Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945
Max Hastings
Knopf, 2004
I do not suppose that at any moment of history has the agony of the world been so great or widespread. Tonight the sun goes down on more suffering then ever before in the world.
Sir Winston Churchill’s bleak view, given to his daughter at the Yalta conference, reflects the deplorable state of Europe in February 1945. The end of the war in Europe was now clearly in sight; however, the finale promised, and delivered, horrors of a truely grotesque nature.
The nature of the German collapse was such that it has not received a great deal of attention by historians. Once the Allies were fully established on the Continent with their victory in the Battle of Normandy, the nature of the outcome of the war was set, and apart from Operation Market Garden, the Battle of the Bulge, and the Battle of Berlin, not a great deal of attention has been given to the general course of operations in Europe.
That is not so surprising. The collapse of Germany was in the most part a gradual erosion rather then a swift cracking. The German army had been broken in France, but logisitical problems and the weather had halted the Allies progress; given time, the Germans were able to scramble enough forces to halt the Allies advance; even launch one last desperate counterattack.
The erosion and collapse of German military power forms the basis of this book, but it is much more then that.
It is also the tale of those who were caught up in these terrible events. This is a comprehensive, but not compelete coverage of events from September 1944 to May 1945. The Italian campaign is ignored completely; the Battle of the Bulge, and the Battle of Berlin are given only cursury coverage, with the excusable reason that these have been better covered elsewhere.
Hastings concentrates on the stories of ordinary soldiers and civillians; thanks to the end of the Cold War, he is able to present a picture of the tale as it looked on the Soviet side as well. This really makes the book; the crimes of the Red Army are not excused, the horrors of Soviet conquest are recorded here. But the Red Army was a complex, strange machine, with very human strengths and weaknesses. Hastings is able to get Red Army veterans to speak in their own terms.
That is important; too often, the Red Army is presented as a mindless rabble of Orc-like creatures, blind, ignorant, driven on by the lash of its commissars and Marshals themselves living in mortal terror of Stalin. It was that, but it was much more then that too- it was a body of men (and women) with hopes and fears, and great emotion. In Armageddon, we get a glimpse of these.
Hastings writes more convential history too; and he asks some hard questions about all the participants. He looks at why British and US forces seemed so inferior to equivilent German units (political choices is Hastings’ answer). He examines the Allied bomber campaign, and its effect on Germany, and the costs and benefits of it.
Most of all, he examines the horrific contradicition of the Germans. At one end of the front, he recounts the terror and the agony of East Prussia as it was savaged by the Red Army; at the same time, the pangs of starvation Germany inflicted on the Dutch in the terrible Hongerwinter are revealed. In between, the fate of the prisoners of the Reich are recounted; the grand canvas of misery that gave truth to Churchill’s observation is painted for the instruction of the reader.
Although Hastings has strong opinions, and does not hesitate to state them, this is that rarity; a work of history that does not try to make a case, but simply to recount events. A clear narrative, with new material (the collapse of the USSR has provided a boon to historians that is plainly not exhausted yet), and well chosen photograhs. I found this book a pleasure to read and I commend it to Samizdata.net readers with an interest in the history of this most terrible period.
Thanks for the tip! I’ll look into it. Sounds promising from what you write.
I really don’t like Max Hastings, though. I’m not sure if I’d want to line his pockets further, no matter how good the book.
I really don’t like Max Hastings, though. I’m not sure if I’d want to line his pockets further, no matter how good the book.
Agreed, I have no desire to assist in helping to further stretch Max Hastings’ ego. Although at least its not yet another book about the Waffen SS.
Did Hastings shit in someone’s breakfast that I didn’t know about?
Tim Newman and Julian Taylor – The book looks very interesting, but I won’t be buying it either, for the reasons you stated. I really don’t like this man.
I read that. I recommend it. He says that the German and Russian armies were much better than those of the Western Allies and that, had we fought the Germans on anything like equal terms we would have got slaughtered.
Harry Hutton, so if we hadn’t won, we’d have lost? Is that Max Hastings’ grand conclusion?
