalist thugs, whose torture and murder of innocent civilians was publicised in the following months.
The motives behind this accommodation are unclear. Justificatory references to success with the IRA and domesticating paramilitaries in a political process are evasive arguments for the accommodation. Equipment shortages are left unmentioned. More astonishing is the role of Des Browne, Secretary of State for Defence, whose permission was required before any British soldier could enter Basra. Whilst the Iraqi Army and US support staff put down the militias, the British authorities waited an unconscionable six days before they were willing to allow soldiers to enter the city. This was partially caused by the commander, Major-General Barney White-Spunner, who was away on a skiing holiday. This may be unfortunate timing but it does not lessen the air of ineptitude and scuttle that surrounds this whole affair.
The Guardian publicised the Ministry of Defence’s rebuttal from unnamed officials, who stated that the Iraqi Prime Minister, Al-Maliki, used the Basra campaign to shore up his credibility at the expense of co-operation with the British. They did concede that they had come to an accommodation with the militias and that,
British defence officials today denied reports that a secret deal between Britain and the Shia militia the Mahdi army prevented UK forces from taking part in a major offensive in Basra earlier this year.
Under the terms of last year’s accommodation, UK troops released suspected members of the militia in return for militia leaders ending their attacks.
Maliki was determined to weed out rebel units of the Mahdi army and criminal gangs. Local Iraqi forces and British troops had failed to do this, annoying the US and the Baghdad government, British officials now concede.
The level of political control that Labour politicians hold over individual deployments is difficult to gauge. Yet the delay and dithering over Basra, smells more of the Brown stuff than Browne’s sauce.
Aha! The media have finally figured out how to get round the inconvenient success of the surge, and get back to bashing our side!
By the way, what’s? with all? the question marks?
Personally, I thought the motive behind the accommodation was perfectly clear. They tried to deal with more politically-minded factions within the militia, in order to steer them towards using politics rather than force voluntarily. The aim was to split the organisation, weaken the case for fighting the new Iraqi government (who were suspected of sectarian bias), and to create enough of a peace to give people something to lose from going back to war.
Strategically, the British aim has always been not to fix Iraq, but to provide the time and space for the Iraqis to get their act together and fix it themselves. (And experience of life with the militias motivates the Iraqis to want to make sure our side wins as no amount of rhetoric about the benefits of democracy can, harsh as that tactic might seem.) From this point of view, a deal that ends attacks, even if it leaves the Mahdi Army intact, plays into their hands because the Iraqi forces are developing far faster than the militias can recover. Deals with bad guys are only a bad idea if they’re intended to be a long-term solution. (Think of it more as a hudna.) And while the continued presence of the militias is bad for the local populace, constant fighting in the streets is worse. The aim has always been to simply maintain as much order as they could until the Iraqis were ready to fix the militias themselves. So in a sense, their plan worked almost perfectly.
It’s annoying that Maliki decided to go it alone and not tell the British or US what he was planning. (Although it’s quite a hopeful sign from another perspective. It’s fairly clear he wanted it seen as an Iraqi operation and not the British/Americans operating through them as a puppet regime.) And it’s a fair criticism to say that when the Iraqis turned out not to be quite as ready as they thought and were getting into trouble, the British were unable to ramp up for action and send help as fast as the Americans.
But overall, I find it an impressive exercise in portraying a surprise success story as a failure and embarrassment. Well done!
That’s not entirely fair, Pa. If it was a “surprise success story” (clearly the “success story” part is correct; not sure about the “surprise” part, though; what exactly did you intend that word to modify?), and the report is accurate, it is correctly being portrayed as an embarassment for the British government, since they played no part in it.
I generally agree with your comment, though. A short-term accommodation with the enemy might be tactically useful; this one may have qualified as such, and might be being unfairly criticized now; and Maliki’s surprise attack can be seen as a good sign of his growing confidence in his own troops. Still, the fact that the British couldn’t react promptly when needed (as the Americans, who apparently were equally surprised by the attack, were able to do) should be an embarrassment to the Brown government. This is especially so if the reason really was because the commander couldn’t be reached for six days because he was on holiday. That is truly unconscionable, and should cost him his command.
