US Army Generals have been much discussed lately, and not for the right reasons. For the most part, discussion has been based on the criticism of US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, by a faction of recently retired officers who have lost confidence in his handling of the insurgency. Discussion has taken two tacks- firstly the etiquiette of senior officers criticising their political superiors, and then the actual merits or otherwise of Rumsfeld. I haven’t been following recent events in Iraq that closely. However for a good description of the case for the prosecution (of Rusmfeld) The Belgravia Despatch has been all over the story.
However, my ruminations were triggered by a story in the Daily Telegraph where American commanders have been criticised for their style and operational methods by British Brigadier Alan Sharpe. There is a long and not entirely honourable tradition of British officers looking down on US Army commanders, going back to the Second World War if not earlier, motived partly by the different traditions of the two Armies, and partly by envy. However, after thinking about this story, I think the thrust of British views on the US Army might have a point.
Since the Second World War, the British Army has changed radically. It has changed from being a force which was designed to defeat an enemy army on a battlefield to a force designed as often as not to keep the peace, and to use military means to create a political climate in which a political solution can be used to solve disputed issues. This means that there has been a great deal of change in the way in which the British Army operates. The United States Army, however, has not changed in this way. It remains designed mostly to defeat an enemy army in battle. It is frighteningly good at this job, as witnessed by the mauling it gave the Iraqi Army in the invasion of 2003. However it is not so good at being a force that uses military means to create the desired political climate.
This is not to be critical of the US Army. It is simply a rumination about why the British Army is perceived as being better then the US Army at one particular style of military operations. The British Army has evolved in this way because it suits the strategic requirements of the United Kingdom to do so. However, in the long term, it is likely that the US Army is going to be increasingly involved in Iraq style counter-insurgencies. If the US political establishment continues to require the US Army to serve as a sort of ‘firefighting’ role in strategic hotspots around the world, then we might see the US Army evolve into a force with an operating ethos more in the style of the British Army.
Probably a better option than evolving the whole U.S. Army, would be to develop a branch exclusively trained for such missions. Have one branch specialized in good old fashioned defeating the enemy on a battlefield, and another specialized geopolitical “firefighting”.
Heck, the Marines have evolved into a fighting force that civilians have a hard time distinguishing from the Army. Maybe it would be better for the battlefield combat to be the domain of the Army again, while the Marines are made into what you are suggesting? That, or a third combat branch of the likes you are suggesting is developed… some might say that you could create just such a force from cobbling together appropriate units of the National Guard… *shrug*
And the minute that we have a “Peacekeeping Force” rather than an Army, we will be utterly screwed if we have to face a true Peer opponent (like, say, China).
I’m reading this as I watch Patton….
Probably a better option than evolving the whole U.S. Army, would be to develop a branch exclusively trained for such missions. Have one branch specialized in good old fashioned defeating the enemy on a battlefield, and another specialized geopolitical “firefighting”.
That’s what the USMC used to do, prior to WW2- small wars, counter-insurgency, and the like (not so much ‘peacekeeping’ in the modern sense, tho. Marines tend to think the best way to ‘keep the peace’ is to kill the enemy). The USMC seems to have evolved away from this, towards being a kind of miniaturized version of the US Army that works for the US Navy, and does a lot of the same kinds of things.
—–
With regards to this: Since the Second World War, the British Army has changed radically. It has changed from being a force which was designed to defeat an enemy army on a battlefield to a force designed as often as not to keep the peace…
British officers should remember that this evolution of British forces was made because they don’t have to be a military that is designed to defeat an enemy army on a battlefield any more.
The reason for that is because the British government decided that it was quite likely that any future war of national survival involving Britain as a belligerent would also involve the United States as a belligerent… so the political types decided to spend the money that would have gone towards maintaining a force designed to defeat enemy armies on a battlefield on other things. The NHS, for example.
IMO, British commanders inclined to look down on US commanders on account of this have their heads quite firmly embedded in their posteriors…. almost as deeply as the political types who made that decision.
With regards to Sharpe specifically:
[…]
Brig Sharpe, 46, who was awarded the OBE and the American Bronze Star for writing the “coalition campaign plan” for Iraq during a tour in Baghdad in 2004, is regarded as a high-flier.
