I have been reading Derek Wilson’s book about The Plantagenets, which is a succinct, blow-by-blow history of England’s monarchs from the beginning of the reign of Henry II in 1154 to the death of Richard III at Bosworth in 1485 at the hands of Henry Tudor. It’s good. All the various blows are briskly and engagingly described. If that’s the sort of book you are looking for, look no further.
In 1471, it seemed at the time as if the fighting had ended. The chapter covering 1471-1485 begins thus (on page 259 of my paperback edition):
After half a century of governmental breakdown, baronial strife and dynastic uncertainty the country needed internal and external peace and a firm hand on the tiller, and Edward IV certainly settled things down for a dozen years. …
But as anyone familiar with Medieval English history knows, and as Wilson then of course immediately relates, the fighting wasn’t quite done. This same paragraph then continues:
… However, following his death at the age of 41 his family managed to tear itself apart, provoke fresh conflicts and pave the way for a challenge from a minor branch of the Lancastrian dynasty, something which had up to that moment seemed inconceivable.
But then, Wilson switches in his immediately following paragraph to a different story:
Beyond central politics profound changes were taking place in these years. Commerce – especially the trade in woollen cloth – flourished, and a wealthy capitalist, mercantile class emerged. Renaissance influences from the continent began to affect cultural life and provoke new patterns of thought. But most revolutionary of all was the appearance of cheap books from the new print shops, which brought the world of ideas within the reach of many more people.
Now I want to make it clear that I have no major complaint to make about Derek Wilson, or his book. His aim with it was to tell the story of the Plantagenet kings, and he succeeds very satisfactorily. What I am here regretting is the absence of a point which he might have made here, maybe in a mere couple of phrases. I am not accusing Wilson of failing to understand the point I am about to make. I am merely noting that, for whatever reason, this is a point that he does not, at this highly relevant moment in his story, make himself.
Wilson could have connected the two paragraphs above, with half a sentence which added something along the lines of: “Perhaps partly because the aristocracy were consuming their energies fighting each other rather by meddling with commerce …”, and then noted that commerce at this time flourished.
For my point is that this royal “hand on the tiller” that Wilson says the country so much needed can sometimes be rather too firm.
Wilson is right that medieval civil war, or medieval war of any kind, could be a disaster to the wider society in which it happened. A routine military method in those days was for a retreating army to wreck the countryside, burning crops and killing livestock, in order to deny these resources to an advancing enemy. That this was a death sentence to whoever lived in this devastated area may have troubled the people who inflicted such horrors, but not enough to stop them doing it whenever they were told to. Elsewhere in the book, Wilson mentions an episode of just this sort, in which the King of Scotland inflicted just this horrible fate upon great swathes of Scotland, when he was faced with an invading English army. Those medieval wars between England and Scotland were not quite the nationalist confrontations that Anglo-Scottish wars later became. They were battles between aristocratic dynasties, between “families”, in the Godfather movies sense. Civilian populations were more prizes to be contested, to be owned or failing that denied to an enemy, than the ideologically enthused participants in the contest, as they became later, for instance in the seventeenth century.
But, on the whole, England’s Wars of the Rose, as they later came to be called, were not like this. These “wars” tended to consist of relatively small armies having sometimes very bloody battles with one another, but not, on the whole, creating all that much havoc for nearby civilians, apart from the unlucky civilians whose crops or animals had been on the actual battlefield.
So, what of that mercantile class which, in Wilson’s word, “emerged” at the same time as all of this rather low level fighting? He makes it sound like an unrelated coincidence. But might there not be an element of cause and effect in operation here? Was not the very fact that all this commerce, all this development of the wool trade, was “beyond politics” perhaps one of the key things that enabled it to “emerge”?
For many people, the mere possibility that the dynastic fights of the fifteenth century might degenerate, even if only in their immediate vicinity, into something more like the English – or worse, the German – civil wars of later times, was probably enough to make them believe, as Wilson believes, that a firm hand on the tiller would be preferable to rival hands flailing at each other. But in the meantime, it surely must have helped farmers – often farmers way off the beaten tracks of the contending English armies in places like East Anglia, and merchants, and speculators, and seafairers, that the aristocrats who might have taken command of their “emerging” arrangements, who, had they been all on the same side, might have brought them into politics, and if not ruined them then at least slowed them down quite severely, instead had other things on their minds. Basically, each other. What I am suggesting is that, from the commercial point of view, the Wars of the Roses might have been quite good wars, complicated enough to divert the attentions of aristocrats away from their usual anti-commercial meddlings, yet not too widespread in their destructive effect. That the Wars of the Rose were, for some, very bad wars, I do not contest.