The US has made plenty of mistakes in this whole matter, especially in the middle stretch (before Petreus took over), and the “opposition” here has been making much political hay over every error. Still, at least our politicians seem to be staying away (for now, anyway) from micro-managing the troops on the ground. That is sound military doctrine.
It’s pretty much a non-story. If the US or UK wanted to eliminate Sadr and his gang then the Mahdi army would already be toast. Horse-trading between ethnic subdivisions and political rivals has been a feature of allied foreign policy for decades and the spooks of the US, UK, Spain etc. are fully appraised – let’s not forget that the US even assisted the evacuation of the Taliban from Afghanistan (Link)in order not to undermine Musharraf. This is the real world not some adolescent fantasy of war.
Nothing is likely to change in that respect as far as I can see.
However, that doesn’t mean we should refrain from criticism of the likes of Des Browne. The man is a disgrace.
Ah yes… and a good proportion of the ‘real world’ decision are by and large fucked in the head in my view.
Not killing Sadr several years ago when the opportunity was there is a classic example of how supposedly ‘nuanced’ and ‘mature’ decision making can lead to miserable failure. This… Basra… is what happens when certain people try to wish away the essential truths of war and end up making things worse, not better. Negotiate and seek an exit if either the stomach or resources for the job are lacking … or truly let slip the Dogs of War and do whatever it takes to destroy the enemy and pursue victory without haver … but chose only one or the other.
Laird,
It surprised the British Army! But I was mainly thinking in terms of the progress towards Iraqi independence going surprisingly fast.
And while it has certainly proved an embarrassment for the UK government, I’m not sure about the cause. They might not have played a part in the battle, but did they play no part at all in getting the Iraqis ready for it?
“This is especially so if the reason really was because the commander couldn’t be reached for six days because he was on holiday. That is truly unconscionable, and should cost him his command.”
If it were even conceivably true that an absent commander wasn’t replaced by someone else with authority to make decisions, you might have a point. Do you truly think the commander went AWOL, or something, and left nobody in charge? Do you truly think the British Army have no procedures for handling this sort of thing?
I think it’s possible that his replacement dithered or otherwise messed it up, and if so, any blame should lie there rather than with the commander. But I don’t know if that is the case. All we’ve really got here is gossip.
I don’t know the reason for the delay. I could spin a dozen theories, not all of them worthy of blame. The Americans were already tooled up, embedded with the Iraqis, and fighting in the North, all they had to do was switch their area of operation. The British had to turn around their ROEs, their logistics, prepare plans, ammo-up for an extended operation, liaise with the Iraqi forces so they don’t end up shooting each other, and yes, no doubt had to get political authority (from both their own government and the Iraqi one). The military is under the control of the civilian government, and I wouldn’t want it any other way for all the government’s faults. The speculation (seen as such) that it was political hesitancy on the part of Brown(e) is one I have no intention of arguing against, as I find it entirely credible.
The only bit I was definitely objecting to was the portrayal of this “accommodation” as definite cowardice on the part of the British Army. As a surrender or failure that the Iraqis and US had to go in and correct. I don’t think that’s justified.
The worst part of this story seems to be the General being on a skiing holiday when this happened.
Why should an officer leave his assigned post during a major combat operation?
The only bit I was definitely objecting to was the portrayal of this “accommodation” as definite cowardice on the part of the British Army.
No. This has a definite aroma of being something imposed from well above the guys wearing uniforms.
Does anyone else think this might be part of the reason they sent Harry to Afghanistan? If he’d gone to Iraq, it’s pretty likely some reporter would have caught wind of the cock-up in progress…
[…]
More astonishing is the role of Des Browne, Secretary of State for Defence, whose permission was required before any British soldier could enter Basra.