Would this be the ‘plan’ that lefties around here keep claiming doesn’t actually exist, or if it does exist, is hopelessly inadequate?
[…]
Arguing that the Army’s 500 years of experience gave it a marked edge over the Americans in insurgency operations,
Is that irony?
Rather than Britain punching above its weight it should “stand in the corner, with a bucket and towel, advising the undisputed heavyweight champion about who and how to fight”.
…and this indicates a significant lack of understanding of Americans, which is never a good thing to see in a British commander. Advice on how to accomplish an objective is weighted according to how much the person giving the advice is willing to contribute (other than advice) to accomplishing that objective.
Well jeez, let’s look at the facts here folks. The British army is assigned to an overwhelmingly Shia city (Basra) and yet they have totally pissed-off the local population.
The US military has taken on the worst, most violent, and most inisurgent provinces in Iraq. You know, the six provinces that are predominately Sunni.
Yeah, right, if the British army had been assigned to Anbar province, for example, everything would be rainbows and puppy tails. NOT.
The US military assigned to the British military the easiest task possible in the war. Go 50 miles, stop, and occupy a city that was 99.9% anti-Saddam. And yet the British army has managed to piss off the locals, Good job guys.
The US army is changing rapidly following the 3 years of experience it has gained in Iraq. There was an article in The Economist recently describing how the US army has learned one hell of a lot in a short space of time about dealing with insurgencies and non-conventional warfare.
Having talked to a number of Australian servicemen, their general impression of American military prowess is broadly similar. The US places too much emphasis on gear and not enough on training. From what I’ve heard, Australian soldiers generally believe that US military commanders use their personnel in a more expendible fashion – take more risks with their lives. An Aussie digger will consider him/herself better trained than a GI, whilst eyeing his kit enviously.
I don’t know whether the above is an accurate representation or not – it just seems to be a typical analysis amongst many in the Australian armed services. I wonder if the British feel similarly.
It is probably too simplistic to categorise the two approaches as “Kill the bad guys” and “Bribe the local Strongmen” but I’ll do it anyway. Of course both approaches are used by both the armies in Iraq, but it would be fair to say that the US tends to use more of the former, and, thanks to the 500 years of experience the Brigadier alludes to, the Brits tend to favour the latter.
It is worth pointing out here that it is the politicians who make these decisions, not the Generals, but the pols decision will be influenced by the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the armies at their disposal.
The Brits do indeed have centuries of experience of using a small force to put down insurgencies and bribing local strongmen with power and / or money, (and sometimes guns), to keep the peace. The Empire was largely built on this sort of operation, and our recent experience in Northern Ireland shows that it can still work.
However, it is also worth considering the aims of the Iraq operation. The US politicians have repeatedly made it clear that one of their main aims is to create a functioning democracy in Iraq, so which of the two approaches is likely to best yield that result?
A look at Northern Ireland, where the political situation seems to stall before it gets started, and large areas of the country are still under the de facto control of the strongmen, (both Unionist and Nationalist), does not seem to offer the best example.
Building democracies is complex and difficult, and the Brits have a better record than most of the ex-colonial powers, but I hope we don’t succumb to the desire to get the boys home, (and the conflict off the front pages), before the fledging democracy in Iraq has strength enough to curb the strongmen.
I would like to apologise for the phrase”Bribe the local Strongmen” in my previous comment.
I did, of course, mean to say “Cultivate the local Community leaders”
he US places too much emphasis on gear and not enough on training. From what I’ve heard, Australian soldiers generally believe that US military commanders use their personnel in a more expendible fashion – take more risks with their lives. An Aussie digger will consider him/herself better trained than a GI, whilst eyeing his kit enviously.
Amusing.
Apparently that typical digger doesn’t think all that nifty kit requires any training in order to use it propertly, and doesn’t understand that the point of a lot of that kit is to keep GI’s alive when someone is trying to kill them.
Strawman. What I was commenting on is the perception that the digger needs to rely moreso on the quality of his training rather than depending on his state of the art kit in such circumstances. The circumstances in which his commanders put him in harm’s way also factors in there.