Wilson himself is not at all indifferent to the wider social and economic stories unfolding in the England of those times. Following his 1471-1485 chapter he adds a Postscript. In this he discusses things like the spread of printing presses and of literacy, and the associated growth of radical challenges to religious orthodoxy such as that offered by the Lollards. Would the printing presses have spread so quickly and had such impact if the political authorities had had the time and the focus to decide what they thought about all that? The subsequent behaviour of the Tudors, the dynasty that replaced the Plantagenets, who mostly succeeded in keeping their various royal hands rather more firmly on that tiller, at least suggests: not.
Wilson also notes the slow, fitful, but crucially important rise of the English legal system. Indeed, he picks the English legal system as the single most important thing that was then happening, in terms of its long term importance to England and to the wider world, during the times he has been writing about. However uncertain, that legal system surely also helped those wool farmers and wool exporters.
And with firmer Plantagenet hands on the tiller, would that legal system have developed in quite the same, relatively benign way? Again, maybe not.
it is not written about enough, that those wars were fought
by the local mafias…
I think I’d have an issue with this as a general statement, as there was still an effective feudal control of much of the population in force. Innovation and trade are difficult when it is not possible to access new resources (without paying a rent-seeker a fee) or to establish markets (which were tightly controlled much later than the fifteenth century).
The towns generally did well in this period (even if St Albans had to put up with a battle literally in the middle of it), but their success was not the lack of a strong hand so much as the fact that the merchant class had managed to establish that they themselves were the strong hand in the town. But if you lived on an estate owned by one of the large ecclesiastical institutions, you’re chances of doing anything other than meeting your work requirements and perhaps making a profit on your own produce was pretty limited (many lay landowners were starting to commute work for rent by this time which may be an improvement, but was not related to the power of the king).
In effect this was an earlier stage in the struggle for individual freedom – it was still a matter of dealing with or overcoming a local authority, rather than a national one, for those who wished to improve things (not that they’d see it that way). By the fifteenth century there was a notable class who had done this (note that in the coastal towns of England and Scotland at least there were always some of these as long as the towns have history), but it was a small minority. And some of this minority were involved in the wars to support their own interests – Edward IV’s supporters against Henry VI included the City of London for example. It was more complex than the original post implies.
I know it’s a bit of a slog, but Pareto’s study (provided one has digested most of his preliminaries)can make the conjectural reading of history of any particular segment of “elites” a mind expanding venture.
Something of similar impact may be found (by some) in the current “Bourgeois” series by McCloskey.
What has seemed to get scant attention (pace; Alan Macfarlane)is Individuality; its historic evidence and singularities amongst the peoples of England in contrast to those of the continent.
Yet, we tend to conjecture the “elites” of English times as composed of and directed by individuality, without considering just how widespread that was in the characteristics of the populations.
“An infirm hand on the tiller has its advantages”
Jeez, sounds like a Hillary Clinton campaign slogan.
Henry II was a firm hand on the tiller, was he not? And the “English legal system,” which was mostly a centrally-administered system of royal writs to override the multifarious local legal customs and procedures, was instituted in his reign.
D. Crawford-
““An infirm hand on the tiller has its advantages”
Jeez, sounds like a Hillary Clinton campaign slogan.”
Addressing Barry’s behavior,…or..uh…Bill’s?
Mayhem, havoc, and chaos, have certainly proved to be useful, but SOMEBODY always complains about the muddy cart tracks afterward.
Trigger warning: Tortured theses plagiarism
Those who “forget” history…are doomed to hear “lest we forget”, yet AGAIN! Apparently, it just hasn’t been done RIGHT yet!,…or something.
It’s easy to do history right – just do what you are doing, and you’ll be part of history soon enough…
It seems quite reasonable to say that conflict within the ruling class is all to the good, as long as only the ruling class suffers from it.
The question remains of why the Wars of the Roses did not follow the pattern of medieval war, in which the ruled classes suffered the most. Perhaps Brian, having read the book, can comment on that … and i suppose that Paul Marks will also have an informed opinion.
Some writers of the time, such as Fortescue, wanted the state to take an active role in controlling trade – and attacked the aristocrat advisers of various Kings (military men and estate managers that most aristocrats were) for the lack of interest most of them showed in government controlling international trade.
The average noble wanted to be able to buy (wine or whatever) from cheapest seller (domestic or foreign) and sell the produce of their estate(England had long been a cash economy – see Alan McFarlaine “The Origins of English Individualism” 1978, or M.M. Poston “Medieval Economy and Society” 1972) to whoever would pay the most – domestic or foreign.
How reactionary of the nobles, and of people in general.
So Fortescue proposed a council of professional (paid) government servants (people like him)to control international trade – for the mercantilist aim of reducing imports and increasing exports.
However, the Kings were a bit busy – with security matters (staying king) to devote as much time and effort to economic planning as intellectuals such as Fortescue would have wished.