[…]
If something this trivial has to be approved by the UK SecDef, I suspect there were very likely to be many other things that had to be approved by a political appointee before they could be carried out.
Who decided Browne was fit for the position?
Despite the Pa Annoyed spin, well Britain like a true European country full of western guilt about any violence just packed it’s bags inside forts and let Basra get on murderous Militia hands strongly giving more power to them when US soldiers were busy fighting at North.
Like the soldier that were held by Iran, it shows the character of British political and military leaders.
It could have happened a Srebenica…
Of course that doesnt prevents this, now that a part of dirty work is done by Americans:
http://d2cft.volantis.net/d2c/0.0?feed-article-id=ae5952ea-6341-11dd-9fd0-0000779fd2ac
British troops set sights on role in Iraq
By Stephen Fidler in London
August 6, 2008 2:15:00 AM
Britain has begun negotiations with the government in Baghdad on a long-term military commitment to Iraq that UK officials say could leave significant numbers of UK troops in the country beyond next year.(…)
——
And btw here are some of extensive changes that are happening in US Army:
http://www.slate.com/id/2196647
“Why should an officer leave his assigned post during a major combat operation?”
Huh? Well, 1) it wasn’t a major combat operation at the time – remember, the Iraqis launched this surprise attack without telling the British, and 2) what, you think that when you’re in the Army you never get time off?
They get 30 days a year, which they have to fit round their duties, of course, but which would seem entirely reasonable to take when things are quiet. Nobody at that rank is going to leave their post without permission, or making sure there’s adequate cover to replace them. It’s possible the replacement could have caused problems (although there’s nothing solid here to say they did), but if the whole army could be stopped by the absence of one man, they’d never get anything done. It’s clearly nonsense.
“Despite the Pa Annoyed spin, well Britain like a true European country full of western guilt about any violence…”
?!!!
I give up. You’re all evidently determined to impose your narrative on events.
Whatever happened to the cool and logical analysis that Samizdata used to apply to news? Or it’s scepticism about the moonbat media? If someone did a story saying Des Browne had sold out to glowing seven-legged aliens from Alpha Centauri, would you all be tutting about how it was typically spineless of the man and all the fault of
EuroGalactic Union regulations?! Sheesh!So a deal with militias giving Basra to thughery and doing nothing is a good policy? Well why dont you asked instead for the troops to come home instead of being humiliated by thugs and spending tax payers money?
Any deal with the likes of the goose-stepping Mehdi Army is a bad thing.
We should have kicked them to fuckeration and nailed Moqtada al-Sadr to his mosque door by his dick. Anything else is dereliction of duty. They are the enemy. They are not part of the solution regardless of how many folk they intimidate.
So far the Great War on Terror has resulted in the formation of two Islamic Republics. For fucking shame.
lucklucky,
It depends what you’re comparing it with. If we had been able to quickly eliminate the militias without significant loss of life, damage to civilians, and severe setbacks to the political process, then it would of course have made sense to do so. But the militias had a lot of popular local support, and were seen by many ordinary people as standing up to the sectarian favouritism of Maliki and the “Western Imperialists”. Continual fighting was wrecking the economy and the development of the Iraqi forces, none of who wanted to join up just to get shot at. And with the militia embedded in the population shielded by popular support, and with the Iraqi forces still worse than useless, it would have been costly and ineffective trying to root them out at that time.
Given a choice between a deal and eliminating the militia, you eliminate the militia. But if you are only offered a choice between a deal and likely killing a whole lot of civilians without eliminating the militia, one might elect to eliminate them later, when you can do so with more certainty of success.
Retreat is a standard tactic of warfare, and not evidence of cowardice. The idea is to use your forces most effectively where they’ll do the most good, to concentrate them on the enemy’s weak spots, not to waste your resources in pointless acts of bravado. Think about how William won the battle of Hastings. And the Mongols won half of Europe using feigned retreats as a tactic.