Like I said – I don’t know if this is true. It’s just something I’ve heard from quite a few people serving in the Australian armed forces.
The British have a “peace keeping army” because:
a) They decided (correctly, I think) that they no longer need a war winning army.
b) Even if they needed one they would be incapable financially of sustaining it.
c) Britain never had a big ground force – the navy was their strong suit.
So, if you have to brag about something, you brag about what you can – “a peace keeping army”… indeed.
These nationalist pissing contests – mine is bigger than yourn – are just silly.
Scott Wickstein,
You should read Thom Barnett if you’re interested in current US Military thinking on this subject. He thinks that one portion of the military should evolve in the direction you suggest, but that we also need to retain the “Big War” specialization in the rest of the army.
Here’s a video of him explaining his main ideas:
link
(faster and cheaper than reading his books)
Jacob: Right……..and I was wondering when a new s**t-stirrer would appear in this current conflict. Well it appears to be ‘up-&-coming’ Brig. Sharpe….and I now wonder who put him up to it because a smart chap like Brig. Sharpe will protect his up-&-comingness above all things.
War is always a learning process because no two are ever the same. That the Americans had to rummage aroung the Iraqi scrapyards for more metal to protect their Humvees is one thing & part of that process. That we should send our uniformed football hooligans into harm’s way without even a decent pair of boots is quite another & utterly reprehensible …although typical of our rulers in the Septic Isle.
During WW2, in Kent, we entertained our neighbours, young American officers, in our mess for lunch. They arrived festooned with lethal hardware…to the prissy horror of our effete Adjutant who informed them of the error of their ways. I have never been more embarrased & wondered at the time who would have been better prepared if a visiting ‘Fallschirmjäger’ had walked in.
We still have this toffee-nosed attitude vis-Á -vis the Americans while trying to steal their boots.
Traditional ‘phlegm, pragmatism etc.’ weren’t enough to deal with a rowdy bunch of uppity colonists in 1776………maybe we were still in the learning process….. & their fathers could certainly piss further than ours.
What I was commenting on is the perception that the digger needs to rely moreso on the quality of his training rather than depending on his state of the art kit in such circumstances.
[shrug]
What I was getting at is that the nifty kit does require a fair bit of training to use (thus, the perception of better training may not be entirely accurate), and that troops so equipped can undertake more dangerous missions with less risk than troops that lack such equipment.
To make the same point in a less abstract way: crews in a M1A2 Abrams can use tactics that would get a crew in a Chieftain killed. Thus, the Chieftan crews might think the commanders of the Abrams crews “use their personnel in a more expendible fashion” when they actually aren’t.
James Waterton,
I have encountered similar attitudes amongst British ex-servicemen that I have worked with. My impression has been that these attitudes are partly contempt for perceived lower quality soldier skills and partly outright jealousy about US soldiers additional equipment. I believe these attitudes have been prevalent in the British Army for decades and are not limited to the enlisted ranks.
This is an interesting paper by a British officer on lessons to be learned from Iraq. In several places he describes British Army lack of understanding of the nature of the insurgency faced by the US. Long, it’s 181 pages, but worth reading.
Small Wars and Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Lessons from Iraq by Major M W Shervington PARA
http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/swjmag/v4/shervington.htm
“Operations in Iraq have been unique for the British Army. Previously it had not conducted a counter-insurgency operation either in a coalition or as a junior partner. This new experience has resulted in a degree of ‘friction’ with the American military over its COIN strategy in Iraq. This is short-sighted and regrettable. Whilst respecting the historical perspective, authority and expertise of the British Army, some US commanders (and encouragingly some British officers too) have come to challenge and even resent our occasionally hubristic and patronising attitude to the prosecution of counter-insurgency campaigns. Indeed one senior British officer has stated ‘the British Army after August [2004] has very little to offer [the US Army]’.16 For an institution that wears the tag of a ‘counter-insurgency army’17 with justifiable selfbelief, its ‘fixation on [success in] Malaya’18 is being eroded by our current posture in Iraq. Simply put, the US and UK are pursuing two almost entirely different campaigns in Iraq – against different enemies in different terrain and with different national objectives.”