Scott, others will be able to respond better than me, but Max Hastings is a notional Tory who is to the left of the socialists. He is one of those Katherine Hepburn patricians who, while enjoying status, privilege and a deluxe lifestyle for himself and his family, knows what’s best for the little people. And he fancies himself quite a character.
Your review really was very interesting, but I am among those who would not put a penny into this man’s pocket.
“too often, the Red Army is presented as a mindless rabble of Orc-like creatures, blind, ignorant, driven on by the lash of its commissars and Marshals themselves living in mortal terror of Stalin.”
The animosity with which the common people of the Soviet Union held Germany and the Nazis was a major factor in the success of Soviets in the war. In most cases, soldiers didn’t have to be driven to war, they went willing hating the invaders far more than their own leaders. In a very real since it was kulturkrieg that had nothing to do either Fascism or Communism.
“He looks at why British and US forces seemed so inferior to equivilent German units”
The answer is training. The Germans had been funneling their society’s best talent into the military for over three generations. They made war fighting the most respected profession in their society which led to the creation of a caste of military specialist unparalleled in the world. They preserved and nurtured this cadre between the wars. In addition, they cleared out a lot of the deadwood of those who attained rank in the Imperial military due to birth. The skill of those officers gave the Wermacht phenomenal flexibility and ability to adapt.
The British by contrast had a class riven military trained to function as a colonial police force. Upper class Brits who couldn’t succeed elsewhere got parked in the military and all the best talent went into the Navy first anyway.
America simply did not maintain a large enough professional military between the wars to be able to provide enough skilled officers for a mass military. The military has always been a relatively low status profession in American culture and most of the brightest minds in the US military served because of family tradition. In WWII, American officers were in the main rapidly trained amateurs.
Only after the SS and Gestapo followed the army. In large parts of the western USSR, and especially in the Ukraine, the Germans were initially seen as liberators. Truly, it was a war Germany lost rather than Russia won.
A somewhat sad example is von Kleist, a professional and highly skilled Field Marshal who actively recruited non-Russian Soviet citizens (over three quarters of a million of them, all volunteers) to fight on the German side, despite political opposition within Germany. He was eventually captured and tried by the USSR as a war criminal on the charge (and I am NOT making this up) of alienating the Soviet peoples through mildness and kindess. Died in Soviet captivity.
Of course, another factor in Soviet victory was the NKVD “special regiments” which lay behind Soviet lines and summarily shot retreating Soviet soldiers. Retreat and certainly die, or fight against impossible odds and just maybe survive – what would you do?
The answer is actually massively superior organisational doctrine. In the Germany army, each individual was trained to be capable of doing his superior’s job as well as his own, and all ranks were actively encouraged to exercise intiative. Quite the opposite of the traditional picture of the “I was only obeying orders” Prussian stereotype. It was noted many times that British and American units would often surrender when all their officers were out of action, whereas German units generally fought until there were only privates left. Interestingly enough, it took the British army another 40 years to figure this out and adopt the same principles themselves.
Harry’s comment about the Allies being slaughtered by Germany whenever they fought on equal terms is spot on. Perhaps the best illustration is the Ardennes offensive in 1944/45, when the shattered German army managed to wipe the floor with the massed western Allies, failing only when fuel ran out and the weather broke so the west could get its planes flying again.
EG
Verity, he said that had we not had our enormous advantage in men and equipment, and had the Red Army not done most of our fighting for us, we would have lost. What is unreasonable about that?
America simply did not maintain a large enough professional military between the wars to be able to provide enough skilled officers for a mass military.
At the time FDR made his “quarantine the aggressor” speech, the US army was smaller than Belgium’s.
Harry. Nothing. It’s a statement of the obvious; that’s all. The side that has the advantage wins.
It’s like saying, “all things being equal, the Bolton Wanderers would thrash Real Madrid”.
It is often useful to figure out who actually had the advantage, what the advantage was, and why he had it. Naturally, everyone has an advantage in something – in the case of WW2, the west had the advantages of money and a secure manufacturing base, Russia the tradtional advantages of room and lots of people, and Germany the advantage of the most skilled, competent and innovative armed forces. Which was decisive?
