You may have thought that the recent search orgy at British airports was triggered by a genuine fear that passengers might bring something explosive on board. Apparently not, because the same regulations apply to air crew too. It is of no consequence to the official mind that a pilot can destroy an airliner without any technical assistance. (9/11 didn’t change quite everything – even where it might be thought to be relevant by us untrained civilians.)
Here is an extract from the security briefing from the BALPA (pilots’ association) website:
The requirements for airline crew are:
Any crew, whether operational or positioning, using passenger search areas must be subjected to the same security measures as passengers.
Crew accessing the Restricted Zone through staff search areas must carry only the items they require to perform their duties (including personal hand baggage meeting that description). All such items must be x-rayed where possible and hand searched where not. All crew must be hand searched.
However, no liquids of any type are permitted other than those mentioned above as able to be taken into the Restricted Zone by passengers.
At airports where there is no specific staff search facility, airports should make special arrangements for crew to be screened away from passengers.
How thoughtful they insist crew are not searched in front of passengers. One would not want them humiliated any more than is strictly necessary. Creating artificial privileges is in any case good psychology to keep the recipients of privilege loyal to the heirarchy. It also helps to avoid anyone getting the idea that the whole rigmarole is ludicrous.
I respectfully dissent. The crew can cause the destruction of the airplane only with themselves in it if searched (assuming perfect searches). If not searched, you could get a crew member who leaves Time Bombs, Remote Detonation Bombs, or materials for someone else to use. A crew member assistant would be an invaluable method for terrorists to bypass normal searches.
I will not touch on whether the searches are in fact effective, of justifiable in general terms.
Or, a suicide bomber could target an unsuspecting stewardess, form a relationship with her, and one morning while she’s in the shower, plant a bomb in a secret compartment in her carry-on bag…….
Or plant a gun instead, and “coincidently” book a flight leaving at the same time as one of her trips, and meet her at the airport bar before your flight, and look after her bag for her while she goes to the toilet……
You know the questions they ask about your baggage ? “Are you carrying anything for anyone else”, “Have your bags been out of your possession since you packed” ?
Who has actually ever said “yes, I’m not sure what’s in my bags”? You lie, say “no, no”, and go about your business. The reasoning behind the questions is valid, although I don’t see the point in actually asking them unless it’s just to get you thinking, or to be able to more easily prosecute you if something is found in your bag….
Guy Herbert,
Three points:
(1) Only one of the pilots could in principle crash the plane. Modern planes carry an aircrew of over a dozen. Even in the case of a pilot, any attempt to crash the plane would be resisted by the rest of the flight crew. A bomb or incendiary would be much more effective. Moreover, a member of the flight crew may not be suicidal. They may simply place a device on plane intended to detonate after they leave it.
(2) The “purloined letter” gambit can never be ruled out. If flight crews are not routinely searched then placing a device into their luggage or effects without their knowledge becomes an obvious tactic.
(3) Flight crews can be impostors. Any identity verification system can be spoofed and the possibility that that an impostor could gain access to the aircraft without any expectation of being searched should be a serious concern.
You can’t stop your analyses of methods of attack with the first one you find. Just because a pilot could crash a plane doesn’t mean that other possible methods of attack from the flight crew do not exist and won’t be used.
There is a lot of discussion of possible but relatively very unlikely types of attack and methods of protecting against them. Is this constructive? Is it any better than what the Government seems to be doing?
In all forms of security, there must be consideration of methods of attack and the protective measures to be taken against them. Then there must be consideration of the likelihood of the security being effective against the attack, compared to what it costs to use that security measure.
In addition there must be consideration of the probability of the various forms of attack. This is, itself, affected by how costly and difficult an attack is to make, and how likely it is to succeed. There is a deterrent effect. Informed attackers make careful judgements on the basis of their perception of the security in place (rather than the actuality of the security that is in place).
There is also the issue of unsophisticated and copycat attacks. These must also be protected against, and are very likely more prevalent than well-planned sophisticated attacks.
It is important to remember that security resources spent against an unlikely attack (especially if expensive resources) mean that those resources are not available against more likely attacks.