Lets move Britain Forces to the Sunni triangle and US to Basrah and then we’ll see.
“Thoughts on the future direction of the US Army”. South.
Rosignol: The British army hasn’t used Chieftan tanks for a decade – although I agree that if they did, they might not use them in the same way as an Abrams.
I’ve seen this same discussion (UK vs US, training vs gear, etc. etc.) 100 times on 100 different message boards, and it all boils down to “My army is better than yours” willy waving, and so is pointless.
Both armies are very high quality and have different roles to play.
We can however agree that the Royal Marines would kick USMC’s sorry arrses.
[runs away]
J
It’s interesting to point out that the US Army is considering the British counterinsurgency style right now. (And the topic of post-cold-war counterinsurgency has been an active subject since at least 1995. And more consideration of the British perspective in 1996, even.)
The Army War College journal, Parameters, is the place to go for this sort of thing.
Don’t bother runing, you’ll just die tired.
😉
LOL! This thread is great.
Marines v. Army GIs in the US military indeed are supposed to maintain the disctinction made in this thread. I believe the issue is more implementation and stratgeic direction of these unique fighting forces rather than their skill-set. Certainly counter-insurgency training has been lacking, but the bigger issue is strategic focus which was clearly set as “blow ’em up” and not “win them over.”
Sheesh… every damn war we fight, this tired old argument crops up again.
American commanders use soldiers more “mercilessly” because they have deeper resources to call upon than, say, the Brits or Aussies.
American soldiers use all the cool gadgets (okay, “kit”) because our entire society’s thrust is developing cool technology.
I’m always reminded of the WWII-era story, as told to me by my stepfather (who served in Italy in 1943).
There was a German stronghold in a church which could not be taken by the English, Polish or ANZAC soldiers. A dozen different attempts to breach the church’s massive doors and walls had proved fruitless — every possible tactic had been tried, and failed, and over a hundred casualties suffered.
So in desperation, they asked for help from the Yanks…
…who simply moved a 155mm howitzer up to point-blank range, and blasted the door clean through the opposite wall — and then proceeded to put another four HE shells into the church. The total human cost of taking the church after that: zero. (The Germans were stunned into submission by the explosions.)
I’ve heard all those “lousy training” slurs before. To use the old techie response: we don’t need brains when we have batteries; and we don’t need tactics when we have technology.
In other words, technology IS part of our method of warfare. Maybe if everyone was armed with spears and swords, the “superior” training of the Brits and Aussies might take the day.
But we don’t fight in that manner anymore — not since WWI, anyway.
Brits and Aussies may have to train “better” (and I’m still not conceding the point) because they don’t have access to the “kit” that we do.
But we have the kit, and we use it.
Amateurs talk tactics; professionals talk logistics. And we kick the world’s ass at logistics.
The Royal Marines will never have to fight the USMC (thank goodness); but if they ever did, the USMC would kick their ass because the USMC has better technology at their disposal — and that’s the fact of the matter. There’s no point is asking how we would fight without all the technology. That’s like asking me how I’d fight a lion: not with my bare hands, but with a frigging F-16, preferably.
That might not be “fair”, but I’d win, which is the point of it all.
In any event, “fighting fair” is playground talk. We fight to win, with whatever tools we have at our disposal, and all the carping about “kit” and “training” is just meaningless chatter.
“…but the bigger issue is strategic focus which was clearly set as “blow ’em up” and not “win them over.””
No contradiction here. First you blow ’em up – then the winning over just follows naturally. It’s when you fail in the “blow ’em up” part that you have problems winning them over.
Kim,
Lion hunting from an F-16… Sounds like the kinda kick Larry Ellison might get into.
Seriously, this has developed into kinda a sad thread. A mixture of pointeless speculation and an even sadder bid-dick contest between allies.
And it always goes this way. I remember on a warbirds forum a pointless, somewhat vitriolic thread on the relative merits of the P-38 vs. Mosquito. And then there was Spitfire vs. P-51…
A good military is a chain and any weakness in that chain is potentially a fatal problem. You need good recruits, good training, good equipment, good logistics, a decisive tecnological advantage over the enemy, good leadership, intelligent tactics and a coherent overall strategy linked to well-defined political goals.