It is entirely possible that, but for three or four strategic errors, Germany could have won WW2. Germany’s advantages could have been (and nearly were) decisive. But in reality they were not. It is important to study this kind of thing, and not just blithely assume the west would necessarily win because we were free and rich, or had the most advantages – because this is simply not true.
EG
For a more numerate analysis of who was better, institutionally, in WW2, I would strongly recommend ‘Numbers, Prediction and War’ by Trevor Dupuy . He demonstrated that the Germans has an approximate 20% advantage qualitatively speaking, over the western allies and almost 150% advantage over the Soviets… and he backs up his claims with rather compelling numerical evidence. His figures also show that any claims by Hastings that the Soviet army was ‘better’ than the western allies is pure nonsense by a rather large margin.
Scrawled across my computer in lipstick: Please stop me before I answer a Euan Gray post!!!
But I simply cannot let him get away with writing: It is important to study this kind of thing, and not just blithely assume the west would necessarily win because we were free and rich or had the most advantages – because this is simply not true.
I am not ‘blithely assuming’ anything. I am complaining about the pleonasm. The side that had the most advantages, whether it was brainpower, manpower, trained officers, money, resources, logistics, or a combination of any of the properties listen herein, isn’t the point – won. The other side most assuredly had advantages, but we had more. That is why we won. We out-advantaged them.
I question your term “the West” (as in, “would necessarily win”). The West won and the West lost. Germany, I believe, hasn’t relocated since the end of the war. It is still part of Western Europe.
Shannon- Hastings said it was not just training. His view was that in WW2 US policy was to put the ‘best and brightest’ in non-infantary roles.
This probably aggrivated the problem that most Americans in WW2 held far more animosity towards Japan, and the most motivated individuals would have volunteered for the US Navy and Marines. (this is my own observation.) A common theme in Hastings work is also the wide gulf between the best and worst US army formations- its clear that the famous paratroop divisions 82nd and 101st were able to match it with anyone. Ditto US Marines.
Euan – Under no circumstances could Germany have won World War 2. The US developed atomic weapons first. The Manhatton Project would have reversed any other outcome.
Verity- on recent form, Bolton would have to fancy their chances against Real Madrid.
Scott wrote – Euan – Under no circumstances could Germany have won World War 2. The US developed atomic weapons first. The Manhatton Project would have reversed any other outcome. This was my point. We had the vast advantage.
I am not arguing the facts and don’t have the knowledge to do so (although I’m very interested in the arguments here). I am objecting to Euan’s facile pleonasm. The redundancy. We won because we had the advantage. This is what winning means. The technical term for the side that doesn’t have the advantage is: the loser.
Bolton vs Real Madrid – I knew I shouldn’t have chosen a football analogy …
As Wellington said after Waterloo, “It was a close run thing…”
It is very good to realize how close, frighteningly close, the world came to Churchill’s “new dark age”. The German and Japanese societies were utterly regimented and committed to war at a time when the future Western allies were still dithering about whether they should fight, or, in the case of the US, even enlarge their armed forces by any significant degree.
Sitting here in the 21st century, in generally free societies, it is very difficult to understand that the world’s future hung by some very slender threads in1939-1942. Britain could have negotiated, the US could have lost at Midway—any number of factors could have produced a nightmare world ruled by the victorious and competing doctrines of European fascism, Russian Marxism, and Japanese militarism.
Imagine an entire world at the level of North Korea.
In the final analysis, it may be that the Axis was undone by the fact that it was run by some truly delusional megalomaniacs, and the Allies were led by some flawed but realistic leaders who would not countenance defeat or surrender.
Our greatest strength was that our enemies dismissed us as mongrels, weakened by democratic divisions, and lacking the proper spirit to resist. Some people in the world today seem to make the same mistake.
Hasting’s point about the difference between German troops (and Soviet troops) and American and British troops is that the latter’s liberal democratic upbringing simply didn’t produce the fanatical killing machines, nor allow the sheer blind hatred to develop, that German and Soviet troops could draw on. Call them soft, or what have you, America and Britain would not accept the casulties, the indifference to life, and the savagery that was commonplace on the Eastern Front. And that is to their credit in Hasting’s view.
