The House of Lords of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland was formed (informally by Simon de Montfort, although some would trace it all the way back to the Anglo Saxon Witan, and formally by Edward the first) of the great landed families and the bishops – first just of England, then of Wales, then of Scotland and finally of Ireland (now just Northern Ireland).
The dominant opinion today holds that it is wrong for a House of Parliament to be made up of the aristocracy plus a few Bishops. So first the powers of the House of Lords (or House of Peers as it is more formally known) had its powers greatly reduced by the Acts of 1911 and 1949, then in the 1960’s an unwritten convention came into existence that no new hereditary peerages would be created, only life peerages. Perhaps this was on the Thomas Paine grounds that “hereditary legislators are as absurd as hereditary mathematicians”. Although Mr Paine never explained what was so good about elected mathematicians or what upholding the traditional principles of law had to do with mathematics anyway.
The government headed by Mr Blair has got rid of almost all hereditary peers, thus leaving the Bishops, in modern times joined by the Chief Rabbi and so on although by appointment, not by right, and the ‘life peers’, the people appointed by recent Prime Minister – mostly by Mr Blair himself. It is felt by most members of the House of Commons and by many outside it that only elected people should be part of Parliament and they are pressing for a fully elected House of Lords.
This would at least have the virtue of there not being ‘second class’ members of the House – as would be the case if some members of the House of Lords were elected and some were not. However, it does miss an important point. If the House of Lords is not going to be a House of Lords, why have one at all? Why not just have the House of Commons? After all many respectable nations (Norway, New Zealand and so on) have a ‘unicameral legislature’.
The United Kingdom (for all the existence of the Welsh and Ulster Assemblies and the ‘Parliament’ in Scotland) is not a federal country. So how is this second elected chamber to be elected?
If it is elected in much the same way as the House of Commons it is just a waste of money as it will mirror this House, and if it is elected in some way to counter the House of Commons there will be conflict between the Houses (not in, say, the sense that there is sometimes ‘conflict’ between the United States House of Representatives and the Senate, but real conflict). In the past a government with a ‘radical agenda’ could always say “we are elected and you are not, so you may delay us – but in the end you must give in on the fundamental points of our platform”, this was as true for Mrs Thatcher as it was for prior radical Liberal and Labour party governments.
But, with an elected ‘House of Lords’ or whatever it is to be called, they could turn round and say “we are elected as well and you are not getting out of the EU” (or whatever the measure was).
Lastly my fear is that an elected second chamber would be elected using proportional representation, thus meaning an alliance of leftist parties would hold a majority for ever, and would be elected on a regional basis – part of the old plan to divide the United Kingdom (really divide England ) into €uro regions under the control of the European Union.
As with most efforts at “government reform”, the current move appears to be motivated more by the idea that “something should be done” than by the idea that there is a coherent goal to be accomplished. No one seems to be able to articulate a purpose for an upper house, so there is likely going to be no particularly clear purpose in the end.
If we are to have an elected upper house, my own fanciful suggestion is election by non-secret ballot. The Lords would represent those people unafraid to publicly support their representative. As legislation would need to pass both houses, the Commons would remain as a check against intimidation by the powerful.
At least that way we’d know who to blame.
Does the American House of Representatives have the right to reform either the President or the Senate, they are elected. Does the President have likewise powers? Does our elected government or House of Commons have the right to reform the House of Lords?
Why should it be called the House of Lords once there are no Lords left there? And if wholly elected, will it not just be under the control of the parties whips?
We should have a proper written single document constitution, fixed term parliaments with mid-term elections of the second house and a supreme constitutional court. I further believe the electorate should have the ability to strike down law via a suitably sized petition followed by referendum.
The foxes have always looked after the chickens in this country, I would like to see that change.
The only power the American House of Representatives only has over the Senate is to initiate Amendments to the Constitution which could affect the Senate, whcih the Senate could then block. This has happened once, when popular election of Senators was imposed over appointment by the States. Otherwise the houses are separate.
