Strategic considerations for attack on Iraq

Part III of III

The long awaited third part on Iraq and war is different from what I originally intended. Strategic and military aspects remain important but the debate has moved on in a direction where evidence of Iraqi threat on its own does not convince. Strange since it provides the most obvious reason for war on Iraq – self-defence.

Both the US and the UK have maintained that Iraq has breached the provisions of the UN sanctioned ceasefire agreement from the Gulf War and continues to pose a military threat to the region. Prime Minister Tony Blair’s dossier on Iraq says President Saddam Hussein has the military planning to launch a weapon of mass destruction at 45 minutes’ notice.

There are other documents that deal with Iraq’s military capabilities and certainly convince me that self-defence is essential. A CSIS document Iraq’s Military Capabilities: Fighting A Wounded, But Dangerous, Poisonous Snake concludes:

It is both easy and dangerous to be an armchair field marshall. Anyone can assert how easily Saddam’s regime will collapse in the face of the slightest opposition, or produce worst case scenarios that argue against any form of attack. The reality is, however, that no one can firmly predict Iraq’s military capabilities and the uncertainties and intangibles are as important as the numbers. It is also important to remember that one key risk – Iraq’s unceasing efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction – will grow steadily worse with each year in which the UN cannot conduct effective inspections and take effective action. There are risks in not acting as well as acting.

Perhaps the best way to assess Iraq’s military capabilities, therefore, is to understand that a war might lead to extensive fighting, large civilian casualties, and significant US and allied casualties. It might involve weapons of mass destruction, and it might be far more costly than other recent wars.

This is not an argument for paralysis, but rather to avoid thinking of war as some safe and antiseptic process where other people’s sons and daughters take the risks. It is an argument against facile half-measures like arming a weak and ineffective opposition, and taking the risk that the Bay of Pigs may be followed by the Bay of Kurdistan. It is an argument against trying to do the job with limited amounts of air power or with air power alone, and without coalition allies and access to friendly bases in Turkey and the Gulf. It is an argument against trying to avoid the deployment of “decisive force” and several sustainable heavy US divisions. It is an argument against going to war without announcing clear redlines to prevent Iraq from using weapons of mass destruction, and without preparing a devastating US conventional response if it does. One does not play with poisonous snakes – wounded or not. One either kills them as safely and efficiently as possible or leaves them alone

Good stuff. Another one is IISS Strategic Dossier titled Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment, more recent and poignant:

In conclusion, war, sanctions and inspections have reversed and retarded, but not eliminated Iraq’s nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and long range missile capacities, nor have they removed Baghdad’s enduring interest in developing these capacities. The retention of WMD capacities by Iraq is self-evidently the core objective of the regime, for it has sacrificed all other domestic and foreign policy goals to this singular aim. It has retained this single objective, and pursued it in breach of the ceasefire and UN Security Council Resolutions that brought a conditional end to the 1991 Gulf War. Over more than eleven years the Iraqi regime has sought to evade its obligations and undermine support for the sanctions and inspections regime meant to eliminate its WMD capacities and contain its ambitions. Iraq has fought a relatively successful diplomatic war of attrition. It is worth recalling that the international debate 18 months ago was centred on how sanctions against Iraq might be relaxed, and inspections concluded with some dispatch in light of the dwindling willingness to support the containment policy developed in 1991.

Today, after four years without inspections, there can be no certainty about the extent of Iraq’s current capacities. A reasonable net assessment is that Iraq has no nuclear weapons but could build one quickly if it acquired sufficient fissile material. It has extensive biological weapons capabilities and a smaller chemical weapons stockpile. It has a small force of ballistic missiles with a range of 650km, that are capable of delivering CBW warheads, and has prepared other delivery methods for CBW, including manned aircraft and UAVs. Sooner or later, it seems likely that the current Iraqi regime will eventually achieve its objectives.

In compiling this Strategic Dossier, the IISS has sought to put the best available facts on this difficult issue before the wider public. This Strategic Dossier does not attempt to make a case, either way, as to whether Saddam Hussein’s WMD arsenal is a casus belli per se. Wait and the threat will grow; strike and the threat may be used. Clearly, governments have a pressing duty to develop early a strategy to deal comprehensively with this unique international problem.

Hear, hear.

Update: Just noticed Perry’s post below – not only he got there first with Tony’s dossier but also makes a similar point. Oh, well, great minds think alike.