This was the first work by Max Hastings that I have read. All in all, I felt the book was pretty good. I wasn’t convinced by his arguments that German and Russian military leadership and soldier were vastly superior to the American/British counterpart. While Hastings cites instances of cowardice and poor fighting by the British and Americans, there was plenty of the same on the German and Russian side. As is the case with most armchair generalling, while he speaks of the supposed incompetence of the military leadership of the Western allies, Hastings doesn’t suggest any plausible scenario where the destruction of Germany woudn’t be anything less than a long hard slog.
I think the book’s greatest value is for stating the obvious. That is, war is hell, and while the idea of going to war as “a last resort” may be overly simplistic, we really should be fully aware of the costs.
“I question your term “the West” (as in, “would necessarily win”). The West won and the West lost. Germany, I believe, hasn’t relocated since the end of the war. It is still part of Western Europe.”
The West is not a location, it is a civilisation, and Nazi Germany was NOT an expression of Western civilisation, nor was it even civilisation, more like barbarism with a bureaucracy.
In that sense, Germany has relocated since the war.
Possibly because you were demolished last time you did it?
But, more seriously:
The whole thing is rather more complex than you suggest. Your assessment betrays a deterministic view of history, and seems to neglect things like luck and misjudgement – both of which tend to happen quite a bit, especially in the chaos of war.
Germany had many disadvantages, it is true, but had not Hitler listened to von Rundstedt about Dunkirk and the infamous halt order (based on unwarranted doubts about fuel supplies, essentially, and in the face of opposition from subordinates), had he not invaded Russia (before defeating Britain and without any schwerpunkt or specific strategy), and had he not declared war on America then it is highly likely that Germany’s advantages would have outweighed those of the opposition and Germany would have prevailed in Europe. If Europe was successfully divided between Germany and the USSR, it is by no means certain that America would have done anything about it, or even that they could have done much for some considerable time. Naturally, Germany and Russia would inevitably have gone to war at some point, but given proper strategic planning and a touch of humanity, Germany would probably have won.
It is not implausible to suggest that an instance of confusion in the fog of war and two major strategic errors were all that lost the war for Germany, allied advantages notwithstanding. War does not always go to the side with the most advantages.
EG
Lots of great comments, I love it.
I like ‘veryretired’s’ comment very much.
On a wider point, if I may be allowed to interfere with Euan’s discussions with Verity, you will recall that Brian not so long ago posted on the delights of asking such historical ‘what ifs’.
No historical event has generated so many historical ‘what ifs’ as the Second World War, which is fair enough because it was the most important historical event since the French Revolution and the wars that followed.
However, there are some ‘what if’s that are not asked. One of the most significant that I would like to invite readers to ponder is, what if Stalin’s leadership in 1941 had not been so horrifically inept? This is by no means a moot point- if the USSR had, for example, allowed its troops to retreat in the Battle of Kiev, Stalin would have had an extra c 500,000 troops to throw in to his Winter offensive.
If he had been able to do that, he might have dealt the Germans a blow that they would not have been able to recover from easily. Certainly, the German Army in the east was savaged badly enough in the December counter-offensive; it might have been devastated beyond repair if Stalin had had the reserve that he threw away at Kiev.
All a moot point now, but a curious ‘what if’ all the same.
Firstly, it has been common knowledge since 1939 that the Wehrmact had discipline, weapons, organisation, and determination which was far greater than anyone else in WWII. It is arguable that they were the most professional fighting force since the Romans, and their methods, if not their aims, are certainly not forgotten to those who teach in Sandhurst today. So if Max Hastings thinks he is breaking new ground by writing that pound for pound the Germans were the best, he is mistaken.
Secondly, the Russian army’s discipline and organisation was bloody awful. They lost 22m men, a large portion of unecessarily. The men were as hard as nails, terrified of what lay before and behind them, and there were millions of them. It was that which was the strength of the Red Army. To suggest that their leadership was in any measure other than stubborness and brutality better than that of the Western allies is ridiculous. The common soldier may have been better at his job than his British counterpart, because for a Russian his job was to die fighting even if his death will be avoidable and achieve nothing.