The point of doing the deal is much the same as with the Islamic hudna. You only agree to such a temporary deal when it helps your military objectives more than the enemy’s, in order to gain strength. And, as people constantly misunderstand, our aims in Iraq are not to beat the insurgents, but to make it possible for the Iraqis to beat them. Like raising a spoilt child, if you do everything for them they’ll never learn. You are in effect asking why the teacher did not do the student’s homework for them. The answer is because if we had, Maliki would not have put together the force that eventually did the job.
And also at the time they were doing it, I read opinions stating that much of the restraint was at the request of the Iraqi government, who were trying to stabilise the political situation within their coalitions with other parties who supported the militias. If I remember rightly, it was the Iraqi governing council that stopped the first US assault on Fallujah (Vigilant Resolve) from being pursued. (And there were atrocities there afterwards, too.) Don’t forget, it’s not just our politicians operating in this situation, and if you think ours are corrupt and incompetent, you should see what they have in the Middle East!
Nick M
Love you man.
Where in this universe is “Fuckeration” ? Are the chicks there cute ? And which airlines fly there ?
“Fuckeration” is just next door to “Shitistan” and is absolutely nowhere anyone wants to go unless carrying a brace of JDAMS with righteous intent.
I feel I have made myself abundantly clear on this point.
Obviously they have the right to to engage in dark-age rituals and obviously I have the right to pay my taxes for the RAF to bomb the fuckers back to the stone-age.
The stone-age if they’re fucking lucky. I personally favour napalming the cunts back to the Pre-Cambrian but that’s just me.
Pa Annoyed so all that quotes are false and/or dishonest? What evidence you do have to support that conclusion?
I am actually more puzzled to your comparison, as if there was any doubts of what a military leader hundred of years ago could do.
All speeches and actions in last 10-20 years hint of a greater Western cultural dificulty to deal with
War and its uncertainities and rollercoaster of fortunes.
Brittleness.
Looking at what goes in Britain today from news i see lots of instances of tail between the legs by Gov Officals against thugs and hard talk against people that drive fast cars, heat fat food, poluters and smokers. Easy targets.
——-
Blair & Brown wanted to eat the cake(mantain the special relationship) and still have the cake of good behavior (do nothing) to show in Media and Labour circles.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/2501918/Secret-deal-with-local-militia-kept-British-Forces-out-of-battle-for-Basra.html
A British colonel in Baghad said at the weekend that Britain had picked a Mahdi army commander in prison as a figure who could stop attacks against UK forces, then based inside the city limits. “We have made some terrible mistakes in Iraq and it is only by talking about them that we will learn from them,” said Col Richard Iron. “Last autumn we made a mistake which was understandable but not excusable.(…)
“As 90 per cent of the attacks were against us, we thought if we moved out we would remove the source of the problem. But actually the (Mahdi army) had been fighting us because we were the only obstacle to their total control.”
Nick
Shitstan I know. A friend who flies helicopters for the USMC flew over the place a couple of years ago. His reaction was the same as yours.
My Air Force buddies have been droping JDAMs and other fun stuff on the place for years.
I just got confused by the name of the place next door, I thought that Fuckeration might have something to do with the pleasent activity implied in the first four letters.
Sadly I see I got it confused, just as I do when I confuse a certain intoxicating liquid with a place called Scotland.
“Pa Annoyed so all that quotes are false and/or dishonest?”
I don’t know. I expect they were individual people’s opinions, based on parts of the picture, cherry-picked by moonbat journalists with an agenda. And at least some of the conclusions being drawn here aren’t deducible from what was said.