“But Paul, England of the 15th century was a land mostly of serfs”
Actually it was not – not even France was, beware those who talk of “feudalism” whilst knowing bugger all about what they speak.
Even at the peak of serfdom (long before this period) most people had not been serfs – by the mid 15 century few people were.
After all what is the military use of a serf?
What any lord needed was free men – who could fight with longbow and/or pole arms (medieval infantry weapons often being evolved farm tools – sounds nice till you understand that they could cut a man in half).
Would you trust a serf with such weapons?
What a lord needed was people who would fight (to the death) for the local land – and for its lord.
For example, would risk their own lives to save him if he was in peril.
Although vast numbers of lords and children of lords died in what we call the “Wars of the Roses” (the idea that nobles spared their own kind and only killed the lowly is, to use a technical term, bullshit).
Just because vast numbers of aristocratic people died does not mean that they wanted to die.
Having a loyal population around you improved your survival chances.
Having people around you who hated you (who would shoot you in the back – or run away if things got bad) reduced your survival chances.
Only a lunatic would insist on treating all the locals as serfs.
Just as only a lunatic would seek to alienate the merchants of the towns.
Plunder for a day is fine – if you are fighting for a day.
If you are in this for the long term – for the sake of your children and grandchildren, you should try and win people over to your side.
And you do that by acting with a certain degree of lawfulness (when you can).
Loyalty had to be a two way street – even if not written, it has to be contractual.
If you want to survive – in an ARMED society
And that is what 15th century England was.
“Law was centralised”
Ah the ghost of the Victorian writer Maitland – a man to be avoided (in just about everything).
Certainly the courts of the nobles (the Manor Courts and so on) were of little importance.
However, unpaid local magistrates (usually local landowners) dominated jurisdiction of minor crimes.
Look what happened to Richard III when he tried to appoint people to interfere with the power of local landowners – a thin end of the wedge for the absolutism of Roman law?
Families like the Stanleys did not like that very much – and made their dislike very clear (in battle – killing someone is a good sign that you disagree with their policies).
Major crime – juries.
Even Fortescue noted that England was not absolute monarchy, it was a limited one.
And for most people most of the time – it was not Parliament that limited the King, it was local juries.
These no longer existed in France (they had once – a least in some areas), but they still very much existed in England.
No Royal judge could just ride in and declare people guilty of capital crimes.
And other sorts of court?
There were many.
Market courts (to settle disputes, including violent disputes, before the “dust of the marketplace” was off – see the one in Ludlow).
Church courts – still very important for many matters.
Law Merchant – important right to the end of the 18th century (when Lord Mansfield incorporated it into the Royal courts).
And on and on.
The Tudor period (after the wars were over) was to see the growth of the state.
Henry VII and his announcement of state supervision of the guilds.
And his creation of what came to be called the “Star Chamber” (not a Common Law court – far closer to absolutism).
Henry VIII – with his massive attack on the Church (especially Church property).
The vast mass of legislation that is passed down to the end of Elizabeth’s time.
In theory making everyone stay in the parish of their birth – and making every ordinary person do the job of their parents.
But, but, but.
The Tudors never really built the administrative machine to enforce their legislation.
Government (for local people) basically did not exist.
There was the local unpaid magistrates (local landowners). And the magistrate would call on local people to back him (having no one else about from the “muster of the county” – from which Americans get the word “posse” a local people turning out to enforce the law).
And there were juries for crimes.
And, errr, that was about it.
So Parliament (under the pressure of a monarch) could pass all sorts of evil and irrational statutes (Maitland lied when he claimed that Parliament had never done that), but there was no way of enforcing them, of local people choose to ignore them.
Thomas Cromwell might have built an administrative machine by which government might have translated its power mad fantasies into truly “centralised power” (this is why the left admire the swine of Wolf Hall and why he gets novels and television series in his memory).
However, the Howards (the Dukes of Norfolk) did for Thomas Cromwell.
As for the period of the Wars of the Roses (so called) – Parliament (when called) really had other things to do.
Basically declare the losing side in a battle traitors – and organise for the next round of dispute.
Most aristocrats were military men and estate managers – wanting (as I said) to buy from the cheapest source and sell to the customer who would pay the most (domestic or foreign).
And in military matters they relied on local armed people – they needed them to be loyal (it was a matter of life-and-death).
And even the most cynical man can “grow loyal” to people who risk their lives for him and his family.
Go back for someone who would go back for them.
It was different “on the continent”.
No juries (in most of Europe anyway – there were in Norway) and ordinary people did not tend to matter much in battle (again in most of Europe – not all of it).
Perhaps the last major battle of the Wars of the Roses sums it up.
Not the Battle of Bosworth – but the Battle of Stoke Bridge (a couple of years later).
The Yorkists had hired mercenary forces.
Fast, and fierce, infantry from Ireland.
And early firearm men from Germany.