If you have these you can wage modern warfare with relatively rapid success and relatively low casualties.
Surely all of Nato should strive towards being able to implement this kinda warfare (when needed) rather than induldge in petty back-biting? From this thread it is clear that enough people here care enough about their own militaries…
I’m amazed no-one has brought up F-22 vs. Typhoon. It usually gets bitched about at this stage.
Maybe you are watching too much of the disgusting Hollywood drama ‘Over There’ but I would put my money on the USA to kick 7 shades of the proverbial out of the Army of the PRC. At the end of the day it does tend to be about discipline more than anything else and US troops do tend to be more disciplined than many.
As for Brigadier Sharpe’s comments we all know (well some of us do) that all armies bitch about the quality of their allies and their allies’ TO&E, so there is nothing new at all about that. I’ve heard of plenty of snide comments from US officers about how the Brits have a ‘cushy number’ in Basra (fewer troops dying, population more amenable to the policing troops etc.) so I don’t put much in this officer’s commentary at all.
Which army is “best” depends largely on what the armies are intended to do.
The Americans are extremely good at fighting large scale conventional wars – precisely because they do have greater resources, more advanced equipment and – critically – a far greater logistical capacity than anyone they’re likely to be up against. The downside of that can be an over-reliance on technological superiority, a strategy of solving problems by overwhelming numbers and a tendency to the arrogant assumption of their own correctness – just as the British had when they were the dominant military power.
Nowadays, the British are very good at the small scale and tend to be better at the hearts and minds stuff. This is largely through necessity – Britain cannot afford large scale armed forces any more and is therefore compelled to find more intricate ways of solving problems. Britain needs logistical assistance to get anywhere in reasonable numbers, but once there usually acquits itself well. In fairness, the British have not for a long time been intended to have the ability to deploy significant expeditionary forces and thus cannot reasonably be expected to achieve in Iraq what America can be expected to do.
Both are amongst the best at what they are intended to do, each has its own strengths and weaknesses. It is not an apples for apples comparison.
EG
EG,
Is it just me, or were you just cribbing from previosus posts in this thread?
Advance the argument, don’t summarise it boy!
Not that I think it’s an argument worth summarising.
“It has changed from being a force which was designed to defeat an enemy army on a battlefield to a force designed as often as not to keep the peace, and to use military means to create a political climate in which a political solution can be used to solve disputed issues. This means that there has been a great deal of change in the way in which the British Army operates.”
In other words, the while the US Army has achieved its long term goals: becoming the British Army of the 21st century, the British Army is well on its way to becoming the French Army. All they need to learn is how to strut twice as much as Monty, eat cheese, drink wine, raise their hands and yell “I surrender” understandably with a mouthfull of cheese and wine.
Cheap shot, yes, quite, but y’all opened yourself up wide to it.
I had the opportunity to review a pre-release copy of the sequel to “The Pentagon’s New Map”. Thomas Barnett, in “Blueprint For Action”, argues that as the US military becomes ever more competent at decimating enemy armies without blasting their civilian infrastructure to rubble, the need for a “nation building” branch of the military grows exponentially. He essentially argues for a permanent world police state paid for by US tax dollars, without explicitly calling it that. Regnery Publishing sent me the copy to write a review for them. They apparently didn’t like the feedback.
The “Blueprint” is a blueprint for American to abandon the Republic and become an Empire, at least partly on the grounds that it has all but become an Empire in fact, even if not in name, and that the US must accept becoming Empire if it, and freedom, are to survive the twin challenges of Islam and China, beyond just dealing with “The Seam” Barnett talked about in TPNM.
He abandons or denigrates the idea that the problem of The Seam, of China, and Islam, is a problem of a lack of faith in markets and private property by himself, intelligentsia, and the US nomenklatura. If you want to compare two books illustrating opposing views of where we should go from here, you could compare “Blueprint for Action” against Dr. Mary Ruwart’s “Healing Our World In An Age of Agression”.