The original idea of the two houses was to balance the power between high and low population states. In the Senate, a small population state is the equal of the large. So Vermont and New Hampshire are equal to New York and California, whereas in the House, they are not.
While I do not know the political situation in the UK, two house can make sense as a brake, one to the other. But that only works if there are different enough selection criteria for membership that they have different purposes. Two proportionally divided house do not do that, to my view.
A single house can work, though I think it requires proportional representation so that as many views as possible can be heard. Two houses can work better, but only if they work to restrict each others excesses, rather than reinforcing them.
Crosbie
If it were sufficiently easy to analyse who voted for the upper house you could effectively implement Verity’s suggestion of disenfranchising the public sector – if it were clear a Parliament were elected by those with a clear financial interest then those particular electors may become unpopular socially.
Alternatively, you could simply disenfranchise the public sector from voting for the upper house, effectively making the upper house a protector of civil society. This would be a neat compromise, making the proposal more palatable for the public sector and retaining their influence over who they think is better at running that sector.
I do question whether this would be sufficient to limit the budget itself, but it would follow that the expansion of state functions would be better scrutinized.
Simon
For some time now I have played with the idea of a second House appointed much like a jury, i.e. selected entirely at random and required to serve unless certain narrow conditions for exemption are met. This would avoid selection along party political lines, remove the peers and clerics (in all probability) and be truly representative of the population.
It’s a lunatic suggestion but, you never know, it just might work…
The United States had a revolution (not just a rebellion) that was led by (enough) liberal people that it ended up with a liberal constitution. They achieved this by killing people, i.e. fighting a war against a Parliamentary democracy whose political majority did not want Englishmen in America to have their rights as Englishmen… and also fighting and then dispossessing and expelling their many supporters in America (i.e. the Tories that get airbrushed out of so many US histories). The winners then used the political capital that comes from winning a war to make their wish for a very liberal political order a reality.
Britain will only get a liberal constitution if there is a liberal revolution in Britain, with all that implies… or at the very least a major upheaval.
It is just possible the break up of the UK (a definite possibility within the next 10-20 years) will provide said upheaval and make a liberal constitution possible for England and perhaps Wales. Scotland on the other hand is fucked and will become Venezuela-on-the-Tweed within a decade of complete independence.
I seem to remember that in Simon’s Parliament the Lords and Commons may have sat together – but it is long (very long) since I looked at this.
In the United States the idea that the Senate would block foolish things pushed through by a House of Representatives dominated by the big towns, came under pressure quite quickly.
In 1816 a tax on imports came into effect even though the United States was at peace, in 1824 the tax was increased, and in 1828 it was increased again.
This tax on imports was not really to pay for the army and navy and to pay off the national debt – it was protectionism, a form of welfare for big business.
The Senate proved ineffective at blocking it. Only by the Democrats (the Democrats where then the party of less restricted trade and smaller government) winning elections (for President and having strength in the House of Representatives) were things pushed back (the tariff reaching its low point with the measure of 1857).
Of course if the-powers-that-be really wanted “democracy” they could either have a popular vote on every measure, or they could have a special “jury” of X hundred members (chosen at random every few years) – to form a Parliament directly “of the people”.
Of course this is not wanted at all. What is desired is the rule of a political elite (via parties) who people are convinced to vote for (by their image) even though they know little of their real beliefs or character.
Libertarians have had a lot of problems with William F. Buckley over the years, but one thing he said is apt in this regard – I would rather be governed by the first five hundred names in the Boston telephone directory than by the people they elect.
That is true of the telephone directory of any city in the West.
Of course, there is little chance of even a second chamber being made up of people who are selected at random (by lot).
The “great and the good” will want it to be made up of people like them – and will design the rules accordingly.
That is why it would be best to replace the House of Lords with nothing at all. Better nothing that another load of jobs for “Guardian” newspaper readers.
The 17th amendment to the US constitution is perhaps the most fundmental vandalism of our constitution and balance of powers ever perpetrated.
The key feature of the separate bodies in the US legislature is that they represent different constituencies. The proportional thing was politically important but overlooked the most significant feature of the system.
