The more I think about it, the more I realise that the establishment of a formal, state-run empire was a mistake, both from the point of view of the conquered peoples and from that of Britain. The first phase of British expansion – our informal mercantile dominion – was much the more successful. It is at least arguable that the nationalisation of the East India Company marked the moment when things started to go badly wrong.
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Even empires run better without a whole lot of stateApril 19th, 2008 |
 20 comments to Even empires run better without a whole lot of state |
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I disagree. Britain required military control to stop foreign countries taking over and banning British trade, which at the time was a serious possibility. The HEIC did have a military, afterall, and quite a sizeable one. It effectively formed a state in India, and we cannot forget that the institution itself was a state-chartered monopoly company, not a proper capitalist institution. The “informal trade dominions” were neither dominating nor informal.
There is a lot to be said for the fact that trying to run the Empire ‘pour la gloire’ did a great deal of damage to Britain, stretching our resources while providing little tangible benefit.
Ultimately, though, the problem came down to increasing industrialisation in the rest of the world. As early as 1910, it was impossible for us to afford to maintain a fleet in the East that could challenge the Japanese, a fleet in the North Sea that could challenge the Germans, a fleet in the Mediterranean that could challenge the Italians and a fleet in the Atlantic that could challenge the Americans. By 1939 we were only able to do two of these – we chose to fight Germany and Italy, give up the naval war in the East and fall into line with the Americans rather than challenge them.
The only hope for the Empire, therefore, was for it to survive long enough for Africa, India and the Middle East under our control to industrialise. Since Britain would no longer be a clear economic centre of such an Empire, it was clear that there would need to be broader representation. This was never and would never have been on the table, on the ‘colonials’ realised this, so they decided to break away when we were weak enough for them to be able to do so.
A shame, in a way. The idea of a ‘superstate’ on EU lines but existing under anglospheric classical liberal values rather than continental authoritarian corporatist values is a pleasant fantasy. But the sort of unity of purpose on the part of the British that would be required for bringing this about never existed. The Left was more interested in building a planned economy at home, and the Right would only accept an Empire dominated by white Britons.
It’s strange, looking back, to know that the ‘Feindbild’ on American ‘sand-tables’ was Britain & The Empire. FDR, no friend at all, ensured that we sank with all hands. Sic transit…
Might be of interest, only officially withdrawn in 1939 apparently -> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Plan_Red
I think Dan’s point here is that had the UK just allowed the East India Company to go bust or be destroyed that would have had two major benefits. First of all, the UK would not have been sucked into paying for the Empire. Secondly, any other imperialistic enterprise would have known that it had better rule well or else it would be doomed.
MDC,
On Plan Red: “only officially withdrawn in 1939 apparently…” That indicates a view of Great Power relations, influenced by the Wilsonian international moralism, ‘historical mission’, and ‘ethical foreign policy’ claptrap that has become the rhetorical commonplace (and in some stupid cases, actual driving force) of late 20th and early 21st century state postures. Realistic great powers have always kept war plans against all possible enemies among the others and working relationships with them, too.
Whether your aim is imperial growth or stable defence, you have to evaluate the practical consequences of all the opportunities and threats. That’s all foreign offices, intelligence services and general staffs used to be for.
Patrick Crozier – The HEIC had a monopoly on all trade between Britain and India; how would the HEIC possibly have gone bankrupt? Unless physically removed by the French Army (something that would probably have lost us the Napoleonic Wars, not a real option) I don’t see how.
Hannan seems to think the HEIC was an example of private enterprise – it wasnt. It belongs to a mercantilist view of economics whose closest successor is Marxism, and is far closer to British Layland than to HSBC.
guy herbert: If you say so, I dont think I indicated it was particularly shocking, I did flag up the possibility of war with America in my first post afterall.
What’s a lot more fun is the Canadian response, a plan for the pre-emptive seizure of much of the Northern US – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defence_Scheme_No._1
how would the HEIC possibly have gone bankrupt?
I understood that they suffered a small setback in 1857, which had significant potential negative implications for the bottom line.
MDC, you stole my thunder. I was about to provide the counter example of Defence Scheme no 1 until I saw your message. Unfortunately, I do believe it a bit late in the game for us to dust it off. But you never know; keep your eyes on the Arctic.
My solution when somebody doesn’t want to do business with me is to find somebody who does. Of course, I suppose I could go and FORCE them to buy my products, but if I’m going to do that, why should I bother providing products they don’t want? Wouldn’t it just be simpler to steal their money honestly?
You misunderstand me. It wasn’t a case of the domestic consumers deciding against British goods on grounds of cost, quality or convenience, it was a case of foreign countries moving in and forcing them at gunpoint not to purchase British goods (or indeed their domestic governments doing the same). Preventing this constitutes defending people from coercision, it doesnt abridge free trade or liberal values at all.
Generally true – for example both the areas of East and West Africa that came under the influence of Lugard were better ruled than when London was in charge.
But it did not occur even to Lugard that London would not take control – with all the stupid “marketing boards” and what not that came along in the 1930’s.