Overall the whole business of security requires a lot of careful analysis of the statistical sort. When there is a flap on, it seems such careful analysis sometimes does not get done. Or, more likely, does not get sufficient weight in the largely innumerate political world in which we now live.
Best regards
Guy, your approach to this, and many other questions and situations involving the hostility between members of the Islamic community and the West, reminds me of the aristocrat who is surprised, and disgusted, by the fact his carriage horses crap in the street.
After you’re done turning up your nose, and, naturally, refusing to clean up the mess yourself, you stand around kibitzing the poor peasant who has to wield the shovel, criticizing his every move.
You’re a diletante.
Absolutely I’m a dilettante. Though I hope in the original, less pejorative sense.
But I am not inconsistent. What I’m surprised and disgusted by is the way that quite small risks are used as a pretext for ever more official interference with our lives, and people who would have no truck with that if the risks came from lifestyle choices, are among the hottest supporters of undermining our freedom if the operative pretext offers scope for fear of foreigners and/or organised violence to them. I’m infuriated and frustrated by a nasty but fundamentally weak threat is fanned by treating it as if it were the end of the world.
(That some weird fringe Christians do believe that it does presage the end of the world, doesn’t help. But we should none of us be in the business of fulfilling prophecy on behalf of religious nutters of any sort.)
The desire of the authorities to demonstrate they are doing something while covering themselves against the possibility of being blamed for something, however unlikely, that does happen, is what drives most of the the security theatre. They are spending your money and wasting your time and giving themselves the satisfactions of power and more jobs, so the real magnitude of the threat is almost irrelevant to the effort that will be expended on it. If it costs a billion pounds to cover some junior ministerial career for the wekend, it will be spent.
As Nigel points out, pre-empting unlikely threats may well be a waste of resources if not properly evaluated. I suspect more strongly that it almost always is when the pre-empting is done is the political sphere against virtual risks. No evaluation is taking place, or is likely to be.
But security theatre is also a positively damaging activity, whatever the opportunity costs. It reinforces in would-be terrorists the idea that their kind have the power to affect the world, that “we” colllectively, fear “them” collectively. And it reinforces in the British public unthinking conformity with arbitrary official instructions “for their own good” and suspicion of those who don’t.
I’m with guy on this one. Can anyone give a single reason why the flight crew shouldn’t go through their security shakedown in public, like the rest of us plebes?
People seem to be arguing above that various kinds of search are appropriate for flight crew. Fine. But why do they get felt up in private while the rest of us have to do it in the middle of a public hallway?
The US Congress were recently trying to exempt themselves from the searches. Nobody should be exempt, least of all members of the parasite class.
And after the baggage is searched it is loaded on the aircraft by casual labour who steal quite a bit of stuff (and can slip in anything they want). By the way the security guards steal to (and could also slip things in if they had a mind to).
The “security” is a joke.
As for searching the pilot – if people can not see that is absurd I do not know how to explain it to them.
In the 19th century there were many Irish Nationalist bomb blasts in Britain – the railway station (or whatever) was cleared of the dead bodies (they looked untidy) and then things would carry on.
People who prefer security to liberty end up with neither – and deserve neither.
When Britian is a full police state there will still be terrorist incidents (perhaps more than there are now).
However, politicians and administrators do not operate in a vacuum. If most people did not tolerate (indeed DEMAND) all this stuff the politicians and administrators would not get away with it.
Indeed some politicians might not even do it if most people did not demand it.
Such things as the take over of airport security by the Federal government and the creation of a department of Homeland Security were resisted by the Bush Administration at first – some people within it had doubts (but these doubts were beaten down by external demands).
In Britain (almost needless to say) the Blair government does not have any doubts about destroying what is left of liberty in the name of “security”.
There was a time when many (perhaps most) British and American people when confronted with a government representative pointing a firearm at them would have said something like “point that thing away from me Son, or I will put a bullet in you”.
Of course that was a time when people were allowed to carry firearms.
If the government wants armed guards and searches outside its offices that is its business.
However, if government people start turning up on other people’s property they should be told “if we blow up we blow up, now fuck off”.