The US Senate represented not the popular vote, it represented the states’ governments. The senators used to be selected by the states’ legislators. The senate
iswas the states’ foreign policy arm. Itiswas the body that would interupt the national govenment’s policies that place hard burdens on the states directly, like the present use of state troops to carry out international policy rather than regular army. The national guard should have been kept for territorial defense, not execution of foreign policy over which the state governments no longer have any influence.The House of Lords should expressly not represent the popular vote or that of the other house. A life peerage is as much a vandalism of your constitution as popular selection is of ours. While hereditary peerages may not represent the average person, the fortunes of England and later the UK maintained steady long term improvement under their institutional authority and has declined in parallel with the decline of the power of the Lords.
Paul- I live in the State of New South Wales, in Australia. Both State and Federal governments have two chambers, and the Federal Senate does its’ job of reviewing legislation. The Legislative Assembly, in NSW, never seems to do anything. On general principles, I support a two-chamber system, since it can stop parties getting too much power. I often think that our ‘upper’ house should be composed of appointees from the shires and local counties. Perhaps a reformed ‘house of Lords’ could be built along similar lines.
And a written constitution would be nice, but make sure that the Bill of Rights gets rejuvenated and made part of the system, and is not just like a pretty book-cover.
Perry- The thirteen states helped the new country be liberal because they didn’t want to cede any powers to the central government- so Britain might be liberalated if the Scottish and Welsh and Irish sections were equal partners with an equal say in any future restructuring.
Errr Scotland already has an “equal say” in the United Kingdom – more than equal actually. England (with many times the population of Scotland) is governed by Labour party Scots.
As for the Australian Constitution – well at least, when people want the govenment to do more things, the Consitution is amdended to allow this (for example the various Welfare scheme amendments just after World War II).
More power gets given to the Federal government in the United States without any Amendment to the Constitution – as the Constitution of the United States is “interpretated” to allow such powers.
Of course, (contrary to Manning Clark) there was no great demand for an Australian government anyway – in fact it was largely British influence that got New South Wales and the others to come together in 1901 (their was concern that without one government the land could not be defended against future aggression). Perhaps it is fitting that it was with World War II that income tax got taken away from the States and handed over to the Commonwealth (1942 if memory serves).
I know at least one Australian (who used to be strong States rights man) who now believes that the State governments should be abolished – and the upper house at federal level.
Although if Labour had the majority in the lower house I suspect he might have a different opinion.
On the general point about second chambers stopping parties having two much power:
It depends on what you want to get done. Bad things (at least bad from the libertarian point of you) are fairly easy to do with two chambers (or more), want to increase government spending, or impose more taxes – it will (with a few tweaks here and there) go through. Although I hope the United States Senate bucks that trend over the next couple of years.
But if you want to reduce govenment spending or repeal regulations – it is hard enough to get this through one chamber (even if one has a majority). More than one chamber and ………
On the point above about the 17th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States:
I can think of worse things (such as various Supreme Court judgements), but I can not think of anything good this Amendment did. And, yes, you are right – the Senate was supposed to represent the States (not the people in the States voting on national issues).
I thought long and hard on that Paul before I said “most fundamental”, and even reviewed in my mind many of the most egregious cases (and non-cases where they refused to grant somebody access to the laws) and decided that the description was appropriate. In no small part because of the senate’s role in the make up of the judicial system.
The judicial used to error in all directions. Now it errors almost exclusively in the direction of less restraint on the national government in any form.
RE the HoL compared to the senate, it seems possible that in a very loose sort of way, the a hereditary Lords did at some long past time represent a sort of different type of government from the central one vaguely similar to the states vs national. Is that a complete misunderstanding of what their original place in society was?
I disagree about the “key feature” of the two houses. The key feature of the Senate is that a determined minority can throw a spanner in the works.
I’m afraid that the HL probably doesn’t have the chutzpah to call the bluff, issue a statement that says something like “We welcome becoming an elected body and as such we should have both unique powers and shared powers with the House of Commons such as:
War Powers
Ministerial Oversight including the power to remove ministers”
That’s not real good, it’s late, but the I think that they should try to start a public debate over what type of powers they have. I think that might put the monkey back on the House of Commons, a group I doubt is really keen to share or give up any power.