However, the East India Company was a government – it raised taxes and faught expansionist wars.
Wars that HURT the interests of the shareholders back home.
But even in the 18th century the powers-that-be had passed statutes and made deals that castrated the power of the shareholders.
That is why Edmund Burke found the shareholders were powerless to control the actions of people like Paul Benfield.
Although I believe that the tarrifs charged by my governement are harmful, both to us and to our trading partners, I would still be annoyed were a foereign power to invade America in order to protect me from them.
If and when it gets bad enough, America will change it’s own regime. Until the people have a better vision, any regime change initiated from outside would be pointless anyway, as we have seen in Iraq.
Who said anything about America? While far from ideal, America is reasonably good. The countries we’re talking about were feudal dictatorships, they were already far and away “bad enough,” at which point it doesnt matter the nationality or skin colour of the person putting an end to the violence, it is still moral.
MDC,
Does “defending people from coercion” in their trading decisions go as far as defending potential consumers of opium in China from the coercion of their govenrment (1842…)?
The final test for an empire is: what does it leave behind? To the extent that Britain’s former colonies practice the English virtues of freedom, fair play, parliamentary democracy and such, they have prospered. To the extent that they don’t, they haven’t.
Perhaps it does Alan – especially as the Chinese government exterminated whole villages (on the collective punishment principle), the people who did not use opium along with the people who did. And the idea was not to prevent the use of opium anyway – it was to preserve the Imperial monopoly.
And remember there were no regulations preventing Chinese people selling opium to the English – and they did (both in China and in London) right up to the First World War and beyond.
Still it is still “perhaps” – there are arguments either way (the war of 1842 might not have been the walk over it turned out to be).
Rich – “regime change from without is pointless”.
What about Germany, Italy and Japan in 1945?
Should the United States have said “O.K. we have defeated you in war, but we will just go home and allow power to either go back to the Fascists or be taken by the Communists”?
The chances of a democratic order emerging in these countries without American action were zero.
I AGREE with you that going into Iraq in 2003 was a mistake. But to try and draw any general non-interventionist conclusion from this is an even bigger mistake. And even in the case of Iraq the point now is to win the war (for to lose, and pulling out now means losing, will have consequences a long way from Iraq).
The world is not a static thing that will stay the same if the United States does not get involved – other powers will still get involved, American non-intervention would just mean their efforts would be unopposed.
The world has always been thus (great powers in a struggle with other great powers – including “armed ideologies” like radical Islam, or Jacobinism, or Marxism) – for example English “non-intervention” in the Low Countries in the 16th century would have meant the victory of Philip II of Spain (and not just in the Low Countries).
Non-intervention in the late 17th and early 18th century in Europe would have meant the victory of Louis XVI (and not just in Europe – eventually in Britain also).
Non-intervention in the late 18th and early 19th centuries would have meant the victory of Revolutionary France – and again not just “over there”.
And so on – right up to the Cold War.
To get involved or not is a hard headed calculation of long run national interest – it can not be decided by an a priori principle (non-intervention OR intervention) either way.
The British worked informally when they could. That was in places where there was already some kind of functioning state. South America, or the Indian princedoms. They started establishing more direct rule when they went into places that had less “state” than they needed to do business, or where they went in some place for defense reasons and needed to get it organized. The British made the most money off of trade with well organized places, countries not within its empire, or its “white” dominions and, I think, India. Next it made decent money off of trade where it had informal relationships with reasonably stable governments, like South America. The more picturesque and formal parts of the empire were not money-makers, on net.
That at least is my understanding of the history.
Norman Stone has a throwaway line in his book on the Eastern Front, 1914-1917, where he says everyone in Europe had the mistaken impression that Britain was rich because it had an empire. It was the other way around. It could afford the Empire because it was rich.
Lenin and many other not-so-useful idiots also got that one backwards.
That’s the problem with exceptionalism. It gives people permission to pretend that there is one set of behavour that is moral for them, and another which is moral for others.
An act is moral or immoral based on the nature of the act itself. If it is OK for you to impose your values on somebody else, then it is OK for somebody else to impose their values on you. That is called principal. You might want to check your favorite dictionary for the word, it’s an important concept.
That is called principal. You might want to check your favorite dictionary for the word, it’s an important concept.
True, but if you do check the dictionary you’ll have to spell the word correctly. It’s “principle”, not “principal”. Spelling is important, too.
As the worst speller here, I had better watch my step.
I am not interested in imposing my “values” on anyone. “Values” is much too vague.
But I do not have a moral problem with killing enemies.
My objection to the removal of Saddam was practical (what happens then?) not a moral one.
Saddam was an open enemy of the West in general and the United States in particular – and (if we are talking law) the first Iraq War had never really ended.
There were armed clashes (for example shooting at aircraft that were trying to prevent Saddam’s extermination plans) every day.
“Principle of nonintervention”.
An interesting principle – it means that one’s enemies take over the world.
Nonintervention AS A PRINCIPLE (as opposed to nonintervention when getting involved is going to backfire) would only work if everyone followed it.