The Irish charged into the English and Welsh men at arms (standing with their large “evolved farm tools”) and were cut to bits.
And the German firearm men were shot to bits by English and Welsh archers who could reload many times faster than they could.
Unless you had the support of local people in England and Wales it was really unwise to come to this island with hostile intent.
Best to just come to trade.
Small point, but possibly relevant. Edward IV (and his brothers) got particular support from the wool trade, notably when E IV was exiled in Flanders. Indeed, I seem to remember that they (and the London merchants) financed his comeback. I invite historians to correct me.
Great stuff, Paul. Words to live by.
Just to give a snapshot of a successful and beneficial English merchant of the 15th Century, Sir William Browne of Stamford in Lincolnshire, whose hospital (almshouse) still stands, and whose contribution to one of many fine local churches, All Saints, was to fund its steeple. This in a town after it was sacked by the Lancastrians in the Wars of the Roses, 1461. The benefits of trade endure.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Browne_(Mayor_of_the_Calais_Staple)
It was different “on the continent”
Depends where you look. Feudalism leading on to absolutism is the Austrian, French and Spanish model, but most of Europe took other paths.
North Italy and the Hansa towns flourished commercially, in part because they were unimpeded by strong aristocratic regimes. Unfortunately they lived in a place where major powers could fight over, and ruin, them.
However Switzerland, the Dutch part of the Low Countries, Denmark and Sweden became non-absolutist states. Belguim, Bohemia and Poland tried but for various reasons failed.
It seems to me that the central point of this post can be summed up in a pithy phrase of which I’m particularly fond: “gridlock is good.”
I very much enjoy reading Paul’s posts of the type above. He has an encyclopedic knowledge of history.
Reading the PMO (can’t be one man) posts brings to mind some notes on
the uses and effects of violence made while reading the North, Wallis, Weingast Violence and Social Orders (Cambridge University Press 2009).
The NWW work is more known for its concepts of Limited and Open Access Societies, but provides (as they say) another “framework” for interpreting recorded human history, which can broaden one’s perceptions of the flow of events.
Their studies (still ongoing, including by scholars in France and Russia) do not appear to “conflict” with other presentations of history, but point out more to be understood.
In terms of the infirm hand on the tiller, it was interesting to see how long Belgium managed to survive without an official government in 2011-12. 589 days! They also had a long period in 2007-08. Even when they do have an official government it is quite weak and gridlocked.
So it appears a modern country can survive quite well without a government for long periods.
Mr. Micklethwaite’s thesis is provocative, but not immediately persuasive. It would take a serious amount of evidence to show that violent political disorder is less damaging to commerce than bureaucratic regulation.
Well that was irritating – I wrote a long comment, but the connection went down.
I will repeat some of what I said.
I apologise to Chester Draws – I should have gone into the variations in Europe and I did not do so (I barely touched on the matter).
Gridlock……
Fine if the government is small (as it was in England and Wales in the 15th century) – utterly terrible if the government is massive as it is in the modern United States.
“Gridlock” has not prevented the entitlement Welfare State programs (and the regulations) continuing to increase.
Unless the Congress and the President are united in rolling these thing back then America is doomed (TM).
As for civil war (civil wars).
Civil war could have utterly destroyed the prosperity of England and Wales.
The wars were terrible – but they did not destroy England and Wales, not many towns were sacked (although that was no comfort to people whose town was sacked)
The wars were mainly men standing in fields shooting each other and hacking each other to bits.
England and Wales remained lands where (unlike say Sicily) the law protected the property rights of ordinary people (not just nobles) and criminal court cases were decided by juries (not Roman Law judges responsible just to the state)
And someone who decided to ignore the law and plunder as they wished – could get a longbow arrow in the face.
Paul, on serfdom, I think you discount the ongoing attempts of the nobility to extend and perpetuate serfdom. They wanted to keep people on the land so they could extract low cost labor from them. They didn’t want their captive labor pool fleeing to the cities or negotiating higher wages. You are evaluating the military benefit of free peasants over the economic benefits of serfs far higher than the actual nobility did.
The big change that occurred was the Black Death. It created a huge labor shortage that undercut serfdom. The response of the nobility wasn’t to welcome serfdom’s demise and embrace free peasantry. It was to make the king pass all sorts of laws to keep the population as servile as possible (limiting wages, prohibiting movement of labor, sumptuary laws). This, of course, lead to the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381 among other things. Eventually demographic reality won out and the nobles were forced to concede they couldn’t limit the peasants (and the War of the Roses took place after this). Of course, in Eastern Europe, the exact opposite occurred when lands that traditionally did not have serfs began to impose serfdom – it’s still unclear to me why the Polish nobles were able to succeed where the English had failed.
Chris, you engage Paul Marks in a debate about history at your own peril.
You have been warned.