The real problem with an elected upper house is that it will probably be done by PR and forever condemn this country to left.
A popularly elected House of Lords would not answer to the people. It would answer to the political parties. That is an unavoidable problem with popular elections.
Only because they permit it in their rules. What matters is who selects the senators because that is who they serve. Popular elections rely so heavily on party support that out of 535 legislators, virtually none can be elected without party approval. Presently there are zero independents in the House of Representatives and two in the US Senate. (Lieberman and Sanders, both of whom caucus with the Democratic party)
The UK would be no different. At least with the present hereditary peerages, that can’t be (?) forced out of office for not toeing the party line. That is probably why the big push for ‘reform’.
As for the Australian Constitution – well at least, when people want the govenment to do more things, the Consitution is amdended to allow this (for example the various Welfare scheme amendments just after World War II).
Well, that is actually the only time in Australia’s history when the powers of the federal government has been increased by referendum. (I would consider the “Aboriginal Affairs” amendment to be a special case, and there were also a couple of amendments that ultimately put responsibility for borrowing money with the federal government that might also count. The federal government has always had the power to raise income tax – what happened in the war was that it used wartime emergency powers to take over the apparatus of income tax collection from the states).
That contrasts with more than 20 occasions in which governments have attempted to have the constitution amended to increase federal government powers and the voters have rejected the amendment. The powers of the federal government have increased, but far more with the consent of the courts (who have interpreted the constitution in a federal government friendly way) than the people.
What Australia does have is multiple power centres – the government, the senate, and the High Court. Although this hasn’t really prevented government from expanding in scope, what it has done has provided protection against a government running roughshot over civil liberties and the common law, as has sadly happened in Britain in recent years.
Democracy as a creed is dead from the neck up. It only has the very slightest chance of long-term survival, and only if it adopts the following procedure with the new second chamber, to whit:
There are two classes of people in this country:
1) The Tax Eaters
2) The Tax Payers
The Tax Eaters currently control the ‘House of Commons’ – which should perhaps be renamed in honour of its patrons, ‘The Representative House of Parasites’.
The Tax Payers should get the new body, ‘The Representative House of Producers’.
Each person in the country would be audited each year in terms of how much tax they consume and how much tax they produce. Anyone consuming more tax than they create is automatically EXCLUDED from voting for the second chamber.
Further, each individual would have a weighted vote dependent on exactly how much net tax they produce. Thus, if Mr De Havilland paid 100,000 net in tax each year, he would get 100,000 votes, whereas if I paid a meagre 10,000 net in tax each year, I would get a measly 10,000 votes.
Obviously, virtually all Guardian readers and other tax eaters would be EXCLUDED (Hurrah! 🙂
And the rest of us who pay for the leather-seated Saabs and Volvos of these miserable statist scum would regain some measure of control over the amount of pelf these bloodsuckers could extract from us, via our second chamber.
Not that any of the above is going to happen in a million years – it’ll be another stitch up for all the boys to get their snouts further into our wallets – but if my plan above fails to win support, that’s good in another way, because it really will (I hope) lead to the eventual collapse of democracy, probably when the welfare/state pension black hole finally implodes.
First, the issue with the House is the Gerrymandering of the Congressional districts.
Second, your reply is an Ignoratio Elenchi, irrelevant to my assertion (yes, I am willing to admit it) that the power of the minority in the Senate is it’s most important feature in practice, regardless of where it comes from.
Finally if the 17th Amend. hurt the States, they did it to themselves by ratifying the Amend., or did you forget it takes the approval of the 3/4 of the state’s legislatures or state elected constitutional conventions to ratify an Amend?
Finally if you look at history, in many ways the 17th was moot as many states had already given voters a say in the selections of Senators.
OOPS, missed the double finality
Dammit! LINK (Link)for block quote
Australia first:
If I gave the impression that Australian voters are a bunch of big government lovers I apologize.