“It has changed from being a force which was designed to defeat an enemy army on a battlefield to a force designed as often as not to keep the peace, and to use military means to create a political climate in which a political solution can be used to solve disputed issues. This means that there has been a great deal of change in the way in which the British Army operates.”
In other words, the while the US Army has achieved its long term goals: becoming the British Army of the 21st century, the British Army is well on its way to becoming the French Army. All they need to learn is how to strut twice as much as Monty, eat cheese, drink wine, raise their hands and yell “I surrender” understandably with a mouthfull of cheese and wine.
Cheap shot, yes, quite, but y’all opened yourself up wide to it.
I had the opportunity to review a pre-release copy of the sequel to “The Pentagon’s New Map”. Thomas Barnett, in “Blueprint For Action”, argues that as the US military becomes ever more competent at decimating enemy armies without blasting their civilian infrastructure to rubble, the need for a “nation building” branch of the military grows exponentially. He essentially argues for a permanent world police state paid for by US tax dollars, without explicitly calling it that. Regnery Publishing sent me the copy to write a review for them. They apparently didn’t like the feedback.
The “Blueprint” is a blueprint for American to abandon the Republic and become an Empire, at least partly on the grounds that it has all but become an Empire in fact, even if not in name, and that the US must accept becoming Empire if it, and freedom, are to survive the twin challenges of Islam and China, beyond just dealing with “The Seam” Barnett talked about in TPNM.
He abandons or denigrates the idea that the problem of The Seam, of China, and Islam, is a problem of a lack of faith in markets and private property by himself, intelligentsia, and the US nomenklatura. If you want to compare two books illustrating opposing views of where we should go from here, you could compare “Blueprint for Action” against Dr. Mary Ruwart’s “Healing Our World In An Age of Agression”.
Why do rules of engagement not come into this argument? Do they dampen the flag-waving sausagefests that happen in these arguments?
I would want to see US making British style counter insurgency today like: resettlement of villagers in Malaya.
Erm, if they’re so crackerjack and switched on in that department… oughtn’t they have, say, avoided making such a colossal hash of Basra? I mean, they handed the place over to Sadr and his Islamist brownshirts lock, stock, and barrel, and the half-measures since that realization (which took Vincent’s NYT article and then his death) they’ve undertaken to fix that situation haven’t exactly gone well.
The americans have been uneven, but I’m not inclined to give the British Army terribly high marks for this one.
rosignol has summed it up well. Couple of additional points. When the Blackwatch ventured out of the semi-secure Shia area they ended up running south again. Left their funny little armored cars behind. Who recovered those? USMC of course. They live there….
Regards technology. The US Army and USMC are radically different forces. Does anyone really think Iwo and Okinawa were taken with technology? Saipan? They dug the Japanese out at the point of a rifle. “Softly” was shown to have a few downsides at Singapore. The Brit army never faced serious Japanese forces after that as they decided it was an Indian affair. Pretty much the same thing happened in France with Monty dragging arse unless he received access to US troops.
After WW1 the British army has just shown fatigue. Perhaps it will eventually get over that but I wouldn’t hold my breath.
Joe: Grow up a bit…..do some serious homework before making yourself ridiculous. Brits & Americans have helped each other out of very deep shit on many occasions. Mistakes are made & professional soldiers admit them to each other. That’s how friends & allies behave.
If you are trying to prove a point, consider it done: Your balls may be bigger than mine & seem to do a fair job keeping your useless ears apart. You should be in bed by now.
He essentially argues for a permanent world police state paid for by US tax dollars, without explicitly calling it that.
Why not call it “Team America”?
Britain cannot afford large scale armed forces any more and is therefore compelled to find more intricate ways of solving problems
We can afford them, we just prefer to spend the money on an army of lesbian outreach coordinators and real nappy facilitators.
I had the opportunity to review a pre-release copy of the sequel to “The Pentagon’s New Map”. Thomas Barnett, in “Blueprint For Action”, argues that as the US military becomes ever more competent at decimating enemy armies without blasting their civilian infrastructure to rubble, the need for a “nation building” branch of the military grows exponentially.
If the objective is to transform the government into something other than what it was, instead of just replacing whoever’s in the big chair, he’s got a point.