If people want to stand in lines for hours and get probes shoved up their backsides I am sure there are airlines that would cater for their tastes.
As for the Muslim question:
I quite understand that after September 11th, 2001 pulling out troops from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the region would have been giving in to terrorism (however misguided having troops in alien naions was in the first place), however it is not true that war must lead to the end of liberty (however tempting it is to use war as a excuse to so end it).
Of course the next major terrorist incident (perhaps atomic next time) and people will be demanding yet more government “security”.
As I stated above most people do not really value liberty and think that government action can make them imortal.
No one gets out of life alive, and anyone can die at any time.
But modern people will not accept that.
I suppose even asking them why, if government can solve any problem, (after so many years) O.B.L. and his Second in Command are still at large, would not shake their faith.
No doubt the response would be “kick Bush and the Republicans out” as if the Democrats could have done any better.
R C Dean,
But why do they get felt up in private while the rest of us have to do it in the middle of a public hallway?
I don’t know for sure but I can speculate. Air crews must board planes several times a day, every work day. Getting frisked in public several times a day all week might be emotionally burdensome.
They might also do it in order not excite the more volatile passengers. Some people have enough trouble flying without a very public and visual reminder that the people in which they must trust their lives might conceivably be willing to actively kill them. Keeping the loons calm is a surprisingly big part of managing a commercial air flight.
guy herbert,
The desire of the authorities to demonstrate they are doing something while covering themselves against the possibility of being blamed for something, however unlikely, that does happen, is what drives most of the the security theatre
Yes and no. We know how to secure air travel because El Al has been doing it successfully for 30 years. We won’t use El Al’s methods because they involve profiling and invest in security officers at the gate the authority to bar people from boarding based on nothing but their gut feel. We are politically unwilling to go to such lengths so instead of looking for dangerous people, we look for dangerous things which is a much harder job. Anyone tasked with keeping dangerous objects off airplanes while treating every passenger the same as every other will soon be driven to the extremes because of the inherent nature of the threat.
I like airports better after 9/11 and don’t care about the security screenings. I try to pick a line with a cute NG or TSA guy, so if he cops a feel, at least the Twins are getting some action from a hottie. LOL
Seriously, airports were like third world village markets before 9/11 and all the riffraff were in there. Self-important VIP types screamed at ticket agents about late/missed flights due to weather/fog (as if the agent was personally responsible) and got everybody’s BP and cortisol up. Now the riffraff are kept out beyond the security gates, it’s less crowded, more peaceful, and the executives wouldn’t dream of screaming because it would draw attention by the security folks. Life is much better in the airport nowadays.
I never quit travelling after 9/11–in fact, flew Heathrow to Dulles on 9/18, the first day the international flights started back up again. I didn’t mind being “observed” by plainclothes types in the Heathrow garage while waiting to be called up; pointed it out to my sis who was oblivious. The US airports had military/NG with sniffer dogs when I got back, and the airports were eerily quiet. Quite nice, really.
I just wish TSA would do better “profiling” and give extra scrutiny to those who are closer to the statistically likely profile of terrorists. The fiercely nondiscriminatory approach is obviously stupid and a waste of resources. I bet OBL is giggling at our boneheaded determination to stripsearch grannies in wheelchairs and small children. DUMB!
A couple of hours ago I was talking with someone who has a good knowledge of chemistry (an Ulster Protestant who is neither a leftist nor a soft person – quite the opposite in fact) and he informed me that the stuff from the government about the chemical bomb plot is largely bullshit.
To make useful bombs from the chemicals described would take hours of (very careful) work on the aircraft. The time and equipment used and the smell and heat given off by the work would rather attract attention.
They would be better off to get the various liquids and prepare them into the solid chemical before they got on the aircraft (apart from of the stuff being so unstable it would most likely go off in the car on the way to the airport).
Of course it is possible that all these Muslims who have been arrested just came up with a plot that could not work.
But it is interesting that none of the newspapers or broadcasting stations have (as far as I know) pointed out that the science the government is comming out with does not make sense.
The government is relying on technobabble to justfy its actions – and the public accept it.
yeh it a load of poo so yeh