What I was trying to say is that in Australia the voters get a choice -whereas in the United States the Constitution is “interpreted” to allow lots of things. For example the two Supreme Court judgements of 1935 (when all “Four Horsemen” were still on the Court) that allowed the Federal govenment to steal privately owned gold (without even the excuse of war) and void the gold clauses in private contracts – thus voiding whole sections of the Constitution, with a lot of double talk about “gold certificates” and other such.
More broadly the way the PURPOSE of the powers granted to Congress “the common defence and general welfare” has been turned into a “general welfare power” in-its-self thus justifying any welfare state program.
And, of course, there was the World War II “interpretation” of “interstate commerce” to mean any commerce at all (if you sell an apple to someone this will have an impact on the national price of apples over State lines, therefore……..).
The question is “would a Senate elected by the States have made for better judges on the Supreme Court” and I do not know.
However, the two “Greenback cases” strike a note of concern.
In the first case Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase led the majority in to, quite correctly, ruling that the Federal government had no right to issue paper money (by whatever dodge) as it was only given the power to issue “coin” (and this was not an accident – the Continental Congress had issued paper money, hence “not worth a Continental”, and the Founders did not want to repeat the experience). This Chase did in spite of the fact that he had been the very T. Sec who had issued the green backs during the Civil War – i.e. he (de facto) convicted himself.
Now the government added judges (with the consent of the Senate – long before the 17th Amendment) and in the second Green Back case Chief Justice Chase found himself in the minority.
Now “it did not matter” as the government was getting rid of the green backs anyway. But in 1913 (when the “private” dodge of the Federal Reserve System was put in place) the govenment could say “even if these really are govenment notes, there is nothing wrong with that – look at the second Green Back case”.
The question Midwestener asked about the Lords:
This is a BIG QUESTION (for once my love of capital letters is justified), and (for example) it goes to the heart of the difference between Western and Islamic civilization in the middle ages (and beyond).
On the face of it there was no great difference between the West and Islam.
In both the ruler was the owner of the land and handed out fiefs (or whatever the grants of land revenue were called) to various people, in return for various services.
However, in their was another tradition in the West.
For example, the Edict of Quierzy in 877 (the same conference that tried to fight back against predestinationism – but that is another story) held that fiefs were hereditary.
Land was not to be taken away at the whim to the ruler, and to be handed on to the next generation – not to revert back to the ruler.
This is DE FACTO PRIVATE PROPERTY IN LAND.
It is fashionable to dismiss the lords who got land in England when William the Bastard took over in 1066 as a bunch of robbers, and in many ways they were.
BUT – they did not hold with the idea that all of England belonged to William (no matter what the official line was).
They wanted to keep the bits they got (regardless of his will) and hand them on to their kids.
This is the long story of the middle ages in England. Why did some “barons” side with Henry the first against his older brother in 1100? Partly because he promised to respect their land holding (he also did other things to bring the Anglo Saxon English on his side – such as stress that he was born in England, marry a direct descendent of Alfred the Great and so on).
Why did some lords rebel against King John (a rebellion that led to the great charta of 1215) – partly because he was believed to be a threat to their land.
Parliament was intended by Simon de Montfort (from 1258) as a check on Royal power – such as Royal power as a threat to property.
For whatever the official line was (and still is hense “free holding” as a form of “tenure”) the lords (and others) came to see their land – as just that THEIR LAND.
Nor is this ancient history – even in the 18th century, “the Crown” (not really George III – but the people about him) was seen as threat to property rights not just in America but also in England.
Even the Duke of Portland (one of the biggest landowners – sorry “land holders” as the official line would have it) found that some of his properties were under threat as being of “doubtful title, which should revert to the Crown” – a special Act of Parliament (pushed through by Edmund Burke) was passed to stop the lawyers playing this game.
“How does all this relate to my question?”
Simple enough.
The lords (by virtue of their, then, extensive holdings of land) were felt to be a different type of interest to the businessmen in the towns, or even the farmers of the shires.
They were thought to be big enough individuals to act as a check on the Crown – an “aristocratic element in the constitution”.