For example, the article says “The deal, which aimed to encourage the Shia movement back into the political process and marginalise extremist factions…” but this morphs into “Unwilling to deal with the problems of security in Basra (and the potential damage of soldiers forced to patrol with inadequate equipment)”. The article says “The British were partly handicapped because their commander, Major-General Barney White-Spunner, was away on a skiing holiday when the attack began. When Brigadier Julian Free, his deputy, arrived to discuss the situation with Mr al-Maliki at the presidential palace in Basra, he was made to wait outside.” But the conclusion drawn is “Why should an officer leave his assigned post during a major combat operation?” How does that follow? And to disagree that one follows from the other, do the quotes necessarily have to be false?
There are two possible charges that I think you might be able to justify from the quotes – that one of the intentions of the deal was to try to draw the Sadrists into the political process, and this failed (which I haven’t disagreed with), and that the delay in the British joining the fight reflects some sort of problem in the way they were set up.
It is possible that this was due to a delay in the politicians authorising the ROE change, it’s quite likely that the usual commander being away didn’t help, and it might even be what the MOD spokesman said it was in the last paragraph – that they were set up for a training mission and light patrols, had stacked their staff with instructors, and took several days to switch things around. Which is a very different sort of incompetence to doing nasty little deals with thugs in order to avoid taking losses.
“Blair & Brown wanted to eat the cake(mantain the special relationship) and still have the cake of good behavior (do nothing)”
Considering the utter media sewer Blair got dragged through politically for several years on end over Iraq, especially given that it was rumoured George offered him a get-out when he realised the domestic political cost Tony was facing, I definitely don’t think that applies to Blair! He got dragged through multiple enquiries in which he was virtually accused of murder. Ultimately, he lost his job over it. While Brown may have avoided the worst of that, he certainly hasn’t won any brownie points with the left for his role in Iraq either.
When the US stood against the UN corruptocrats, Britain stood with them, at considerable political cost both locally and globally. The Brits have contributed the biggest contingent to the alliance, and the only serious one in military as opposed to political terms. Our death rate has been comparable. Militarily, we’ve given everything we’ve got to the effort, at the cost of significant overstretch. We don’t claim to be perfect, but please don’t tell me we’ve done nothing.
The Basra pact with the Mahdi “Army” was a good front page story – I am glad that the Times treated it with due seriousness.
This was the issue of the Times (Tuesday August 5th) that also carried many interesting articles about Sozhenitsyn.
Contary to what Mille Woods says in another thread (something I believed myself at one time), I suspect that the Times may soon knock out the Daily Telegraph from its top spot in circulation.
As I now hate the Daily Telegraph (not everyone who works for it – but a goodly number of them), this can not happen soon enough for me.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20080808.wafghan08/BNStory/Afghanistan/home
“The NATO forces had not planned to make news of the assault public until next week but Brigadier-General Denis Thompson, the Commander of Task Force Kandahar, spoke to British reporters about the operation on Thursday, bringing an end to the embargo.”
American commanders have withheld public criticism of the British actions, and have said, when speaking not for publication, that they sympathize with the political problems Mr. Brown faces, because opinion polls indicate strong British opposition to the war within both his own party and the British electorate.
But the March events have sown ill feeling that has been rare between the militaries. One British expert on Iraq who has advised Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top American commander in Iraq, described the chill he encountered among American officers and civilian officials in Baghdad after the Basra offensive. He asked that his name be withheld in exchange for candor in discussing a sensitive topic.
“Having a British passport was a bonus” for advisers visiting Saddam Hussein’s old Republican Palace, the American command center in Baghdad, at earlier stages of the war, he said. “But when I went back in March, it was a distinct disadvantage. There was a strong air of disillusionment.”
lucklucky,
You’re quoting from The New York Times now? 🙂
Anyway, everybody knows that it’s because the British released giant man-eating badgers in the neighbourhood of Basra that they’re unpopular. The MOD denied doing it, but they would say that, wouldn’t they? I read about it all in the newspapers.
“British and Iraqi commanders in Basra had their own troop-surge plan to rid the city of Shia militia extremists but it was vetoed by the Iraqi Prime Minister, the Ministry of Defence has confirmed.”
So how could they do that, if they had a deal? Have they no shame?