Samizdata

Lord (Robert) Skidelsky is the biographer of JM Keynes. Keynes is, as regulars here know, a man generally regarded as the “dark knight” of economics, a man who made intellectually respectable notions that had been often regarded as little more than the ploys of quacks and charlatans. Books by Henry Hazlitt and William Hutt, for example, have in my view pretty much demolished his central idea: that the way to get out of a recession is for governments to print money in large amounts and hopefully, when the sun comes out from behind the clouds, to turn on the monetary and fiscal brakes later on. It is an approach that was destroyed by the stagflation of the 1970s, when a combination of high unemployment, out-of-control trade union power, low growth and skyrocketing prices forced policymakers to seek alternative sources of wisdom, in the forms of Friedman, Hayek and the rest. However, the attempts by governments to revive their economies in the past few years have given what I consider to be a spurious impression that Keynes’ ideas are still appropriate to our time. I disagree.

Skidelsky argues that the current Tory/LibDem coaltion government is making a fearful error in trying to reduce debt and spending. He also argues that what the world needs right now is a new sort of Bretton Woods agreement, moving on from the original deal as signed in the 1940s at the end of WW2. That agreement achieved, among other things, strict controls on capital flows between nations. It is hard for younger people to realise that it was not all that long ago that it was illegal, for example, for Britons travelling abroad to take more than a small amount of money out of the country without explicit consent. This is serfdom: if people are banned from taking money from place A to B even if they have earned it, then what is the difference between that and a serf seeking the consent of his lord before moving to another village down the road?

And in any event, as Lord Skidelsky knows only too well, the BW agreement eventually failed because of a combination of forces: rising government deficits, rigid, unionised labour markets and inflation (caused by things such as Vietnam War, the Great Society welfare policies in the US and UK); the oil crisis of the early 1970s, and developments such as the offshore Eurodollar market, which encouraged a relatively unregulated, vibrant financial market that made BW increasingly hard to operate. The stresses proved too great; the US finally severed any link between the dollar and gold during the Nixon presidency, and Bretton Woods was dead. A good summary of how it all went wrong can be seen in this recent book by Deepak Lal.

Keynes was not completely wrong on all the topics of the day, and to his great credit, the post-war settlement did include attempts to foster free trade and reduce protectionism, which policymakers realised had been such a disaster in the 1930s. But the idea of governments spending vast sums of central bank funny money as a way to deal with the results of previous monetary excess looks less and less wise with every day that passes. Keynes still has his devotees, such as Paul Krugman, but his ideas are not, by and large, what are needed to get us out of our current predicament.