The Whig view of England was not quite “a confederation of great country houses” (the great landed familes), but they did think these powerful landowner (strong in various parts of the country) could act as check.
After all these men not only had influence in House of Lords – they also had influence (via their land holdings) in many House of Commons seats (before the Act of 1832), just as the Crown (via its holdings) could count on about 50 seats in the House of Commons (before bribes or anything else).
So, you see, John Adams rather missed the point when he talked about an “aristocracy of talent”.
No one (at least very people) claimed that the great landed families were especially talented, or moral – that was not the point (so an aristocracy of talent would be no subsitute for what they were really about).
The point was that individuals had enough behind them to stand against government.
Government contracts were of no importance to a man like the M. of Rockingham – he had the landed estates (not just farming, but coal and other such) to snap his fingers at them.
Nor could a couple of men be sent arrest Rockingham. He could call (if need be) on many armed men to assist him. To arrest someone like Rockingham would be big thing – so better not to try it. Over the centuries a certain code of behaviour had evolved – which was basically “do not try and kill me and I will not try and kill you”.
Powerful landed men can not be made to vanish in the same way that an individual small farmer or tradesman (whoever talented) can.
Of course rule by the great lords might be terrible (some have argued that was the curse of Polish history) – but as an ELEMENT in the constitution they were vital.
Liberty they demanded for themselves (as they did not fully control the government, the Crown being quite strong, they wanted it limited) could not be limited to themselves (as to a great extent it was in places like Poland) – so it went right down the social scale.
The barons of 1100 or 1215 may not have given a toss about ordinary people, but by the 18th century it was assumed that the body and goods of the ordinary person could not be touched by the government without proving a crime – just as for the greatest lord.
Of course the Lords of the 18th century were not the same people as the Lords of 11th century.
They were (in reality) not even mostly the same families. Various English familes had got some money together over time and had married into the Norman aristocracy. Indeed some English familes had just bought up old estates and changed their names. It was always possible to buy a title of noblity in England – perhaps not for a rich merchant, but if that merchant bought land the son could buy a title (especially if his name somehow changed from something like “Smith” or, if Welsh, “Jones” to something like Fitz…. whatever.
I was once told that there are only two familes left owning estates in England that can (in reality) trace their line back to people who came over with William the Bastard.
If true this would be poetic justice.
After all in the Doomsday Book prepared under William there were only two Anglo Saxon landowners (sorry “land holders”) left in England.
I think Paul Marks is on the right track.
I understood that the Lords were composed of the “power elite” of the time who insisted they be consulted by the central government (the Crown) before major actions were taken – and the commons were, at the time, the “lesser power elite” (at least until electoral reform).
Today the “power elite” would not necessarily be major land holders/owners, but the Richard Branson’s, et al. (at least in the private sector).
I certainly understand the desire to be ruled by someone elected rather then sitting via an accident of birth (Buckley notwithstanding), but just how does one jusitfy an elected uppper chamber in the UK today? What interests are they representing, other then merely a second power center, with their own personal ambitions, to check the Commons? (not that there is anything wrong with that, a lot of our US states are set up just that way).
Most interesting in all of this is that the Commons would apparently tolerate the creation of an elected rival. THAT is the news in this for me.
andrewdb,
The thing that helps it all make sense is to realize who it is that popularly elected officials truly represent. The nature of the beast is that they represent not the constituents of their districts, but the party that they are members of.
It is through control of ballets, rules and commisioners of elections, and having party members in places of administrative, legislative, and even in many cases judicial power, that parties are able to offer the whip or the carrot to their members. UKIP got a taste of what trying to work from the outside is like.
An elected ‘upper’ house is not problem to commons, it just gives them a potential pay-raise/ego boost to aspire to. A great many senators were representatives first. Since they all serve the same master, it is the party leaders who matter. Sound familiar?
I think your Bransons, et al idea would substantially reproduce the original role of the Lords, but would be politically even less likely than reverting to only hereditary Lords in that house.