Our existing forces are quite capable of deposing SOB’s and
replacing them with Our SOBs. Turning random countries into the local equivalent of Belgium is something else entirely.
He essentially argues for a permanent world police state paid for by US tax dollars, without explicitly calling it that. Regnery Publishing sent me the copy to write a review for them. They apparently didn’t like the feedback.
Sounds kind of like what we have now, actually.
[…]
He abandons or denigrates the idea that the problem of The Seam, of China, and Islam, is a problem of a lack of faith in markets and private property by himself, intelligentsia, and the US nomenklatura. If you want to compare two books illustrating opposing views of where we should go from here, you could compare “Blueprint for Action” against Dr. Mary Ruwart’s “Healing Our World In An Age of Agression”.
Dr. Ruwart seems prone to the rather common misconception that a nation is like a person. I dunno if Barnett gets it right, but I doubt very much that Dr. Ruwart is.
I’ve heard all those “lousy training” slurs before. To use the old techie response: we don’t need brains when we have batteries; and we don’t need tactics when we have technology.
Kim, I have been reading that a Major du Toit of the South African Army invented the flail tank to deal with minefields. Before that, the SOP had been to send sappers out with bayonets to dig them up. Technology clearly has its place – there’s no way to negotiate with a landmine is there?
There used to be a view, among British miltary types, that the Americans favoured overt fire-power as the first and only solution in all actions. If all war comes down to is who has got the bigger guns, then no problem with that.
But… A good number of conflicts have to be settled in less obvious ways. One thing the British can do is get into the type of warfare that emerges in urban areas. The kind of engagement that doesn’t always allow for heavy tanks and howitzers to be brought up or helicoptered in easily.
Of course, the UK forces learned much of this from Northern Ireland, whose “insurgents” were heavily funded by a strange combination of Marxist wannabes and US fund-raising dinners. Thanks, guys.
Of course, having lots of big weapons means that you tend to see this as the only solution to anything and everything. How long, for example, will it take to redeploy a bigger US army in the ME to take on Iran?
You think they might see the US coming?
Watcher, there is a corrolary to the saying “If all you have is a hammer then everything looks like a nail”. It goes something like this. “If you don’t have a hammer and the problem IS a nail, then you’re stuck.”
US forces have a full toolbox and the experience and training to use whatever approach is needed. And as I said up thread, it’s the politicians who decide which approach they want.
As I also hinted up thread, don’t be too quick to claim Northern Ireland, (or Kosovo or the whole former Yugoslavia mess), as a shining example of the softly softly approach.
The fact that whole areas of UK cities are run by gangsters who can’t be touched for fear of re-igniting the whole mess is not a great advert.
(And BTW, the yanks don’t have to bring up tanks or artillery. They can call up an Apache or point at the enemy strong point and a 500lb bomb drops on it. )
“I have been reading that a Major du Toit of the South African Army invented the flail tank to deal with minefields.”
Good grief. A Boer helping out the Redcoats?
Whatever next?
Kevin: take your point entirely about Northern Ireland. No shining light there for anyone but sympathy for the poor sods who had to live there and put up with sectarianism, dodgy church leaders and loopy republicans.
I should, at this point, emphasise that I’d rather be on America’s side than not. Most soldiers respect what other soldiers do – and hence they salute them out of a shared respect, and the US is an ally of the UK.
Things may get a lot tougher in the world and hence we may be very glad that all we have against the US is a few small gripes over nothing important. When push comes to shove we can work with the US military.
intrestingley enough during the D Day landings the US forces declined the use of flail tanks and suffered heavily as a result of being pinned on the beach.
Alex,
Actually, the Americans were pinned down on Omaha Beach because they were landed in the wrong place. Mines caused a minimal number of casualties there, compared to artillery and machine-gun fire. And because the beach wasn’t the right one, many if not most of the DD tanks (amphibious ones) foundered and sank.
the british got the harrier jump jet the best jet in the better than amrican jets o year and royal marines will kick usmc ass
i argee with bobby royal marine commandos r much better than USMC coz its not about technology the RMC got better training than USMC and vietnam beat usa and vietnam did not have any technology like the U.S so don’t forget that amrica