Sorry, but if these two revelations form the backbone of the book, I’ll give it a miss and read something by Martin Gilbert or Antony Beevor instead.
Anyone who thinks that American or British troops or society were too soft to have fought a war like that on the Eastern Front needs to revisit the key battles in the war against Japan.
We would have slaughtered Germans in whatever numbers necessary. Remember Dresden? Hiroshoma? Nagasaki?
Would we have taken losses equivalent to those of the Russians? Hard to say: the enormous Russian losses were due largely to the idiocy and brutality of their leadership. It is doubtful we would have tolerated leadership of that poor quality, I’ll say that much.
Right after I finished Hasting’s book, I delved into Matthew Cooper’s weighty tome “The German Army 1933-1945” and the difference in tone is striking. Cooper asserts that it was a miracle that the German Army was as successful as it was, given its too rapid buildup during the late 30s (going from 100,000 to ~3.5 million men), lack of mechanized and tracked equipment and Hitler’s complete lack of trust in the professional generals. The myth of blitzkrieg as the central German strategy is busted. (Double envelopment was more their style.)
I’m also reading Guy Sajer’s “The Forgotten Soldier”. This is his memoir as a German soldier and it doesn’t really paint a picture of an overly professional, well-trained fighting force.
I must comment that, in the case of the Germans, soldier quality differed by militery body. Regular army troops would have been very often inferior to the specialized SS divisions.,which were often trained to be of highly professional capability. Incidentally It was the SS that would rot quicker in quality as the war went on. This being due to the fact that unlike the Army, the SS was allowed to draft anyone from any of the occupied countires into service. Near the end of the war SS units were often made up of draftees with poor morale and no love of Germany. In fact it was a group of SS officers which pulled off the Reichsbank robbery of 1945.
I’m also reading Guy Sajer’s “The Forgotten Soldier”. This is his memoir as a German soldier and it doesn’t really paint a picture of an overly professional, well-trained fighting force.
Have you got to the bit where he leaves the Rollbahn and joins the Grossdeutschland yet? IMO, the latter appeared to be an impressive outfit given what they were up against at the time.
Stephan: Towards the end Nazi racial doctrine was so modified by necessities of war that the Waffen-SS even had a mountain division of 20,000 Bosnian and Albanian Muslims who wore fezes. The Germans also raised a ‘Legion Indien’ of anti-British Indians, despite Hitler’s admiration of the Raj. But they were Hindus and he deprecated their martial qualities, saying they would be best put to work turning prayer wheels for victory.
A measure of the democratisation and improved class solidarity of the German land forces between the Kaiser’s time and the Fuhrer’s was that German generals and field marshals were more apt to be KIA, leading from the front, than the top brass of any other major combatant. Some party political appointees proved disastrous, such as Himmler’s brief spell running the Replacement Army, but others (e.g. Sepp Dietrich) fared well.
Stephan: Towards the end Nazi racial doctrine was so modified by necessities of war that the Waffen-SS even had a mountain division of 20,000 Bosnian and Albanian Muslims who wore fezes. The Germans also raised a ‘Legion Indien’ of anti-British Indians, despite Hitler’s admiration of the Raj. But they were Hindus and he deprecated their martial qualities, saying they would be best put to work turning prayer wheels for victory.
A measure of the democratisation and improved class solidarity of the German land forces between the Kaiser’s time and the Fuhrer’s was that German generals and field marshals were more apt to be KIA, leading from the front, than the top brass of any other major combatant. Some party political appointees proved disastrous, such as Himmler’s brief spell running the Replacement Army, but others (e.g. Sepp Dietrich) fared well.
Sajer’s book apparently has a fairly high probability of being a fake, though I must say I enjoyed it immensely when I read it and would recommend it most highly, fake or not.
It was hard work to get my father to discuss his war, but here’re 4 things he said (1) The German junior officers and NCOs were much better than ours – presumably because of their training (2) The British officers who were regulars were largely duds: all the brightest and most energetic were “civvies” (3) The American commander of whom he saw most was profligate of the lives of his infantrymen, presumably to advance his own ambitions (4) Thank God we won: “I saw Belsen”.