Paul Marks,
you really should write books. I’ve said before that your history descriptions remind me of historian James Burke’s Connections programs. They are memorable because instead of capturing an entire snapshot of one point in time, they follow a single common thread through history.
I remember James Burke’s “Connections” – and I liked the series (although, like any such effort, it can be attacked). I also remember James Burke from his commentary on the Moon landings – indeed these are my first memories (which, more or less, gives away my age).
As for writing books – well if things had gone differently I would have written them (I intended to be academic), but things did not work out that way for me.
“But you could write books without having a position” – no. Other people can, but I can not.
On businessmen:
Well Cathage is supposed to have been dominated by rich traders and manufacturers (as opposed to landowners) and it lasted for centuries. And some people say Venice was (and some people say it was not – I confess I do not know).
However, it was considered by the classical writers who were interested in this (basically Aristotle for the Greeks and Cicero for the Romans) that only with something physical underneath them (land) could a man really be independent – a trader would always be looking for that government contract or tax money (like the publicans of Rome) or other such.
Of course farmers get big subsidies these days (which would have confused Aristotle – who considered even small farmers as the great reserve of independence against the city mob), but so do some businessmen.
And if there was ever a businessman who understood how to play the system for his advantage (via P.R. and the use of regulations) his name is Richard Branson.
Here’s an interesting thought- Why not have an extra house, to be known as the house of Repeal? The sole function of this house would be to look at any and all laws, and repeal any of them! In the natural world, we have creation, sustainance, and destruction, but our political world only has the first two covered! Parties could advertise which laws they would specialize in repealing (Labour would bring in Welfare laws, and repeal fair tax laws, etc., whilst the Cons would simply CLAIM to do this, etc.) At least we’d have less laws this way.
The same idea gets kicked around here, every so often.
I think I’d rather just encourge my congressthings to spend so much time taking bribes and having illicit sex with each other that they never have time or energy to do anything really harmful.
Treat them like prisoners in Sunfishtopia, in other words. The idea is to keep them confined where they can’t endanger the rest of us. We don’t have to punish them. Supplying prisoners with hookers and blow might be cheaper than the current system. We just keep them locked up.
Maybe lock the congressthings up with the inmates? Have a prisoner-politician exchange program? And we sell it to CBS: those dumbasses will buy any show billed as ‘reality.’ “Tony Blair in Prison, the series!”
Picture it: Blair and Cameron, in an 8’x10′ cell 22 hours a day, getting 2300 calories of hot dogs and oatmeal pushed under the door each day, and trading each other to the neighbors for cigarettes…you know you smiled when you read that.
I did smile – clearly I have a sadistic streak.
As for a repeal house – well Lord Harris of High Cross (Ralph Harris when I first met him – not to be confused with the Australian gentleman) set up a “repeal group” inthe House of Lords do try and do just that (he sat on the “cross benches” i.e. as a true independent). But he died years ago (well that memory has taken the smile off my face).
As for getting politicians out of the House (in these days when the powers-that-be will not accept membership by birth), well there is an alternative to election or appointment.
Chance – a vast jury of X hundred people chosen (at random) every few years. “Experts” (or either side of a suggestion) could still make their case – but the final choice would be theirs.
“But we could not have that” (would say the “liberal” elite) – so much for their “faith in the people” and beloved “democracy”.
They’ve been unusually bad about that here, the last few years.
Back in the 1990’s, my state’s voters passed the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights, a constitutional amendment which dramatically limited the taxing power of state and local governments by requiring a popular vote for every increase in tax rates. TABOR also limits the rate of government growth and requires refunds of any revenues in excess of those limits.
Naturally, the left have been squealing about how democracy took power away from the General Assembly and keeps them from being able to effectively legislate. My usual response is “You’re damn right!”
Now, we have a state senator from Boulder who introduced a bill that would prevent any person from being elected to office, if he was rejected in a party primary. Senator Tupa apparently believes that selecting congressmen isn’t the job of the voters after all. An odd perspective from someone who claims to be from the “Democratic” party, I thought.
Quite so Sunfish.
What is the bill called – the “We Do Not Want Any Joe Libermans In This State” bill?